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Plant Closings
The Problem and Current Policy

In the 25 years immediately following World War n, the United States
economy experienced moderate industrial and regional restructuring.
The decline of the manufacturing sector and the movement of capital
and population from parts of the North to most of the South and West
took place amidst vibrant national economic growth and relative cyclical
stability, and, consequently, went unnoticed in most parts of the coun
try. In the last 18 years, these trends have accelerated. Not only is
restructuring now occurring more rapidly than in previous decades, but
it is taking place in an environment of weaker national growth and greater
cyclical instability. In this context, it is not surprising that the loss of
manufacturing jobs and the decline of many of the older industrialized
regions have caught the attention of policy makers and academics, and
that issues surrounding worker displacement have risen near the top
of the domestic policy agenda. More and more often, manufacturing
workers seem to be the victims of plant closings and permanent layoffs
in regions and industries where employment opportunities are limited.
The aggregate numbers show that in recent years, job loss in some
locations and industries has been significant. Between 1981 and 1986,
the manufacturing sector lost 1.2 million jobs. This decline was not
shared equally by all regions and industries. During the same period,
for example, the Mid-Atlantic region lost 0.6 million jobs, while the
East South Central gained 16,000 and the Mountain states gained 31,000
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1985 and 1988). There were also struc
tural changes within manufacturing, with the skill-extensive, high-wage
industries experiencing the largest employment losses. The steel industry
lost almost 230,000 jobs; at the same time, office and computing
1
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machine manufacturing gained 94,000. While manufacturing employ
ment declined in the U.S., the service sector grew by 4.5 million jobs
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1982-83 and 1988).
Large overall employment losses in manufacturing hide the fact that
a far larger number of jobs were lost and workers displaced. For ex
ample, with the net loss of 1.2 million manufacturing jobs, estimates
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics are that approximately 2.6
million manufacturing workers, with previously stable work histories,
were involuntarily and permanently laid off between 1981 and 1986
(U.S. Department of Labor 1986).
These permanent job losses can be traumatic for the individuals af
fected. Numerous studies have documented the psychological and finan
cial costs of displacement and have found that the consequences can
be devastating for individuals and communities. Many victims of plant
closures and mass layoffs experience prolonged periods of unemploy
ment, and, if they find new jobs, they often accept a dramatic cut in
their standard of living. Medical studies have shown that dislocated
workers exhibit rates of anomie, depression, alcoholism, heart disease
and suicide that far exceed the rates in the general population. The prob
lems are particularly acute for many older dislocated workers because
they have had a stable work history (and consequently have rusty job
search skills) and a high-paying job and comfortable life style which
cannot be duplicated. Furthermore, they are less geographically mobile
and often are perceived by employers as being less retrainable than
younger workers (Gordus, Jarley, and Ferman 1981). Communities can
also face difficult adjustments after a plant closing or mass layoff. When
a large employer closes or downsizes, local governments can be hit with
a declining tax base, a rising tax burden, and reductions in the quality
of services.
The purpose of this study is to look behind net employment changes
to (1) examine the relationship between regional employment shifts and
plant closures, and (2) draw the implications of that relationship for
displaced worker policy. More specifically, this study explores four
questions.
Is regional economic restructuring responsible for high rates of plant
closures and permanent layoffs in the less competitive regions?
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What are the characteristics of the enterprises most likely to close?
Does a plant's age, size, or status as a headquarters, independent, branch,
or subsidiary affect the probability of a closure?
To what extent do adverse local economic conditions, such as high
wages, utility costs, and taxes; a unionized labor force; or shrinking
local market influence the probability a plant will close?
Do workers displaced in an expanding local labor market experience
large postdisplacement financial losses, or is economic dislocation a
problem specific to the Rust Belt economies?
The intention of this study is both to increase our conceptual under
standing of the process of economic decline and job loss, and to con
tribute to the ongoing debate on displaced worker policy.

Plant Closures and the Dynamics of Regional Change
In regional economics and regional planning literature, plant closures
are widely believed to be both cause and consequence of industrial
restructuring. When an industry shifts location, high rates of plant
closures in the less competitive region are assumed to coincide with
high start-ups in the low-cost or higher-revenue regions (see for exam
ple, Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Markusen 1985; Mansfield 1985).
Underlying causes of employment shifts to the South and West, or the
so-called Sun Belt, are changes in regional production costs,
technological change within industries, growing union strength among
regional workforces, intensified industrial competition, and declining
local markets.
Changes in relative regional production costs can alter the least-cost
location calculus for an industry. For example, the slowdown in Euro
pean immigration into New England in the 1920s caused the price of
unskilled labor to rise in the northern states. Southern and southwestern
locations, with abundant low-skilled labor from rural areas, became more
attractive to assembly line manufacturing. Second, technological change
in an industry's production process can free many industries to seek
lower input costs in new locations. For example, with the development
of steam power in the 1830s, the textile industry was no longer tied
to the inland rivers of New England, and many firms relocated toward
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the coast and the South to cut labor costs. Third, restructuring may also
be capitalists' response to growing militancy or organization on the part
of labor (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Storper and Walker 1984). Firms
may close branches, relocate operations and open new plants in the non
union areas as a strategy for keeping in check labor's demand for higher
wages and other benefits. Fourth, intensifying international competi
tion is cutting into the profit margins of many domestic companies, for
cing them to take new cost-cutting measures. One such measure may
be a move to lower-cost production sites. Markusen (1985) argues per
suasively that the steel industry would have decentralized earlier, to
be near markets and to reduce transportation costs, if not for the in
dustry's oligopolist structure, market power, and high profits. Prior
to foreign competition, the steel industry did not have an incentive to
tighten costs. Finally, the loss in local markets has led to the regional
shift of market-oriented manufacturing out of the Frost Belt.
Manufacturing industries in the process of decentralizing are generally
beyond their earliest stages of product development, and are consequently
no longer anchored to a region-specific, specialized labor force. If not
tied to a natural resource, they are free to relocate, and if they operate
in a competitive environment, they have the incentive to seek out their
most profitable location.
In order to understand the process of regional employment shifts and
its relationship to plant closures, this study examines the components
of employment change in three decentralizing industries, metalworking machinery, electronic components, and motor vehicles. These in
dustries are intended to be representative of many manufacturing in
dustries shifting out of the northern states to the South and West.
The components of employment change include plant start-ups, clos
ings, relocations and net on-site expansions. At the outset, there were
three possible findings.
(1) Industry plant closure rates and rates of worker disloca
tion are highest in the regions where the industry is exhibiting
the greatest decline.
(2) Dislocation occurs at even rates in all regions of the coun
try, but worker displacement is not a problem in growing
regions because new jobs absorb the laid-off workers.
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(3) Displacement occurs evenly in all regions, but workers
do not move easily into new firms. Consequently, displaced
workers are forced to accept dramatic losses in income, even
in growing regions.
In the first and second cases, worker displacement is an issue confined
primarily to declining economies. In the third instance, worker displace
ment is a national concern.
The findings support case 3 above, with two reservations. First, in
industries experiencing dramatic declines in employment and where plant
start-up rates are already low, as with motor vehicles, permanent layoffs
appear to be highest in the declining regions. In other words, case 1
applies. The second exception is that the youngest, best-educated, white
and female workers displaced in labor markets exhibiting strong employ
ment growth appear to make the transition to a new job with relatively
small or no income losses. In other words, for these workers, case 2
applies.

Current Public Policy to Assist Displaced Workers
Policymakers have acknowledged the high costs of job loss for the
stable worker, but a coherent federal policy is still in the formative stages.
At present, there are four policies which address some aspects of the
displaced worker problem: import protections for selected domestic in
dustries, Trade Adjustment Assistance, the Job Training Partnership
Act, and plant closing legislation.
The U.S. restricts imports of a number of commodities, with the ex
plicit purpose of protecting domestic jobs in those industries. At pres
ent, textiles, apparel, some leather products, steel, large motorcycles,
and small trucks are protected by import duties, voluntary restraints,
or import quotas. Several additional industries are protected by anti
dumping duties, including semiconductors and steel. An antidumping
case can be brought when foreign producers are found to either sell
their product in U.S. markets at a lower price than they charge at home
or sell their product in U.S. markets below cost. Trade protection is
the only major policy in force that attempts to slow structural shifts and

6
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inhibit job loss, and even this policy has become less common with time
(Goldstein 1986). Increasingly, uncompetitive industries are forced to
improve the quality of their product, cut costs, or experience major
revenue losses that lead to employment declines. The emphasis of
displaced worker policy has switched away from protecting jobs through
trade restraints to providing some adjustment assistance for workers
after layoff.
One such policy and a second form of assistance to displaced workers
is Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). TAA provides supplemental
financial assistance and a small amount of job search and relocation
assistance to workers who lose their job as a result of the liberalization
of trade. The legislation states that TAA is to be made available to
workers when imports "contributed importantly" to their separation.
The justification for this assistance, which supplements unemployment
insurance, is that it will reduce political resistance to trade liberaliza
tion and provide partial income maintenance to the workers who face
the greatest barriers to reemployment. Because of questions about the
equity of TAA, and findings that many recipients are later reemployed
by the same company, there is growing congressional pressure to phase
out TAA and shift additional resources to the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA Title HI), the third program to assist displaced workers.
JTPA Title III makes aid available to all dislocated workers, not just
those affected by trade. These funds are flexible, but the most com
mon uses are to set up plant-based job search and training assistance.
The Reagan administration has voiced support for this program, and
Congress increased funding from $223 million in 1985 to $287 million
in fiscal year 1988. JTPA's performance evaluations noted delays in
getting the money to a closing plant, shortages in funds for hard hit
areas, and lack of knowledge about the program on the part of displac
ed workers (U.S. Congress 1986).
A fourth set of policies to assist displaced workers falls in the category
of plant closing legislation. This legislation has focused on assisting
all workers affected by plant closures. Presumably, the legislation ex
cludes workers who lose their jobs through cutbacks, because a layoff
is clearly permanent when a plant closes, while it is not easy to deter
mine whether layoffs from a continuing plant are permanent or cyclical.
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The proposed legislation has been designed to both minimize the per
sonal losses and community costs of plant closures and to reallocate
the social costs of displacement to those responsible for the layoff
decision.
In some states, protections for workers have already been adopted.
Maine and Wisconsin have enacted legislation requiring employers to
give workers 60 days notice before a merger, liquidation, relocation,
or plant closure. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland and
Delaware have passed laws to promote employee ownership, and Califor
nia, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania have passed
laws providing loans and/or loan guarantees and technical assistance
for worker buyouts of closing plants (Rosen, Klein, and Young 1986,
pp. 253-254). Other states have introduced, but not enacted, bills to
require prenotification or to assist workers in buying out their closing
plant.
Legislation to shift some of the burden of large scale job losses from
workers to firms has also been introduced at the national level. In 1974,
Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota and Congressman William Ford
of Michigan introduced the National Employment Priorities Act (NEPA).
This original bill died in committee, and was unsuccessfully reintroduced
in an altered form every year until 1984. The major components of these
bills provided for employee prenotification of a closing, severance pay
to separated workers, grants and loans to failing businesses under some
circumstances, and economic redevelopment assistance to local govern
ments. In response to strong industry opposition and the bill's failure
to get out of committee, Congressman Ford, along with Congressman
Conte of Massachusetts, introduced a new bill in 1985 as a stopgap
measure. This bill required that workers be given 90 days advance notice
of a closing for plants with 50 or more employees, and was designed
to aid displaced workers until a blue ribbon commission could evaluate
the need for a more comprehensive bill. This last initiative was nar
rowly defeated on the floor of the House.
In response to a request from Congress, Secretary of Labor William
Brock established an economic adjustment and worker dislocation
taskforce, made up of representatives of industry, government and
academia. The taskforce's January 1987 recommendations call for a
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merger of the JTPA and TAA programs into a Worker Adjustment
Assistance Program, with additional spending for job search, training,
and cash assistance. The taskforce could not agree on a law requiring
mandatory prenotification of a closing for displaced workers and
communities.
In 1988, Congress again introduced displaced worker legislation. This
time it passed both Houses as part of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill.
This bill included $900 million for worker retraining, continuation of
TAA, and 60 days advance notice of a closing for firms with 100
employees or more. In mid-1988, President Reagan vetoed the bill.
While the House of Representatives mustered enough votes to over
ride the veto, an override failed in the Senate.
In contrast to the U.S. experience, the largest industrialized coun
tries outside of the United States have already instituted some benefits
for displaced workers. In Sweden, Great Britain, and West Germany,
corporations are legally obligated to give advance notice before a clos
ing and to negotiate the closing with their employee unions or workers'
councils. The extent of other protections, such as severance payments,
varies by country (U.S. Congress 1983, pp. 113-163).
In the United States, most structural adjustments are allowed to take
place with little public sector intervention, leaving workers to bear a
substantial share of the costs. In part, our reluctance to adopt a coherent
and successful policy to deal with displaced workers can be attributed
to a conservative political trend, but the effort to implement displace
ment legislation has also been hampered by a lack of understanding about
the relationship between plant closures and economic growth, about the
causes of plant closings, and ultimately about the most efficient and
effective way to help displaced workers. This study attempts to address
these issues.

Organization and Major Findings
The study is organized into five additional chapters. Chapter 2
describes the Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) data, used to carry out the
analysis in chapters 3 and 4. This data set includes establishment level
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information for the years 1973, 1975, 1979, and 1982 for three in
dustries, metalworking machinery, electronic components, and motor
vehicles. From these data, we can estimate regional and central citysuburban employment changes, subdivided by plant closures, start-ups,
relocations, and on-site contractions and expansions. Chapter 2 explores
the reliability and shortcomings of these data.
Chapter 3 examines the hypothesis that plant closures within industries
are more frequent events in the economies where the industry exhibits
the greatest decline. The chapter begins by describing the regional
distribution of employment and employment trends for metalworking
machinery, electronic components, and motor vehicles. All three in
dustries are decentralizing from the industrialized North to the Sun Belt
states. Metalworking machinery and motor vehicles are also decentraliz
ing within regions, whereas electronic components employment is grow
ing fastest in central cities. Regional employment shifts are analyzed
by their components of growth, and finally the chapter tests whether,
holding establishment characteristics constant, a plant is more likely
to close in declining than in growing economies.
Four points characterize the process of regional restructuring for the
three industries. (1) Employment shifts to the Sun Belt are not explain
ed by relatively high rates of plant closures in the Frost Belt, but by
high rates of job creation in the Sun Belt and, to a limited extent, by
plant migrations from the Frost Belt to the Sun Belt. This same pattern
also holds for intraregionals shifts in employment. Plant closure rates
are relatively even across central city, suburb, and nonmetropolitan areas,
and uneven rates of growth are explained by spatial variations in job
creation through plant start-ups and expansions. (2) After holding con
stant a plant's status as a branch, subsidiary, headquarters or indepen
dent, and its size, there is no evidence that plant closure rates vary by
location. (3) In the metalworking machinery and electronic components
industries, the number of displaced workers is substantially higher in
the older, industrialized states only because these industries are con
centrated in those states, not because of higher closure rates. (4) There
is some evidence for the 1975-79 period, in the motor vehicle industry
only, that job loss through plant closures was greater in regions with
greater industry decline. These results suggest that industrial decline

10
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may initially take the form of falling rates of job creation, which fail
to compensate for losses occurring through an average rate of plant
closures (as was found for the metalworking and electronic components
industries). When an industry's rate of job creation is already very low,
industrial decline is furthered by a rising rate of job loss through plant
shutdowns.
Chapter 4 examines the hypothesis that high wages, utility costs, and
taxes, relatively large increases in wages and utility costs, a unionized
labor force, degree of import penetration, and/or shrinking market de
mand are responsible for plant closures. While some evidence from the
metalworking machinery industry shows that the relocation of
establishments is more likely out of unionized states than nonunion states,
we find no evidence that the variables commonly believed to affect plant
closures do, in fact, have an impact. Instead, plant closure decisions
appear to reflect the strategies and idiosyncracies of individual firms.
The limited cross-industry results are similar. There is no evidence
that plant closure rates are higher in slow-growth than in expanding
industries. The only variable to consistently influence the probability
a plant will close is the plant's status as a subsidiary or branch. Branch
plants and subsidiaries are between 8 and 32 percent more likely to close
than headquarters or single plant operations.
Even with equal rates of plant closures, and, for metalworking
machinery and electronic components, permanent job loss in all regions
of the country, worker displacement may still be a regional problem,
specific to the economies where new job creation is not sufficiently strong
to absorb workers laid off by plant closures and permanent layoffs. The
analysis in chapter 5 relies on a January 1984 Bureau of Labor Statistics
survey of displaced workers to identify the labor market conditions under
which displacement is a problem. Specifically, we test the hypothesis
that worker displacement is still primarily a problem concentrated in
declining economies, because workers laid off in labor markets with
high rates of job creation successfully make the transition to a new job.
Chapter 5 argues that workers displaced in economies where the in
dustry of displacement is growing are unemployed shorter periods of
time and with smaller financial losses than workers displaced in areas
where their industry of displacement is declining; that many displaced
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workers do not move easily into growing industries after displacement;
and that many workers, especially those who are older and less educated,
experience large reductions in living standards after displacement, even
when they are displaced in a growing local labor market. We therefore
conclude that worker displacement is a national issue, especially for
older, less educated workers, and not a concern specific to the Rust
Belt economies.
These findings indicate that the commonly accepted view of the causes
of worker displacement is inaccurate and the problems of worker
displacement, so evident in the Frost Belt region, are not simply a con
sequence of regional and industrial restructuring. A worker is as likely
to be displaced in a growing region as in a declining region, and for
the industries studied, as likely to be displaced from a declining as a
growing industry. Structural shifts are, however, responsible for the
increasingly high costs of displacement. Many displaced workers do
not move easily into new occupations and industries and as a conse
quence regional realignments mean that the new, compatible jobs are
frequently in the wrong location. Furthermore, industrial shifts mean
that the skill requirements of newly created jobs do not match those
of many displaced workers. The reemployment barriers are, therefore,
particularly severe for workers displaced from shrinking industries in
stagnating or declining economies.
Chapter 6 explores several policy options for both national
policymakers and local economic development officials and argues for
increased federal support to assist in the local takeovers of closing branch
plants and subsidiaries, and for financial and adjustment assistance,
especially for older, less educated displaced workers. The study's find
ings argue against industrial policy as a means of slowing the pace of
worker dislocation, and against concessions in wages, utility bills, and
taxes as a strategy for retaining local jobs.
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The Dun and Bradstreet Data
The Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) data underlie the analysis in chapters
3 and 4. Chapter 2 examines the reliability of these data by comparing
D&B's employment estimates with those of other sources and by
evaluating the ways in which the data may bias estimates of plant clos
ings, worker displacement, and employment growth due to start-ups,
relocations, and on-site contractions and expansions.
In its role as a credit-rating company, Dun and Bradstreet collects
and maintains information on approximately 6 million establishments.
This data base, called the Dun's Market Identifiers (DMI) file, includes
a Dun's number assigned to each business establishment; the establish
ment's business address; the number of employees at that location; the
business's major Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) at the 4-digit
level; and the establishment's status as an independent, headquarters,
branch, or subsidiary.
The Urban Institute obtained a subset of the Dun and Bradstreet file
that included all establishments listing either SIC 354 (metalworking
machinery), SIC 367 (electronic components), or SIC 371 (motor
vehicles) as primary, secondary, or tertiary lines of business. To per
mit an analysis of employment changes over time, the above data were
obtained for the peak year of 1973, the recession year of 1975, the peak
year of 1979 and the recession year of 1982. The sample includes data
on 27,014 distinct establishments in SIC category 354, 14,067
establishments in SIC category 367, and 11,909 establishments in SIC
category 371.
These three industries were selected for a number of reasons. First,
their growth rates vary. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics'
Employment and Earnings, motor vehicles is a stagnant industry, with
an annual average rate of employment growth over the 1973-79 period
of 0.9 percent. Metalworking machinery is an average-growth industry,
13
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exhibiting a 2.2 percent average annual growth rate, and electronic com
ponents is a fast-growth industry, with a growth rate of 4.7 percent over
the same period. For purposes of comparison, total manufacturing
employment grew from 1973 to 1979 at an annual average growth rate
of 2.4 percent.
A second reason for selecting these industries is that all three are decen
tralizing from the industrialized northern states to the Sun Belt. Conse
quently, we could use the data to examine the process of regional decline.
Third, there is at least anecdotal evidence of a large number of clos
ings among them.
Fourth, the three industries were selected to provide a variety of in
dustry structures. Motor vehicle employment is concentrated in a few
large companies, while metalworking machinery employment, in con
trast, is dispersed among many relatively small producers.
Fifth, metalworking machinery and electronic components were
selected because the establishments in these industries are reasonably
well-represented in all of the major census regions of the U.S. (Each
region's share of national employment in the three industries is shown
in table 3.1 in chapter 3.)
A final reason for this selection of industries is that motor vehicles
and machine tools represent basic industries, whereas electronic com
ponents is considered part of the high technology sector. These crossindustry differences are more likely to capture variations in plant closure
behavior and to permit generalizations from three to many industries.

Creating the Data Set
In order to estimate plant closing rates and employment losses due
to plant closings, as well as employment changes due to start-ups, reloca
tions, and expansions or contractions, the four D&B files were merged
to create histories for each establishment.
Information from the City Reference File (CRF) of the Bureau of
the Census was then added to the merged D&B file. The CRF assigns
place descriptions to zip code areas. Thus, each establishment located
in a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) was noted as having
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a central city or suburban location. The 1977 Census definition of a
central city is used here and includes the largest city in an SMSA. One
or two additional cities may be identified as a central city on the basis
of the following criteria (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1979, p. 25).
1. The additional city or cities must have a population of one-third
or more of that of the largest city and a minimum population of
25,000; or
2. The additional city or cities must have at least 250,000 inhabitants.
The DMI file records an SMSA code for each establishment, thus allow
ing us to determine whether a firm is located in or outside an SMSA.
Suburbs, for this study, are defined as the area within an SMSA as noted
by the DMI file and outside a central city, as noted by the CRF. The
1977 boundaries are used throughout this study, in order to maintain
consistency in geographical comparisons.

Coverage
The D&B data are expected to provide reasonably complete coverage
for all types of establishments in the manufacturing sector except branch
plants. D&B collects these data for credit rating reference, and
branches are unlikely to require a credit rating independent from the
owning company. Thus D&B has been less assiduous in recording in
formation for branch plants than for headquarters or single-plant firms.
There are two ways that this underreporting of branch plants has been
handled by other users. The two major users of the D&B DMI file,
to date, are David Birch of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
and Armington, Odle, and Harris of the Brookings Institution. Both
groups worked with the complete data set, including all industries. For
headquarters, the data set includes the total number of employees in
the company and the total number of employees at that site. For singleplant firms (independents), the two numbers are the same, and for
branches the record includes only the number of employees at that site.
The Brookings team accounted for the underreporting of
branches by assuming the employment totals for the whole company,
found in the headquarters record, were accurate. They then created
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"imputed" records for missing branches. The MIT group, on the other
hand, assumed the establishment level data were accurate.
We followed the MIT group's approach because the industry of the
headquarters is not a good proxy for the industry of the missing branch
es. Jacobson (1985) offers further support for our approach. In a com
parison of establishment level data between the D&B file for Texas and
the Texas unemployment insurance file, he found underreporting of bran
ches by D&B not to be a serious problem. In addition, the Brookings
group's method of "imputing" branches overestimates employment in
the U.S. because foreign branches of domestic firms are included in
the total.
Even though employment totals may underestimate branch plant
employment, the D&B data set captures 100 percent of each industry's
employment in all regions, with one or two exceptions. Table 2.1 com
pares total regional employment estimates from the D&B data base with
total employment as estimated by the Census of Manufactures. The
employment estimates from both data sources include only those
establishments that regard each respective industry as their first line
of business. The ratios shown in table 2.1 are employment totals as
estimated by D&B, divided by totals as counted by the Census for 1982.
The ratios are disaggregated by region to detect the existence of any
regional biases in the undercounting of employment.
For metal working machinery and motor vehicles, the D&B data
estimates are higher than those of the Census of Manufactures. One
reason to expect lower Census than D&B estimates is that the figures
from the former source are aggregated from state data, and the total
for several states is suppressed to avoid the disclosure of information
about a single firm. For other states, a range of numbers rather than
an actual figure is given. When this was the case, we took the mid
point of the range. The D&B data are not subject to the disclosure restric
tions of government data sources, and thus may give a more complete
count of employment totals. Because of the high coverage, the D&B
data are treated in several parts of this study as a population total, rather
than as a sample.
The D&B data have several advantages over other data sources. First,
establishment level data permit growth rates to be partitioned into the
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components of growth, including start-ups, closings, expansions and
contractions, and migration. As mentioned above, the D&B data on
individual establishments are publicly available and confidentiality is
not an issue. Second, businesses have a commercial interest in providing
accurate information, and consequently are likely to take more care in
providing data to D&B than to the U.S. government. In spite of these
advantages, the data base has a number of shortcomings, which are ad
dressed in the remainder of this chapter.

Table 2.1
Ratio of Employment Totals from Dun and Bradstreet
to Employment Totals from Census of Manufactures 1982, by Region
Region
New England
Mid- Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Total

Metalworking
machinery

Electronic
components

Motor
vehicles

1.42
1.76
1.26
2.91
1.17
1.06
1.33
1.07
.95
1.31

1.00
.74
.94
.73
.76
1.47
1.41
.87
1.07
.96

1.21
1.31
1.19
1.03
1.40
1.46
1.26
1.39
1.31
1.23

SOURCES: Numerator=total employment as estimated from the Dun and Bradstreet File, 1982.
Denominator=total employment from U.S. Census, Census of Manufactures, Geographic Area
Series, State Books, 1982.
New England: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island.
Mid-Atlantic: New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
East North Central: Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
West North Central: North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, and
Kansas.
South Atlantic: Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, West Virginia, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.
East South Central: Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Mississippi.
West South Central: Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Oklahoma.
Mountain: Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico.
Pacific: California, Oregon, and Washington.
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Problems in Estimating Plant Closings
with the D&B Data
As with any data set, especially one not intended for research, there
are a number of shortcomings. One shortcoming of the DMI file is that
not all establishments are interviewed every year. The data sets acquired
from D&B are as they existed on December 31, 1973, December 31,
1975, December 31, 1979, and July 28, 1982, and not all firms were
interviewed during the year of the tape's date. Fortunately, the D&B
file records the date of establishment interview so that a distribution
of interview dates could be calculated. The tables were calculated by
region, so as to detect any regional biases in the updating of
establishments. The table for metalworking machinery for 1975 is shown
as table 2.2. The 1979 and 1982 results and other industry results are
similar (see Rowland 1983). We report the 1975 results because they
are the earliest year for which we have the survey date for each establish
ment. Since D&B has attempted to improve the accuracy of the data
over time, these are reported as baseline estimates. In general, we find
no regional bias and, furthermore, that about 80 percent of all
establishments are updated in a year. Only about 6 percent of the records
are more than two years out of date.
Table 2.2
Percent of Interviews Taken in and Prior to 1975
As Recorded on the 1975 D&B Tape
By Region for Metalworking Machinery
(SIC 354)

New England
Mid-Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

1967-69

1970-72

1973

1974

1975

1
2
1
1
1
0
1
1
1

5
5
4
5
4
3
5
4
5

6
5
4
4
5
2
4
4
7

8
8
8
8
10
10
8
9
10

79
80
83
82
79
85
82
83
78

SOURCE: Dun and Bradstreet DMI file, 1975.
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The failure to update records may bias the plant closing estimates
downwards. Outdated records are probably inactive firms which have
done little or no borrowing in the capital market, and we suspect that
many of them are out of business. Birch and the MIT group treated
outdated records as open and left them in the file. The Brookings group
took into account that some of the records may have been closures and
dropped out-of-date records from their analysis.
To estimate the extent to which outdated records are closings, we
attempted to track down all of the Maryland records that were more
than one year out-of-date, using both the telephone directories and the
Maryland Directory of Manufactures. As stated above, the percentage,
and therefore the number, of outdated records is relatively small. The
percent of incorrect records is shown in table 2.3.
Table 2.3 shows, for example, there were only five metal working
machinery establishments in Maryland more than two years out-of-date
in the 1982 D&B file. The November 1982 and 1984 phone books and
the Maryland Directory of Manufactures gave no evidence that four of
the five companies were still operating, resulting in an error rate of
80 percent. For metalworking machinery records that were one to two
years out-of-date, 29 percent of the 14 establishments appeared to be
closed. The remaining 71 percent had a current phone number and ad
dress. Clearly, the error rate is higher for the more dated records.
Also shown in table 2.3 is the employment error rate. There were
15 employees in the five establishments outdated by more than two years;
73 percent of those jobs were incorrectly recorded as still in existence.
The employment error rate is much lower among establishments one
to two years out-of-date. These numbers indicate that small
establishments are more likely to have outdated records in the D&B
file. According to the Maryland phone book and the Maryland Direc
tory of Manufactures, all of the out-of-date records that appeared to
be closed were independents. The few branch plants in the outdated
group were all still in existence.
A second shortcoming of the data base that affects the accuracy of
plant closing estimates is that from time to time, D&B purges out-ofdate records on establishments they believe to be closed. D&B sends
first class letters to each inactive establishment requiring information
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of their status. When no response is received, D&B assumes the
establishment is closed and retires its Dun's number. Some of these
eliminated records might actually have been moves rather than clos
ings, and the establishment might never have received D&B's letter.
Table 2.3
Percent of Inaccurately Recorded Establishments
in the D&B File, for Maryland
Percent of out-of-date
establishments incorrectly
recorded as open
(Total number)
More than
2 years
1-2 years
out-of-date
out-of-date

ESTAB
EMPLOY

ESTAB
EMPLOY

ESTAB
EMPLOY

Percent of recorded
closings found to
be open
(Total number)
Independents

Branches

All

.80
(5)
.73
(15)

Metalworking Machinery
.29
.39
(14)
(31)
.002
(3090)

0
(3)

.35
(34)
.31
(662)

.88
(8)
.88
(24)

Electronic Components
.17
.30
(12)
(50)
.02
(1064)

.19
(16)

.27
(66)
.41
(1819)

.25
(4)
.20
(5)

Motor Vehicles
.30
.25
(10)
(12)
.004
(5680)

0
(3)

.23
(13)
.55
(150)

SOURCES: Dun and Bradstreet DMI file; Maryland Phone Directories, November 1979, Oc
tober 1982, October 1983; and the Maryland Directory of Manufactures, Department of Economic
and Community Development, Annapolis, MD, 1977/78, 1979/80, 1981/82, and 1983/84.
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The MIT and Brookings researchers also recognized this problem,
but dealt with it in different ways. Birch's group at MIT assumed that
the removed firms were still operating and included them in their employ
ment counts. The Brookings group assumed the removed firms were,
in fact, closings.
To determine the extent to which purged firms were movers, we again
took all the establishments that D&B recorded in Maryland as closing
and attempted to track them down through the phone directories and
the Maryland Directory of Manufactures. A substantial number of
establishments were found to be operating after D&B dropped them
from the file (table 2.3). Most of the still operating establishments had
changed location, with only 2 out of 113 operating at the same address
recorded in the D&B file. Unfortunately, the error rate for both
establishments and employment is high, ranging from 23 to 35 percent
for establishments and 31 to 55 percent for employment.
We disaggregated these error rates by independents and branch plants
and found a higher error rate for independents than for branch plants
(table 2.3). Because it is possible that a branch could close and other
branches of the same company still show up in the Maryland phone
book or Directory of Manufactures, we made phone calls to branches
registered by D&B as closed that had a listing in one of the directories.
The error rate in table 2.3 reflects all corrections due to the closing
of one branch of a company and the continued operation of sister
branches.
The very high error rate is handled in two ways. In the analyses that
rely on aggregate totals, such as regional totals, we keep the outdated
records in the file to cancel some of the error caused by attributing a
closed status to some establishments still in operation. If Maryland is
typical of the rest of the nation, the net effect should be a slight
overestimate of establishment closings and a larger overestimate of
employment lost in plant closings.
In the analysis (in chapters 3 and 4) based on individual observations,
the focus is on establishments rather than employment. The error rate
for establishments is below that for employment. In addition, we at
tempt to avoid some of the biases caused by errors in the data by
separating branches and independents, since the error rate for branch
plants is relatively low. As shown in table 2.3, there were only three
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branches in all three industries that were incorrectly recorded as clos
ings, and there were no branches whose records were more than two
years out-of-date and who were closed. The errors among both the outof-date records and relocations recorded as closings are concentrated
in single-plant operations.
Attributing a closed status to some proportion of movers may give
the data a regional bias. Movers are most likely to be growing enter
prises that move to obtain more space. Since growing establishments
are most likely to be located in growing regions, the plant closing rates
in growing regions may be overestimated more than the rates in slowgrowth regions. Potential biases are discussed in more detail in the results
sections of chapters 3 and 4.
A third factor that may affect closing rates is a change in legal status.
D&B's procedure is for acquired establishments to keep the same Dun's
number. We did not find any evidence to suggest that recently acquired
firms were given new Dun's numbers and thus recorded as a closing
and an opening. We therefore assumed that retired numbers were in
fact closings.
A fourth problem that might affect estimates of displaced workers,
as well as estimates of employment gains or losses due to start-ups,
relocations, or expansions and contractions is coding errors in the
employment numbers. In the original D&B tape, the number of
employees was coded as YXXX, where Y is the number of zeros to
be attached to XXX. Any error in coding Y could easily distort employ
ment values by thousands of employees. To check for such errors, a
listing of all establishments that experienced employment changes of
1,500 employees or greater between any two years was printed out.
There were 1,779 establishments that fell into this category in all three
industries. These cases were reviewed by hand to check for coding er
rors. In some cases the change looked plausible. In one establishment,
for example, employment went from 7,500 to 6,000. Such cases were
left unchanged.
There were, however, cases where coding errors were obvious. For
example, one establishment was recorded as having 300,000 employees
in 1975, and 151 employees in 1979. The 1975 value was changed to
300. The number of cases where similar errors were detected and records

Dun and Bradstreet Data

23

revised was 5 cases for SIC 354, 17 for SIC 367, and 16 for SIC 371.
Where errors were not obvious, the original numbers were left
unchanged.
To determine the accuracy of estimates of displaced workers from
the D&B data, estimates from this source were compared to the estimates
derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS) of Displaced Workers
from January 1984. The comparisons are shown in table 2.4. While
the time spans of the two data sets do not precisely overlap, the figures
are annualized to facilitate comparisons. The D&B estimates cover the
period December 1979 to July 1982. The CPS estimates cover the period
January 1979 to January 1984.

Table 2.4
Comparison of Estimates of Displaced Workers
Metalworking Machinery and Motor Vehicles
(per annum)
Metalworking
machinery
Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

Motor
vehicles

D&Ba

BLSb

D&Ba

BLSb

2,557
3,436
7,623
1,019
1,112
866
627
414
1,962

127
757
4,511

282
4,378
33,123
2,515
1,881
1,282
2,881
78
3,081

836
1,560
13,494
2,102
427
1,356
1,644
213
3,313

337
921
455

SOURCES: Dun and Bradstreet DMI file, 1979 and 1982 and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplement on Displaced Workers, January 1984.
a. Includes workers displaced due to plant closings or a relocation out of state, covers the years
December 1979 to July 1982.
b. Includes workers displaced due to either plant closings or the failure of a self-operated business,
January 1979 to January 1984.
Sample too small to provide estimates.
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Data for electronic components are not included in table 2.4 because
the CPS data do not have an equivalent industrial category. It should
be noted that the CPS counts are derived from a sample, which is less
accurate in instances where the total population is small, such as for
metal working machinery employment in the West North Central, East
North Central, and Mountain states. As indicated above, the D&B data
tend to overestimate closures. Therefore, the D&B estimates on the
number of displaced workers were expected to be higher than those
of the BLS, which is often, but not always, the case. Another reason
D&B estimates were expected to exceed those of the BLS is that if a
worker intended to retire or quit at the same time his or her job was
eliminated by a plant closure, a job lost would not represent a displac
ed worker in the BLS data but would be included in the D&B estimates.
Given the differences in the ways the two data sets were assembled,
in the dates of their coverage, and between definitions of jobs lost and
displacement, the results are reasonably close and suggest that results
derived from the D&B data will be meaningful.

Problems in Estimating Start-Ups
and Relocations With the D&B Data
In spite of the problems outlined above, the closing estimates from
the D&B file are expected to be more reliable than the start-up estimates.
Dun and Bradstreet are constantly expanding their coverage of
establishments, especially branch plants, but they do not give a date
of start-up for branch plants. Therefore, it is not possible to determine
whether a branch added to the file is actually a birth or the addition
of a previously existing but unrecorded establishment. A date of incep
tion is reported for headquarters and independents.
The MIT group and the Brookings group approached this problem
in different ways. Brookings assumed that all branches added to the
file were in fact new start-ups. The only exception to this rule occurred
when a newly listed headquarters was added to the file. Then all of its
branches were also assumed to be new listings rather than births. The
MIT group, on the other hand, used statistics on employment in
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multiplant enterprises for 1967 to 1977 to estimate the likely level of
employment change due to actual branch births in the 1978-80 period.
This procedure led to estimates of branch births that were less than half
of the estimates of Brookings. Both procedures are problematic. Clearly,
Brookings includes as births many branches already in existence. The
MIT approach does not take into account the cyclical sensitivity of birth
rates.
The estimation of start-ups is further complicated by a serious under
reporting of new firm start-ups. It can be several years before a new
plant is included in the D&B file. Brookings adjusted for this short
coming by accepting any newly listed nonbranch business that was
established up to five years prior to inclusion in the file as a 1978-80
start-up. To estimate nonbranch births, Birch and the MIT group
estimated the rate at which D&B absorbed start-ups over the period 1967
to 1980. The MIT team then calculated "absorption factors" by which
recorded births must be multiplied in order to estimate actual births in
the "real world." Different absorption factors were calculated for the
five major industry groups and for different time intervals. This pro
cedure probably leads to start-up estimates that are too high, due to
the implicit assumption that D&B promptness in recording births has
not improved between 1969 and 1980 and the employment in recorded
births is the same as that in unrecorded births. 1
Our adjustment to account for underreported start-ups and the inability
to distinguish between branch start-ups and the addition of a previous
ly existing branch to the file differs from both of the above approaches.
We estimated employment growth rates for the periods 1973-75,
1975-79, and 1979-82 from the D&B data set. To calculate these growth
rates we included only those firms that registered a date of birth be
tween 1973-75, 1975-79, or 1979-82, respectively. All other
establishments that were added to the file over the three periods were
ignored. These employment growth rates were then compared with
employment growth in each industry as estimated for the same time
period by Employment and Earnings. We then assumed that any dif
ferences between the two growth rates were due to the underreporting
of births by the D&B file.
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This procedure is based on two assumptions. First, the DMI file cap
tures the same percentage of start-ups in all locations of the U.S. and
during all phases of the business cycle. Second, the divergence between
the D&B and Employment and Earnings estimates are solely due to
unreported start-ups. Using this procedure, we estimate that D&B cap
tures approximately 1 out of 7 new jobs in start-ups in the metalworking machinery industry, 1 out of 11 new jobs in start-ups in the elec
tronic components industry, and 100 percent of new jobs in start-ups
in the motor vehicle industry. It seems reasonable to find greater coverage
of new start-ups for the slower-growing industries since there are fewer
births in those industries to capture.
Another problem arose in attempting to identify each establishment
as having either a central city or suburban location. The post office is
constantly dividing zip code areas and creating new zip codes. For the
zip codes created after 1977, there were no matching location identifiers
in the 1977 CRF. Since the majority of these new zip codes were out
side SMSAs, the problem was not as serious as it might have been.
Out of 32,253 records in 1982, there were 204 establishments located
within SMSAs whose zip codes did not have matches in the CRF. These
establishments were eliminated from the central city/suburban analysis.
The number of cases in this category is sufficiently small (0.6 percent
of all establishments in SMSAs) that the elimination of these cases should
not distort the results.
A further difficulty arose in attempting to identify intrametropolitan
movers. One problem with the DMI data is that many addresses are
not legitimate street addresses. Birch (1979, p. 17) estimated that, for
all industries, about 20 percent of addresses were illegitimate. They
were names of office buildings, industrial parks, shopping plazas, or
street intersections. In other cases, addresses were abbreviated in one
year and not in another; for example, Skyline Rd was reported as the
address for one firm in 1975 and Skyline Road was reported in 1979.
Due to both of these problems, in combination with misspellings, the
matching of street addresses to determine movers was impossible. For
this reason we decided to match zip codes rather than addresses to iden
tify intrametropolitan movers. Two problems arose. First, firms occa
sionally use the zip code of the nearest post office rather than the code
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of the location of their facility. This creates a city bias in identifying
the location of establishments. Second, as mentioned above, zip code
boundaries changed over time. Consequently, it was difficult to deter
mine whether an establishment was a mover or whether its zip code
was redefined. This second problem was resolved through an editing
process carried out as follows.
According to the post office, when changes are made in a geographical
area's zip code, only the last two numbers of the zip code are affected.
In order to distinguish between an actual move and a redefinition of
zip codes, a list of firms for which the last two digits changed during
interim years and whose addresses were not the same was printed out.
Many nonmovers were included in this file. For example, in 1975 Jephco
Manufacturing had a zip code of 74135. In 1979 the code was 74112.
The address for Jephco Manufacturing was recorded as 3704 E 56th
St. in 1975 and 3704 E 56 St. in 1979. This establishment is clearly
operating in the same location. Establishments such as Jephco were
remerged with the file and flagged as nonmovers.
An exception to zip code changes affecting only the final two digits
occurred in 1980. During that year, the post office revised the last three
or four digits of a number of zip codes. Establishments affected by these
changes were accurately recorded as nonmovers.
Clearly, the use of zip codes arbitrarily includes some short moves
in the mover file and excludes others, but this should not have a substan
tial effect on the results. The study will analyze central city to subur
ban moves, SMSA to nonmetropolitan moves and interregional moves.
The number of establishments moving within a zip code district and
yet changing type of geographical place should be very small.
A final bias of the data is that it probably underestimates relocations.
Many companies, especially larger multiplant firms, often change loca
tion by setting up a branch in a new location at the same time they phase
out an obsolete plant. Capital equipment at the old site may deteriorate
as cash flows generated at that plant are shifted to finance the new plant.
When the new plant is well-established, and/or the older plant is no
longer profitable, the company finally closes the latter down. While
this process may be considered a relocation or "runaway shop," it is
counted by D&B as a start-up at the new plant and a closing of the old.
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Summary
The Dun and Bradstreet establishment data were not assembled for
academic research and therefore are flawed in several respects. In spite
of the shortcomings identified above, however, it remains the most com
plete data source for identifying spatial patterns of plant closings and
worker displacement. An understanding of the problems and biases of
the data permits a more careful interpretation of the results that follow
in chapters 3 and 4.

NOTE
1. See Johnson and Storey (1985) for a good discussion of the differences between the MIT and
Brookings adjustments to the D&B data.
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Spatial Patterns of Plant Closings,
Job Dissolution, and Economic Growth
Chapter 3 uses the Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) data to examine the
hypothesis that business closings and worker displacement are more
frequent events in slow-growth than fast-growth economies. The fac
tors that discourage the start-up of new firms and branch plants, and
lead to economic stagnation or decline, are also expected to accelerate
job dissolution. Relatively low regional profit rates caused by high local
wages, a unionized labor force, and high utility costs have been found
to discourage regional investment (Engle 1974; Carlton 1979; Schmenner
1982; Rowland 1985; and Harris 1986). These same factors should also
depress relative profit levels in existing establishments, leading to aboveaverage rates of plant closures, runaway shops,and shrinkage in on
going enterprises.
The hypothesis is tested by (1) comparing regional rates of plant clos
ings with rates of local employment growth, and (2) determining whether
plants are more likely to close in the slow-growth regions, when plant
age, status, and size are held constant.
Chapter 3 is divided into five sections. The first section describes
the regional distribution of employment along with regional employ
ment shifts. The second section presents rates of employment growth
for metal working machinery, electronic components, and motor vehicles
by regional and metropolitan/nonmetropolitan economies, and examines
the extent to which high rates of plant closure are responsible for
economic decline. This section also considers the remaining components
of growth (start-ups, relocations, and expansions or contractions) and
their role in explaining geographic differences in employment growth.
The third section examines the relationship between economic growth
and rates of job loss due to plant closings, relocations, and contrac
tions. The fourth section presents regional estimates of the number of
31
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displaced workers, and the final section reports the results of logit models
testing the impact of regional location on the probability a plant will
close, holding constant the plant's size, age, and status as a headquarters,
independent, branch, or subsidiary.
As stated in chapter 2, we use data on three 3-digit Standard Industrial
Code industries, metal working machinery (SIC 354), electronic com
ponents (SIC 367), and motor vehicles (SIC 371). By disaggregating
the data to three specific industries rather than all manufacturing, we
avoid some of the complications caused by regional differences in in
dustrial composition. For example, closing rates could be high in a region
because all industries close at high rates there, or because of that region's
dependence on industries with high closing rates. We are particularly
interested in examining how closure rates vary across regions within
a single industry. To provide background to the analyses that follow,
the first portion of this chapter describes the spatial distribution of
employment in the three industries studied and their regional employ
ment shifts.

Regional Employment Distribution and Trends
Table 3.1 shows the distribution and shift of national employment
between 1973 and 1979 for metal working machinery, electronic com
ponents, and motor vehicles. The 1973-79 growth rate was selected
because both 1973 and 1979 were peak years in the national business
cycle. The use of a peak-to-peak growth rate reduces biases in crossspace comparisons caused by variations in subnational business cycles
(see for example, Rowland 1984; Rowland and Peterson 1988). If, for
example, we took growth rates using the recession year of 1982 as the
end point, the regional shifts out of the East North Central region would
be accentuated by the severity of the 1979-82 recession in that region.
The data show that metalworking machinery employment is concen
trated in the East North Central, Mid-Atlantic and New England regions.
Electronic components employment is concentrated in the same three
regions plus the Pacific region, and motor vehicles employment is con
centrated in the East North Central region. All three industries show
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a dispersal of employment from the East North Central and Mid-Atlantic
regions to the southern and western regions, with two exceptions. The
Pacific states' share of motor vehicle employment declined, and the MidAtlantic states' share of motor vehicle employment increased. New
England's share of national employment in the three industries remained
constant over time.
Table 3.1
Regional Distribution of National Metalworking Machinery,
Electronic Component, and Motor Vehicles Employment, 1973-79
(Percent)

New England
Mid-Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Total

Metalworking
machinery
1973
1979

Electronic
components
1973
1979

Motor
vehicles
1973
1979

15.1
19.6
48.1
3.6
4.5
2.1
1.6
.5
5.0
100

11.1
30.1
19.7
4.5
4.9
2.1
6.6
2.0
19.0
100

1.4
10.3
66.9
4.5
5.1
3.0
2.7
.3
5.8
100

15.0
16.2
46.6
4.8
5.1
2.7
2.6
.9
6.1
100

11.1
20.5
15.9
4.0
7.3
2.7
6.6
4.8
27.2
100

1.4
11.4
60.8
7.2
5.2
4.4
3.8
.4
5.3
100

SOURCE: The Dun and Bradstreet DMI file, 1973 and 1979.
New England: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island.
Mid-Atlantic: New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
East North Central: Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
West North Central: North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, and
Kansas.
South Atlantic: Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, West Virginia, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.
East South Central: Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Mississippi.
West South Central: Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Oklahoma.
Mountain: Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico.
Pacific: California, Oregon, and Washington.

Table 3.2 shows the distribution of employment across central cities,
suburbs and nonmetropolitan areas. Both metal working machinery and
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motor vehicles establishments are primarily concentrated in central cities,
and electronic components employment is primarily located in suburbs.
Both metalworking machinery and motor vehicles employment have
become more decentralized over the period, whereas electronic com
ponents employment is becoming more centralized.
Table 3.2
Percent of Employment in Central Cities, Suburbs
and Nonmetropolitan Areas, 1973 and 1979
Metalworking
machinery
1973
1979

Central cities
44 .9
Suburbs
37 .7
Nonmetropolitan areas 16 .9
Total
100

40 .2
42,.7
16.,9
100

Electronic
components
1973
1979

Motor
vehicles
1973
1979

34. 8
51. 1
14. 1
100

52,,3
33,,0
14.,7
100

35,.3
53,.5
11,,0
100

46.5
35.1
18.5
100

SOURCE: Dun and Bradstreet DMI file, 1973 and 1979.

Growth Rates by Components of Growth
One of the major strengths of the Dun and Bradstreet data is that they
can be used to disaggregate employment growth into the components
of change, including employment gains or losses due to (1) establishment
start-ups, (2) closings, (3) expansions and contractions, or
(4) relocations. Table 3.3 subdivides employment growth rates for the
regions by these four components of change and ranks the regions by
their employment growth rates, from the slowest- to fastest-growing
regions. The data in table 3.3 are graphed in figures 3.1 through 3.3,
again with the regions ranked by growth rate from the slowest- to fastestgrowing regions. Four generalizations may be derived from these figures.
First, there is a positive association between regional growth rates
and employment growth due to start-ups and net expansions. In general,
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the regions experiencing rapid metalworking machinery and electronic
components employment growth appear to be doing well primarily
because of the high rate of new business formations in those regions.
The regions experiencing high rates of motor vehicles employment
growth appear to be doing well because of their high rates of expan
sions. Second, there is no evidence of a relationship between employ
ment loss due to closings and regional growth rates. In other words,
the slow-growth regions do not appear to be growing slowly, or declin
ing, because of high rates of plant failures or shutdowns. Third, the
fast-growth regions tend to experience greater employment gains due
to net expansions than the slow-growth regions; and fourth, while the
migration pattern behaves as expected, with the northern regions ex
periencing net outmigration and the South and West experiencing net
inmigration, these shifts do not play an important role in regional growth
and decline.
These conclusions are supported by the results of three simple regres
sion equations, where employment growth is regressed against com
ponents of growth. The equations are as follows:
1) G^a+jSjCr+jSjDM+jSaDE
2) Gr =a+j81 Sr +j82DM+j83DE
3) G^a+ftEr+fljDM+jSaDE
where: G=annual average rate of employment growth.
C= annual average rate of job loss due to plant closures.
S= annual average rate of job gains due to plant start-ups.
E=annual average rate of job gains (or losses) due to net ex
pansions or contractions.
DM=dummy variable for metalworking machinery.
DE = dummy variable for electronic components.
The jSj coefficients and their respective t-statistics are reported in table
3.4. The results reported in table 3.4 further support the argument that
regional variations in industry growth are the result of variations in job
creation due to plant start-ups and net expansions and not the conse
quence of regional variations in plant closures.
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Table 3.3
Regional Growth Rates by Component of Employment Change, 1973-79
Annual Average Percent
Regions are Ranked by Industry Growth Rate from Slowest to Fastest Growth
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Metalworking Machinery

Start-ups
Closings
Net Expansion
Net Migration

MidAtlantic

New
England

East
North
Central

West
North
Central

1.6
-3.0
-0.8
0.3
-1.9

1.4
-2.3
0.4
-0.5

2.6
-3.0
0.7
-0.1

3.7
-3.3
1.5
0.1

-1.0

0.2

2.0

I

Pacific

South
Atlantic

East
South
Central

West
South
Central

Mountain

All
U.S.

4.7
-4.4
1.7
0.6

4.3
-2.9
1.1
0.3

4.2
-2.5
1.9
0.1

10.6
-4.6
2.7
.0

10.3
-3.5
2.6
0.1

2.7
-3.0
.5
.0

2.6

2.8

3.7

8.7

9.5

.2

All
U.S.

Electronic Components
MidAtlantic
Start-ups
Closings
Net Expansions
Net Migration

2.4
-4.2
-0.8
.0
-2.6

West
North
Central

East
North
Central

West
South
Central

New
England

South
Atlantic

Pacific

Mountain

East
South
Central

3.0
-4.0
0.6
.0

4.1
-3.2
0.6
-0.3

3.6
-4.2
2.9
0.2

4.8
-3.3
1.2
0.1

6.2
-4.3
1.8
0.1

5.9
-4.5
2.5
0.1

8.9
-2.8
3.7
-0.2

17.5
-1.6
1.7
0.1

4.5
-3.9
1.1
.0

-0.4

1.2

2.5

2.8

3.8

4.0

9.6

17.7

1.7

Motor Vehicles

Start-ups
Closings
Net Expansion
Net Migration

Pacific

Mountain

East
North
Central

0.5
-4.2
0.8
.0
-2.9

1.6
-4.3
-0.1
0.0
-2.8

0.1
-2.4
-0.5
.0
-2.8

MidAtlantic

South
Atlantic

New
England

West
South
Central

West
North
Central

East
South
Central

0.2
-2.1
-0.3
.0
-2.2

0.3
-2.4
0.5
0.1
-1.5

0.5
-2.2
0.2
0.4
-1.1

1.0
-3.4
1.8
0.1
-0.5

0.3
-1.8
2.2
0.1

0.3
-1.5
2.5
-0.1

0.8

1.2

All
U.S.
.2
-2.4
-.1
.0
-2.3

SOURCE: Dun and Bradstreet Data, 1973 and 1979.
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Regional Growth by Components of Growth, 1973-79
Ranked from Region with Slowest to Fastest Industry Growth
Figure 3.1
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Regional Growth by Components of Growth, 1973-79
Ranked from Region with Slowest to Fastest Industry Growth
Figure 3.3
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Finally, although these general patterns hold, there are exceptions.
For example, the Pacific region experienced higher rates of metalworking
machinery employment growth due to start-ups than the East South Cen
tral and South Atlantic regions, yet the Pacific region experienced slower
aggregate growth due to this region's higher rates of employment losses
in plant closings (see table 3.3).
Table 3.4
Results of Regressions, Regional Growth on the
Components Growth, 1975-1982

Coefficient
t-statistics

Closings

Start-ups

Net expansions

1.53
(1.70)

1.20*
(15.00)

2.27*
(3.98)

SOURCE: From data reported in table 3.3. Calculated from the Dun and Bradstreet Data.
* Statistically significant at the .01 percent level of confidence.
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The data are partitioned in a similar fashion for central cities, suburbs,
and nonmetropolitan areas in table 3.5. Figures 3.4 through 3.6 show
the components of growth, again ranked from the slowest- to fastestgrowth areas. The data indicate that metalworking machinery employ
ment is growing fastest in the suburbs, electronic components employ
ment is growing fastest in central cities, and motor vehicle employment
is growing fastest in nonmetropolitan areas.
Table 3.5
Annual Average Employment Growth Rates
in Central Cities, Suburbs, and Nonmetropolitan Areas, 1973-79
Metalworking machinery
Start-ups
Closings
Net expansions
Migration
Total

Start-ups
Closings
Net expansions
Migration
Total

Central City Nonmetropolitan
4.9
4.3
-5.7
-7.0
2.9
0.5
-0.2
-0.2
-1.9
-2.4

Suburbs
7.1
-5.4
1.9
0.4
4.0

Electronic components
Central City
Suburbs
Nonmetropolitan
10.4
8.9
6.3
-7.3
-8.1
-8.3
3.5
2.3
2.1
-0.9
-0.9
0.4
-0.8
5.7
3.5
Motor vehicles

Start-ups
Closings
Net expansions
Migration

Central City
0.3
-4.8
-0.9
-0.2

Total

-5.6

SOURCE: Dun and Bradstreet DMI file, 1973-79.

Suburbs
0.5
-5.2
0.7
0.3
-3.7

Nonmetropolitan
0.6
-4.1
2.7
0.0
-0.8
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Intraregional Growth by Components of Growth, 1973-79
Ranked from Region with Slowest to Fastest Industry Growth
(Annual average percent)
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For all three industries the intraregional pattern is similar to the
regional pattern in that high industry growth rates are explained by high
start-up rates and, for motor vehicles, by expansions rather than by low
rates of employment losses due to plant closures. Again, there is no
evidence that rates of job loss due to plant closures are higher in slowgrowth than fast-growth regions.
David Birch used the total D&B file, including establishments from
all sectors, to examine the regional pattern of employment growth by
components of change. Birch's work covers the time period 1969 to
1976, and he disaggregates the data into the four major regions of North
East, North Central, South, and West. Birch reports three findings
similar to ours. One, that the rate of job loss through closures and onsite contractions is fairly constant across regions, approximately 8 per
cent per year between 1969 and 1976. Two, that the difference in growth
rates between fast- and slow-growing regions appears to lie in the rate
of job creation due to expansions and births of new firms. And three,
that interregional migration accounts for an insignificant percentage of
regional employment change (Birch 1979). In spite of different ad
justments to the basic D&B data base (some of which are described
in chapter 2) and their coverage of different years, these findings are
also supported by the Brookings studies (Armington and Odle 1982a).
The similarity in our results indicates that Birch's and the Brookings
Institution's results hold when the data are disaggregated by industry
and that our findings can be generalized to most industries.

Regional Rates of Job Loss
This section looks specifically at how important plant closings are
in total employment loss and estimates rates of total job loss by region.
Table 3.6 and figures 3.7 through 3.9 show rates of job loss by the
nine census regions. Job loss is defined here as those employment losses
by either a plant closing, the contraction of a continuing establishment,
or the relocation of a plant out-of-state. Job loss may approximate, but
is not equivalent to worker displacement. First, when a plant is relocated
some employees move with the enterprise. Second, workers laid off
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an on-going business may be rehired. Third, a job may be lost but no
displacement occur because of attrition.
To minimize the inclusion of temporary layoffs in the number of jobs
lost due to establishment contractions, the estimates in table 3.6 include
only the expansionary period, 1975-79. Workers laid off during a reces
sion, such as occurred from 1973 to 1975 or 1979 to 1982, are more
likely to be cyclically unemployed than workers laid off during an
economic expansion.
The regions in figures 3.7 through 3.9 are again ranked by industry
growth rates. In all industries, plant closings are responsible for the
majority of lost jobs. A relatively small proportion of jobs appear to
be lost due to plant outmigrations.
For the metalworking machinery and electronic components industries,
rates of job loss are no higher in the slow-growth than the fast-growth
regions. This conclusion would hold even if the definition of displace
ment were limited to plant closures and excluded relocations and
contractions.
The pattern for motor vehicles is different. As shown in figure 3.9,
jobs lost due to plant closures, contractions, and relocations are greater
when the regional growth is slower. Contrary to the findings reported
in table 3.3 and figure 3.3 from the years 1973 to 1979, this associa
tion is due in large part to the higher rates of job loss due to plant closures
in the slow-growth regions. The motor vehicle industry may behave
differently from metalworking machinery and electronic components
for the following reason. When industry employment shrinks in a region,
it may first contract by the failure of job gains from start-ups to replace
job losses due to an average rate of closings. As the industry declines
even further, and the start-up rate is already very low, further industrial
decline must occur through rising closure rates.
The 1975-79 motor vehicle results may differ from those of 1973-79
because start-ups may have originally fallen during the 1973-75 reces
sion. As this industry continued to decline during the 1975-79 national
recovery, there were few industry start-ups to absorb further economic
decline.
To summarize, in the years 1975 to 1979, the rate of motor vehicle
job loss was greater in the regions where motor vehicle employment
was declining, but this pattern did not hold for the metalworking

Table 3.6
Employment Losses by Reason, 1975-79
Annual Average Percent
Growth Rate from Slowest to Fastest Growth
Industry
by
Ranked
are
Regions

C/3
13
&.

E.
"0

Metalworking Machinery

Closings
Contractions
Relocations*

MidAtlantic

New
England

East
North
Central

West
North
Central

-5.2
-4.7
-0.1

-2.6
-2.7
-1.5

-5.2
-2.4
-0.3

-10.0

-6.8

-7.9

-4.4
-1.8
.0
-6.2

Pacific
-7.0
-1.4
-0.1
-8.5

South
Atlantic
-4.5
-1.0
.0
-5.5

East
South
Central

West
South
Central

Mountain

-3.5
-0.8
-0.4

-7.0
-1.2
-0.1

-9.3
-0.8
-0.1

All
U.S.
-4.9
-2.7
-.4

-4.7

-8.3

-10.2

-8.0

East
South
Central

All
U.S.

Electronic Components

Closings
Contractions
Relocations*

MidAtlantic

West
North
Central

East
North
Central

West
South
Central

New
England

South
Atlantic

Pacific

Mountain

-4.3
-5.0
-0.1

-6.8
-2.6
-0.1

-6.0
-2.4
-0.7

-10.3
-4.6
.0

-6.0
-2.7
-0.1

-8.2
-0.9
-0.3

-8.6
-3.0
.0

^.0
-2.4
-0.8

-9.4

-9.5

-9.1

-14.9

-8.8

-9.4

-11.6

-7.2

-1.5
-1.0
.0
-2.5

-6.6
-3.4
-.2
-10.2

i

Motor Vehicles

Closings
Contractions
Relocations*

Pacific

Mountain

East
North
Central

-7.9
-1.8
-0.1

-5.1
-2.8
.0
-7.9

-4.9
-4.5
.0
-9.4

-9.8

MidAtlantic

South
Atlantic

New
England

West
South
Central

West
North
Central

East
South
Central

-3.3
-4.6
-0.1

-3.9
-1.0
-0.2
-5.1

-5.0
-1.2
.0
-6.2

-3.2
-2.0
.0
-5.2

-2.1
-1.4
-0.2

-8.0

-2.6
-4.4
.0
-7.0

-3.7

All
U.S.
-4.6
-3.8
.0
-8.4

SOURCE: Dun and Bradstreet DMI file, 1975 and 1979.
*Plant out-migration only.
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Employment Losses by Reasons, 1975-79
Ranked from Region with Slowest to Fastest Industry Growth
11
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machinery and electronic components industries, where there is no
evidence of a correlation between economic decline and job loss.

Numbers of Jobs Lost By Regions
Another issue relevant to state and federal policymakers concerned
with plant closing legislation is where displaced workers are concen
trated. The numbers of displaced workers are highest in the regions
with the largest employment base (see table 3.7). For example, the East
North Central region, with the largest share of national metalworking
machinery employment, lost nearly 80,000 jobs between 1975 and 1979,
whereas the Mountain region, the area with the lowest percent of na
tional metalworking machinery employment, lost only an estimated 1,542
jobs during this period. The region experiencing the largest losses in
electronic component employment was the Pacific region (87,000 jobs),
and while the largest motor vehicle employment losses were in the East
North Central region (299,107 jobs).

Regional Variations in Plant Closing Rates
and the Structure of Local Economies
Surprisingly, there is no evidence of a negative relationship between
rates of job loss (due to plant closings, relocations, or contractions) and
economic growth in the metalworking machinery and electronic com
ponents industries. There is, however, some evidence that, during the
1975-79 expansion, rates of worker displacement in the motor vehicle
industry were highest in the regions where motor vehicle employment
growth was slowest.
In this section, we test the hypothesis that regional variations in plant
closure rates exist, but are hidden by differences in the age, size and
status composition of establishments in the regional economy. For ex
ample, headquarters of a given size and age may close at lower rates
in the Sun Belt than the Frost Belt, but the Sun Belt regions may still
have a high overall closure rate. The reason is that a large proportion
of Sun Belt employment could be in new, small plants and in branch

Table 3.7
Number of Jobs Lost, by Region, 1975-79
New
England

MidAtlantic

East
North
Central

West
North
Central

South
Atlantic

East
South
Central

West
South
Central

w
Mountain

Pacific

All
U.S.

Metalworking Machinery
Closings
Relocation
Contractions
Total

8155
4578
8635

21741
598
19671

52763
2705
24256

3229
25
1305

4020
0
872

1536
26
369

2059
20
341

1415
0
127

7207
50
1433

102125
8002
57009

21368

42010

79724

4559

4892

1931

2420

1542

8690

167136

Electronic Components
Closings
Relocation
Contractions
Total

20557
203
9412

32094
1066
37439

31302
3660
12326

9184
79
3523

11978
480
1327

808
5
520

24531
22
1101

2541
490
1564

64425
23
22579

197420
6028
89791

30172

70599

47288

12786

13785

1333

25654

4595

87027

293239

Motor Vehicles
Closings
Relocation
Contractions
Total

1719
23
2908

15777
396
22137

155223
745
143139

6729
17
4340

8596
351
2103

3170
250
2011

5604
12
1336

756
5
414

21123
275
4747

218697
2074
183135

4650

38310

299107

11086

11050

5431

6952

1175

26145

403906

SOURCE: Dun and Bradstreet DMI file, 1975 and 1979.
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plants and subsidiaries that close at higher than average rates. Here we
test whether the closure rates of similar types of plants vary across the
regions.
Closing rates are expected to be particularly high for new firms, small
establishments, and branch plants and subsidiaries. Opening a new
business is a risky venture. The perceived market may not exist or may
not be large enough to sustain the new enterprise. Another common
reason new firms fail is that many entrepreneurs do not have sufficient
capital to sustain the company through several years of losses. Banks
are less likely to lend money to companies without a proven track record,
and new companies are generally too small for other sources of capital,
such as public capital markets, private stock sales, or bond placements.
Thus, regional economies with a high proportion of employment in new
firms should, all other factors held constant, experience relatively high
closure rates.
Small companies also experience relatively high closing rates. Small
firms have limited access to financial capital and are therefore more
likely to be forced out of business than larger firms when personal
sources of revenue or retained earnings run short (Litvak and Daniels
1979). In addition, during bad economic times larger establishments
can contract, whereas smaller establishments close. Thus, regions with
a high proportion of employment in small establishments may also ex
perience higher rates of plant closings.
A number of authors have speculated that branch plants and sub
sidiaries provide a less stable employment base than single-plant enter
prises. One theory is that managers of multiplant firms allocate capital
more efficiently and rationally than managers of single-plant firms and
therefore are quick to close branch plants that do not yield sufficiently
high rates of return. A second theory argues that large corporations are
more likely to mismanage acquisitions, resulting in losses and, ultimately,
in closings.
Disinvestment and plant shutdowns may occur more readily in
multiplant than single-plant firms because managers of the former have
a wider scan of investment possibilities. First, the managers of multiplant
firms can easily shift cash flows among branches and subsidiaries.
Williamson (1975, pp. 147-148) argues that one of the greatest advan-
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tages of multidivisional firms is that capital allocation is more efficient
internally than in capital markets external to the firm. A multidivisional
firm has good information about all of its branches and divisions and
therefore can assign cash flows to high yield uses, phasing out, divesting
itself of, or closing less profitable operations. In addition, managers
of multiplant and multidivisional operations have the expertise and staff
to carry out a wide-ranging search outside the firm for more profitable
sites or ventures, again phasing out less profitable activities.
The single-plant manager faces a more limited range of alternative
investments because the cost of identifying and taking advantage of new
investment opportunities is high. Single-plant firms probably do not have
the staff to search out new ventures, and they are less likely to have
the skills to operate a new line of business even if the opportunity were
identified. Thus many small business people will probably continue to
invest in and operate ventures that a multiplant firm would shut down
(Cyert and March 1963; Hymer 1972, p. 120; Storper and Walker 1984).
In addition, small entrepreneurs will be more likely to keep a plant
operating when its profits fall below those of alternative investments
because they draw a salary from the business and live in, derive status
from, and have a commitment to the community where the business
is located. Noneconomic benefits, therefore, may compensate the small
entrepreneur for lower rates of return (Westaway 1974, p. 151; Dicken
1976, pp. 404-405; Erickson 1976; McGranahan 1982).
Evidence of plant closures in Philadelphia supports the view that
branch plants or multibranch and multidivisional firms demand higher
rates of return to operate than do single-plant enterprises. Hochner and
Zibman (1982, pp. 204-205) found that over a 10-year period, indepen
dent firms did not close until their sales revenues failed to keep pace
with inflation. National corporations closed firms that had average sales
increases which kept pace with inflation, and multinational corpora
tions closed branches that experienced average sales growth rates sur
passing the inflation rate.
Another school of thought explaining why subsidiaries and branches
are more susceptible to shutdown than single-plant operations contends
that plant disinvestments and shutdowns occur where rates of return
are low relative to alternative investment possibilities. In this model,
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private firms are often responsible for the low return of their branches
and subsidiaries. In the most recent merger movement, companies are
spending human and financial resources to acquire and divest themselves
of existing businesses in order to improve the "bottom line" of their
balance sheets. This "paper entrepreneurism" diverts resources from
research and development on new product lines and production methods,
from the development of new, more efficient management techniques,
and from investments in state-of-the-art technologies. This short-run
approach to improving profit performance has led to falling rates of
profits in many branches and subsidiaries, resulting, in many cases,
in their closing (Reich 1983).
In addition, corporations frequently acquire businesses in which they
have little operating experience. As a result, a once profitable acquisi
tion may be poorly managed, become unprofitable, and ultimately be
closed (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, pp. 151-159). For example, profits
in the New England Provision Company, a meat packing plant, began
to decline shortly after its acquisition by LTV. It was estimated that
management fees, inept management hired by LTV, and required pur
chasing from other holdings of LTV cost the plant an additional
$325,000. Consequently, the New England Provision Company was
eventually closed. In another case, Clinton Colonial Press was acquired
by Sheller Globe in 1974 during the purchase of Clinton's parent com
pany, an auto parts business. Lacking interest and management exper
tise in the printing business, Sheller Globe closed the plant in 1976 (C
and R Associates 1978, p. 49).
Alternatively, McKenzie (1982) predicts that branches and subsidiaries
are less likely to close than single-plant operations. He argues that con
glomerate ownership should lead to the continued operation of many
plants that would close under local ownership. A locally-owned firm,
with limited access to capital and without a cushion of profits from other
product lines on a different business cycle, might be forced to close
a temporarily unprofitable plant for lack of funds to carry it through
a financial storm. A conglomerate would spread the losses over a number
of varied ventures enabling it to subsidize temporarily unprofitable plants
and adding to job stability.
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The evidence on the instability of branch plant employment is mix
ed. Evidence from Great Britain shows that branches are not particularly
susceptible to closure (Townroe 1975). Erickson's (1980) findings are
similar. He studied branch plant closings in rural Wisconsin and found
that the annual closure rate among branches between 1959 and 1977
was 3.3 percent. This figure compares favorably with an average an
nual closure rate for all firms in the U.S. economy of 8 percent.
Other authors have found contradictory results. Barkley (1978) found
that, over the period 1965-75, branch plants in rural Iowa were more
likely to close than locally-owned plants, and Bluestone and Harrison
found that corporations and conglomerates together were reponsible for
a disproportionate share of job loss through plant closings in New
England (1982, p. 34). Barkley's and Bluestone and Harrison's findings
are consistent with the findings presented here.
The distribution of new firms, small establishments, and branch plants
and subsidiaries should vary across local economies for several reasons.
First, as shown above, fast-growth economies have relatively high plant
start-up rates. Thus, fast-growth economies should have a relatively
high percent of employment in new firms. Second, Armington and Odle
(1982b) found small firms to be larger contributors to growth in the
slow-growth regions. They present, as one explanation, the fact that
large business expansion plans may dominate the short-run supply of
labor, locations, and capital and squeeze out small firms in the fastgrowth regions. In the less competitive economies, small firms fill the
gap left by the retreat of the larger companies. Finally, a number of
authors have argued that southern economies are more dependent on
branch plant employment than northern economies. According to this
argument, economic growth in the southern states is due, in large part,
to the expansion of northern firms into the southern economy.
Data from the Dun and Bradstreet file indicate that the phenomenon
of southern branches controlled by Frost Belt headquarters is signifi
cant. Birch (1979, pp. 45-46) found that over the period 1960-1976,
Frost Belt firms controlled nearly 70 percent of the South's net job growth
in manufacturing. Analyzing data on the computer industry, Hekman
(1980, p. 12) found that New England and the Mid-Atlantic states were
more likely to be home to headquarters than branches and that the South
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Atlantic and South Central regions had few headquarters relative to the
branches they contained.
Southern economies may be relatively dependent on branch plant
employment for two reasons. First, the product-cycle model implies
that the South will have high concentrations of branch plants in mature
industries. Routinized production processes and standardized products
can be produced where workers are low-skilled and produced more
cheaply where wages are low, i.e., the southern states. In addition, firms
producing market-oriented products may have also spun off branches
to the South to take advantage of expanding markets in this region
resulting from above-average population and employment growth. Head
quarters of both production-oriented and market-oriented firms are ex
pected to have remained in the metropolitan areas of the Frost Belt and
Pacific regions to retain access to financial markets, to benefit from
agglomeration economies, and to operate in proximity to a skilled labor
pool (Hymer 1972).
To test the extent to which plant closing rates vary across the regions,
we estimate a model predicting the probability a plant will close, based
on its regional location, and its size, status as an independent, head
quarters, branch, or subsidiary, and its age. The model is estimated
with a logit procedure. The logit model is appropriate for cases where
the dependent variable is binary (0-1). In this case the dependent variable
takes on the value of 1 when an establishment closed and 0 when it
did not. The parameters are maximum likelihood estimates. Regional
locations and establishment status enter the equations as dummy
variables. New England is the reference economy for the regional dum
my variables. Independent establishment is the reference catagory for
the status dummy variables.
Three models are estimated. One includes just the regional dummies
and tests the hypothesis that regional location influences the probabili
ty a plant will close. The second model includes, in addition to the
regional dummies, the size and status of the plant. The third model in
cludes only single-plant firms. This model is estimated to test the im
pact of age on the probability a plant will close. The age variable could
not be included in the equation estimated with all establishments, since
dates of birth are not available for branch plants.
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The models are estimated with D&B data from the 1975-82 period.
This period is one mil business cycle, including the 1975 to 1979
expansion and the 1979 to 1982 recession. These data also capture the
most recent years in our data set. Data from the more recent cycle is
preferable, since the DMI file has become more accurate with time.
The results of the three models are presented in tables 3.8, 3.9 and
3.10, respectively. In all three tables, the regional results are similar,
whether or not we control for the status, age, and size of establishment.
In table 3.8, the significant coefficients indicate plants in the Sun Belt
are more likely to close than plants in the Frost Belt for the metalworking machinery and electronic components industries. In all three in
dustries, there is only one case where the coefficient is significant and
of the expected sign. This is in the motor vehicles equation, where the
coefficient on East South Central is negative, indicating that the pro
bability of a closure is lower in the region where motor vehicle employ
ment is growing most rapidly.
Table 3.9 presents the results when plant status and size are held con
stant. The results indicate that, as hypothesized, larger establishments
are less likely to close than smaller establishments. The coefficients for
this variable are statistically significant at very high levels of confidence.
Headquarters appear to close at about the same rate as independents
in the metalworking machinery industry, but at lower rates than in
dependents in the electronic components and motor vehicles industries.
Both branches and subsidiaries are more likely to close than in
dependents. The coefficients on these variables are not only large relative
to all other coefficients, but are significant at very high levels of
confidence.
Table 3.10 reports the results for single-plant firms (independents)
only. Older independents are more likely to close in the metalworking
machinery and electronic components industries, but not in the motor
vehicle industry. Size is statistically significant in all three industries,
with large firms less likely to close than small firms. Again, when the
regional variables are statistically significant they show higher plant
closer rates in the faster-growth Sun Belt economies.
We estimated the same equations for each industry for the periods
1975 to 1979 and 1979 to 1982. Breaking the data into recession and
expansion does not alter the general conclusion that closing rates tend
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to be slightly higher in the faster- than in the slower-growth economies.
We also estimated the equation with dummies for central cities, suburbs,
and nonmetropolitan areas in each region. This was done to determine
the extent to which regional aggregates were masking variations in plant
closing rates within regions. These results are reported in appendix 3.1
and do not alter the conclusions reached here.
Table 3.8
Logit Estimates of the Probability of a Plant Closing
by Region, 1975-82
Independent
variables
Constant
Mid-Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
No. of observations
Fraction of pairs where
predicted=actual response

Metalworking Electronic
machinery components
-.49*
-.02
(99.03)
(.12)
-.15**
.03
(.26)
(2.97)
-.11*
.01
(4.13)
(.03)
.01
-.002
(.00)
(.00)
.31*
.14
(10.72)
(1.36)
.10
.18
(.78)
(.65)
.57*
.27*
(26.45)
(4.42)
.56*
.09
(14.32)
(.34)
.32*
.08
(19.92)
(1.01)
14745
6372
.40

.40

Motor
vehicles
-.11
(.86)
.02
(.03)
-.05
(.17)
-.08
(.31)
-.02
(.01)
-.40*
(5.40)
.04
(.09)
.01
(.00)
.13
(1.03)
6402
.45

Figures in ( ) are Chi-square statistics.
*Significant at the 5 percent level of confidence or greater.
**Significant at the 5 to 10 percent level of confidence.

The apparent inconsistency, in the motor vehicle industry, between
even closure rates across the regions and uneven rates of job loss due
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Table 3.9
Logit Estimates of Plant Closings
by Region and Status, 1975-82
Independent
variables
Constant
Size
Headquarters
Branch
Subsidiary
Mid-Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

Metalworking
machinery
-.55*
(120.32)
-.001*
(23.69)
.10
(1.77)
1.00*
(228.18)
.68*
(52.69)
-.02
(.14)
-.14*
(5.99)
-.01
(.01)
.25*
(6.60)
-.04
(.12)
.52*
(21.29)
.53*
(12.45)
.31*
(17.85)
14745

No. of observations
Fraction of pairs where
predicted =actual response

Electronic
components
-.14*
(3.79)
-.0004*
(20.45)
-.16*
(3.53)
.83*
(126.70)
.43*
(20.72)
-.14
(2.42)
.01
(.02)
-.02
(.01)
.07
(.38)
.08
(.13)
.27*
(4.31)
.07
(.19)
-.16
(1.11)
6372

.52

Figures in ( ) are Chi-square statistics.
*Significant at the 5 percent level of confidence or greater.

.54

Motor
vehicles
-.11
(.83)
-.0003*
(38.17)
-.33*
(14.10)
.47*
(42.58)
.29*
(7.03)
.02
(.01)
-.08
(.38)
.05
(.11)
-.08
(.32)
-.50*
(8.21)
.005
(.00)
-.03
(.02)
.11
(.67)
5811
.54
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to plant closures across the regions may be explained by regional dif
ferences in the average size of the closing establishment, with larger
plants closing in the slow-growth regions. The data in table 3.11 do
not bear this out, however. The average size of the closing plant is not
negatively associated with economic growth. The number of workers
in the average closing plant is substantially larger in the East North Cen
tral than in any other region, and this may explain why we found a
relatively large rate of job loss in the East North Central (table 3.6)
with an average rate of plant closures (table 3.3).
Table 3.10
Logit Estimates for Probability of a Closing,
Single-Plant Firms Only, 1975-82

Independent
variables
Constant
Age
Size
Mid-Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

Metalworking
machinery
-.42*
(55.32)
.001*
(6.33)
-.009*
(85.72)
-.05
(.43)
-.20*
(10.30)
-.05
(.19)
.22*
(4.08)
.16
(1.38)
.49*
(15.62)
.46*
(8.35)
.24*
(8^84)
12116

No. of observations
Fraction of pairs where
predicted = actual response

.56

Electronic
components
-.11
(1.49)
.001*
(6.85)
-.0007**
(2.81)
_ 20**
(3.27)
-.09
(.61)
-.07
(.14)
.22
(2.23)
.06
(.04)
.18
(1.28)
.17
(.88)
-.04
(.16)
4032
.48

Figures in ( ) are Chi-square statistics.
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence or greater.
**Statistically significant at the 5 to 10 percent level of confidence.

Motor
vehicles
-.08
(.39)
.000
(.02)
-.005*
(21.58)
.002
(.00)
-.06
(.17)
.20
(1.18)
-.06
(.13)
.02
(.01)
.06
(.14)
.06
(.07)
.06
(.15)
3483
.52
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Table 3.11
Average Number of Employees in Closing Plants in Motor Vehicles
Ranked by Region with Slowest to Fastest Employment Growth
Region
PAC
60

MTN
12

ENC
332

MA
77

SA
80

NE WSC
33
31

WNC
47

ESC
77

SOURCE: Dun and Bradstreet data, 1975, 1979, and 1982.

One explanation for higher closing rates in the Sun Belt regions may
be a bias in the data. As indicated in chapter 2, D&B drops many con
tinuing independent firms from the file. These tend to be firms that mov
ed; frequently, such enterprises are growing and in need of additional
space (Schmenner 1982). Since the data suggest that growing and ex
panding firms are more likely to be in the Sun Belt, it is possible that
D&B dropped more continuing firms in this region than in the slowgrowth regions. If this is the case, the plant closure rates in the Sun
Belt would tend to be overstated.

Summary

Three conclusions are drawn from the above data. First, there is
little regional variation in plant closure rates, and, when there are dif
ferences, the rates are higher in the faster-growth Sun Belt economies
than in the Frost Belt.
Second, in the metal working machinery and electronic components
industries, there is no evidence that a worker is more likely to be dis
placed in areas where the industry is slow-growing than growing rapidly.
Conversely there is no evidence that high rates of job loss explain
regional industrial decline. Instead, rates of displacement are much the
same in all regions and area variations in employment growth are
primarily due to variations in start-up rates and expansions. There is
some evidence, however, that rates of displacement from the motor
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vehicle industry are higher in the regions experiencing the greatest losses
in motor vehicle employment. It is possible that in industries such as
motor vehicles where births are already very low, further economic
decline must occur through increased rates of plant closurees.
Third, we find that most of the jobs lost in a region, are lost through
plant closings. The second most important cause of job loss is contrac
tions, while relocations play only a small role. These conclusions argue
that a closure is no more likely to occur in a declining than a growing
economy, not that the consequences of a plant closure are equally severe
in all regions, a topic explored in more detail in chapter 5. In chapter
4, we directly address the causes of plant closures.
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Appendix 3.1
Logit Estimates for Probability of a Closing
by Central City, Suburb, and Nonmetropolitan Area
by Region, 1975-1982
Independent
variables
Constant
Size
Headquarters
Branch
Subsidiary
New England-Sub
New England-NM
Mid-Atlantic-CC
Mid-Atlantic-Sub
Mid-Atlantic-NM
E. No. Central-CC
E. No. Central-Sub
E. No. Central-NM
W. No. Central-CC
W. No. Central-Sub
W. No. Central-NM
South Atlantic-CC
South Atlantic-Sub

Metalworking
machinery
-.63*
(45.53)
-.001*
(23.99)
.09
(1.66)
1.02*
(232.58)
.68*
(52.24)
.21*
(2.93)
-.03
(.04)
.26*
(5.07)
.10
(.90)
-.28**
(3.65)
.01
(.00)
-.08
(.69)
-.13
(1.28)
.18
(1.18)
.04
(.06)
-.04
(.04)
.28**
(2.72)
.36*
(4.83)

Electronic
components
-.07
(.26)
.0003*
(20.32)
-.16**
(3.35)
.88*
(135.85)
.44*
(21.09)
-.04
(.05)
-.22
(1.29)
-.22
(1.68)
-.19
(1.63)
-.32**
(2.76)
.18
(1.09)
-.12
(.56)
-.43*
(4.70)
-.04
(.01)
.11
(.17)
-.42
(2.24)
.08
(.12)
.06
(.10)

Motor
vehicles
-.08
(.28)
.000*
(39.51)
-.32*
(13.02)
.50*
(48.48)
.32*
(8.18)
-.18
(.44)
.28
(.77)
.06
(.07)
-.06
(.10)
-.05
(.04)
-.12
(.50)
.11
(.37)
-.40*
(4.82)
.11
(.24)
.01
(.00)
-.05
(-06)
-.39**
(2.98)
.19
(.67)
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Appendix 3.1 (continued)
Independent
variables
South Atlantic-NM
E. South Central-CC
E. South Central-Sub
E. South Central-NM
W. South Central-CC
W. South Central-Sub
W. South Central-NM
Mountain-CC
Mountain-Sub
Mountain-NM
Pacific-CC
Pacific-Sub
Pacific-NM
No. of observations
Fraction of pairs where
predicted = actual response

Metalworking
machiner

Electronic
components

Motor
vehicles

.32**
(3.38)
-.05
(-07)
-.18
(.43)
.35*
(3.78)
.66*
(16.12)
.57*
(5.86)
.50*
(4.70)
.77*
(12.51)
.35
(1.84)
.78*
(3.84)
.48*
(13.80)
.33*
(8.16)
.38
(1.72)

-.20
(.76)
.44
(1.52)
.25
(.14)
-.49
(1.97)
.33**
(2.85)
.11
(.17)
-.21
(.42)
-.10
(.19)
.30
(1.08)
-.37
(.82)
.18
(1.35)
-.09
(.38)
-.07
(.05)

-.13
(.35)
-.53**
(3.61)
-.50
(1.76)
-.55*
(5.52)
.03
(.03)
-.22
(.66)
-.02
(.01)
-.12
(.18)
-.26
(.48)
.24
(.47)
.07
(.14)
.09
(.26)
-.001
(.00)

14745

6372

5811

.55

.57

.52

*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence of greater.
**Statistically significant at the 5 to 10 percent level of confidence.
( ) Chi-square statistics.
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Plant Closures
and
Regional Rates of Profit
Regional employment growth is determined by the rate at which jobs
are created through establishment start-ups, expansions, and the inmigration of plants, minus the rate at which jobs are phased out by plant
closures, contractions, and the outmigration of establishments. There
is a well-developed theoretical and empirical literature on the factors
that encourage job creation, including the economic conditions that spawn
local jobs and draw firms and branch plants to a location (Stafford 1980;
Smith 1981). On the other hand, there has been surprisingly little study
of the reverse side of location theory, the factors that influence the deci
sion to permanently close or relocate a plant.
Data presented in chapter 3 show that plant closing rates and rates
of worker displacement are no higher in areas where industry is declining
than where industry is experiencing strong growth. This finding sug
gests the factors dampening new start-ups in a region may not be the
same ones influencing plant closures.
Chapter 4 explores the causes of plant closings by using a model that
estimates the probability a plant will close. We hypothesize that the prob
ability of a plant's closing during some period is a function of the plant's
profit level at the beginning of the period and the change in the plant's
profits during the period compared to profits a plant could have earned
in some other region. We also hypothesize that there are regional varia
tions in profit levels and these are the result of regional differences in
production costs and revenues. Plant profits are expected to be lower
where production costs are relatively high and markets are declining.
The following five hypotheses are tested. Plant closures are influenced
by (1) local production cost levels, (2) the extent of unionization of the
labor force, (3) changes in local prodution costs relative to changes in
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costs in other regions, (4) the degree of industry import competition,
and (5) local and national market growth.
The chapter begins with a review of previous literature on the causes
of plant closures and the conditions found to influence investment.
Because the latter issue has received a great deal of attention in the
literature, we focus on studies that have also used the Dun and Bradstreet
(D&B) DMI file. Next we present the model and report the results of
the empirical tests, which use the D&B data described in chapter 2.
The D&B data were supplemented with data from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, U.S. Census, and U.S. Department of Energy.
The statistical results provide little evidence that the economic variables
identified here are responsible for plant closures. The only variable that
consistently influences the probability a plant will close is the plant's
status as a branch, headquarters, independent, or subsidiary, with
branches and subsidiaries closing at much higher rates than headquarters
and independents. For independents (single-plant firms), the firm's age
and size are also factors in the probability the plant will shut down.

Previous Literature
Most empirical research on the causes of plant closures is based on
surveys of managers responsible for closing a plant. For example,
Schmenner (1982, pp. 237-239) conducted a survey of 175 closing
facilities. He found that 21 percent attributed their closing to high labor
costs, 10 percent cited unions, 2 percent cited high energy costs, and
1 percent claimed high taxes were factors. Fifteen percent cited com
petitive pressures from foreign producers and 58 percent cited domestic
competition as additional reasons for their plant closings. Schmenner's
findings lend support to the hypothesis that spatial differences in factor
costs, unionization rates and market growth should result in spatial dif
ferences in plant closure rates. Gainer (1986) surveyed 355 managers
who closed plants and found 57 percent of them attributed the closing
to high labor costs. The Rhode Island Strategic Development Commis
sion (1983) surveyed all manufacturing firms of 50 employees or more
that either closed or experienced major layoffs in Rhode Island between
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January 1,1972 and August 31, 1982 to determine the reasons for these
job losses. During this period, 177 firms closed. The commission found
that the lack of business acumen, overexpansion, overleveraging or inabiity of new management to successfully operate a business led to the
majority of firm failures. They did not find labor problems or energy
costs to be a primary cause of firm failure.
Authors of the Rhode Island study believe their results differ from
those of Schmenner because the Rhode Island sample is dominated by
small independents, whereas Schmenner surveyed Fortune 500 firms.
The few national corporations included in the Rhode Island study also
reported high costs among their reasons for closure (Reamer 1987).
Massey and Meegan (1982) examined nearly 60 industries to study
the different mechanisms of employment decline. They categorized each
industry by its causes of displacement, including: job loss due to
technological change; intensification of the production process, i.e.,
increasing worker productivity without substantial technological change;
and rationalization of the production process, i.e., cutbacks in declin
ing industries. They found that firms within each of the three categories,
in fact within each industry, exhibit a wide variety of responses to the
same external circumstances. For example, firms in a declining industry
may close plants, diversify product lines, or seek new markets, and
as a consequence, there were no obvious spatial patterns to their employ
ment adjustments. They suggest that more generalizations might be possi
ble if the data were analyzed by other categorical breakdowns, such
as the size of firm or the nature of the labor process.
Press accounts of closings also lend support to the view that high
wages, energy costs and tax rates can be responsible for plant closures.
For example, Duracell Inc. closed a lithium battery manufacturing plant
in North Tarrytown, New York, laying off 200 employees. John
Bergman, a spokesman for Duracell, said the plant had become un
profitable because of high taxes, along with high fuel costs (New York
Times, 2/2/84, p. 4:6).
While statistical research on plant closures is rare, a number of em
pirical studies have looked at the reverse question of which factors en
courage the birth and location of new firms and the location of branch
plants. A number of these studies have used the D&B data. Carlton
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(1979) used the D&B data to study the birth and location decisions of
plants in the plastic products, electric transmitting equipment, and the
electronic components industries. Modeling the start-up and location
decision of independents separately from those of branch plants, Carlton
found that wages had the greatest impact on the location of single-plant
firms. For every 1 percent decrease in wages, new births increased by
1 percent. Aside from wages, the existence of agglomeration economies,
the availability of a skilled labor force, and for two of the three industries,
low energy costs also had a positive effect on a Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area's (SMSAs) rate of business start-ups. The results for
branch plants were similar, except that a local skilled labor force was
less important for branches than for independents.
Harris (1986) conducted a study similar to Carlton's, using data on
branch and new firm start-ups in the high technology sector. She found
SMSAs with a skilled labor force, low energy costs, and agglomera
tion economies attracted the greatest number of start-ups. Branch plants
were drawn to SMSAs with agglomeration economies and a skilled labor
force.
Rowland (1985) also tested a model of new firm start-ups using the
D&B data. Rowland's study differed from those of Carlton and Harris
in that she used data on 106 counties in New Jersey, Maryland,
Washington, D.C., and Virginia from the metalworking machinery and
electronic components industries. Her findings show the greatest number
of firm births and employment gains due to births were in the counties
with low wages near metropolitan areas. Proximity to a Ph.D.-granting
university also influenced the start-up of firms in the electronic com
ponents industry.
Rees (1979) found the Southwest had become a spawning ground for
innovations and growth industries, and not merely a receiving ground
for standardized production processes from the northern states. Using
data compiled by the Bureau of Business Research at the University
of Texas at Austin in combination with the D&B data, Rees found that
61 percent of new firms in Dallas/Fort Worth were firm births and 39
percent were branch plants. Fifty-seven percent of the branches had
headquarters in the local area. Rees attributes this strong local job genera
tion to the growth of agglomeration economies and local markets in
the Sun Belt.
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In general, this literature concludes that firms locate where they can
operate most profitably. Results from the above studies, as well as others
(Smith 1981; Stafford 1980; Malecki 1981), show most new firms and
branches operate most profitably where wages are relatively low, energy
costs are low, agglomeration economies exist, and an appropriately skill
ed labor force is available. Do these same factors increase the profitability
of existing establishments and reduce the probability they will close?
This is the question addressed below.
The Causes of Plant Closures—Five Hypotheses
We hypothesize that the probability of a plant permanently closing
during some period is a function of the profit level at the beginning
of the period and the change in profits during the period. A plant will
continue to operate at its current site as long as economic profits are
positive and as long as profits in the current location exceed profits that
could be earned in alternative locations, minus transaction costs
associated with relocating, or as long as
(1)
(2)
TR=
TC =
Tj =
i =
o =

TRj-TC^Oand,
TRi - TCt >TR0 - TC0 - Tj, where
Total revenue
Long run total costs
Transactions costs associated with relocating or closing plant i
Plant at the current location
Plant's next most profitable location

When the conditions in (1) or (2) no longer hold, the process of disinvest
ment begins, and closure can be predicted.
Equation (2) makes explicit that factor prices in other locations (TCJ
and transaction costs associated with closing (Tj), including, the plant's
scrap value, the values of tax write-offs, severance payments to workers,
and site clean-up costs if the plant were to close, influence closures.
For example, a reduction in wages at another site would increase the
opportunity costs of operating at the current location (by lowering TC,,)
and increase the probability of closure. Higher required severance pay-
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ment to workers if the plant should close should increase the trans
actions cost of closure (Tj) and reduce the likelihood of a shutdown.
There are several reasons to expect profit levels to vary spatially and
to result in variations in plant closure rates. Five hypotheses are ad
dressed below.
Hypothesis 1: Regional Differences in the Price of Inputs
One assumption projecting regional variations in rates of plant closures
is that plants in some regions, particularly the industrialized North, have
higher production costs not compensated for by scale economies or
transport costs. These higher production costs result in lower rates of
plant profit, which in turn lead to higher-than-average rates of plant
closures.
Hulten and Schwab (1983) provide evidence that profit rates vary
spatially and are, in fact, lower in the high-cost regions of the U.S.
They found a 15.9 percent annual average rate of return to capital in
the Sun Belt and a 14.2 percent return in the Frost Belt states for the
period 1951 to 1978.
Plants should close at above average rates in the low-profit regions
as establishments both fail at above average rates and relocate to the
lower cost areas of the country.
A number of authors have argued this hypothesis. Leary (1985, p.
115) states:
High labor costs, aging infrastructure, and increasingly
burdensome regulatory restrictions. . . . are creating disad
vantageous conditions for firms operating in these [North and
North Central] regions. It is the 'push' of these higher costs
in the frostbelt .... which is causing the trivial amount of
outmigration.
Mansfield (1985, p. 244) makes the argument for the textile industry.
Considerable excess capacity existed in the cotton textile in
dustry from about 1924 to 1936. ... It is also important to
note mat profit rates in cotton textiles were higher in the South
than the North. Profits in the South averaged 6 percent,
whereas profits inthe North averaged 1 percent. This was

Regional Rates of Profit

71

due to the fact that the prices of many inputs—like labor and
raw cotton—were lower in the South.
If we are given a situation of this sort, what would the
perfectly competitive model predict? . . . Many firms would
have to leave the industry. . . . The industry would tend to
become concentrated more heavily in the South, the exit rate
being higher in the North than in the South.
Bluestone and Harrison (1982) follow a parallel line of reasoning in
their book The Deindustrialization ofAmerica. They argue that regional
disinvestment and plant closures in the Frost Belt states are the conse
quence of both high production costs in the northern states and intensi
fying competition in many basic U.S. industries.
Firms in some of the United States' basic industries were willing and
able to pay higher prices for inputs when output was concentrated in
a few oligopolists and profit levels were sizable in the late 1940s, 1950s
and 1960s. In the 1970s, the profit margins eroded. From the period
1963-66 to 1967-70, real rates of return for all nonfinancial corpora
tions in the U.S. fell from 15.5 percent to 12.7 percent. By the 1975-1978
period, rates of return had fallen to 9.7 percent.
This profit squeeze was caused primarily by intensified competition
and falling market shares. Firms found their northern operations were
especially hard hit because of high production costs in this region, and
as companies began to search for ways to restore profit margins, they
began phasing out plants located in high cost regions and reinvesting
their capital in new or existing plants in the lower cost areas, both
domestic and foreign.
For example, during the 1950s and 1960s the oligopolistic structure
of the American auto industry permitted wage increases, negotiated by
union leaders, to be easily passed on to consumers. When U.S. pro
ducers were faced with intensifying competition from lower cost Japanese
and German imports in the 1970s, revenues and profit levels fell, and
the American auto companies could no longer hold their market share
while continuing to pay the high wages and benefits negotiated during
better economic times. To cut costs in this new competitive climate,
companies began to shift production out of the high-cost North Central
region to lower cost regions of the U.S. and abroad, and to outsource,
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or purchase inputs from abroad that were once produced internally by
the firm or from other American suppliers. Outsourcing reduces costs
when manufactured inputs can be purchased at lower cost than they can
be produced "in house" (Bluestone and Harrison 1982).
Hypothesis #1 applies only to firms facing competition, since firms
in concentrated industries can pass at least some of the cost increases
on to consumers and therefore may not be driven to seek minimumcost locations. As indicated by Bluestone and Harrison, it was not until
the auto industry faced increased competition that it began to shift in
vestment out of the high-cost regions.
This argument is also unlikely to apply to industrial activity in the
earliest stages of the product cycle (see Vernon 1966). When a product
is at the innovation stage, the product design is still variable and the
production process flexible. Producers, therefore, require proximity to
a specialized and skilled labor force, to other manufacturers in order
to monitor their discoveries, and to venture capital markets. For in
novative activities, nearness to these specialized inputs is likely to com
pensate for high factor costs.
To summarize, we expect profits to be relatively low in locations where
wages, energy costs, and taxes are high, referring back to equations
(1) and (2), where TCj are high. Plant closures are expected to be
higher in regions where profit levels are relatively low, especially in
more competitive industries and where production has become
standardized.

Hypothesis 2: Unionization
In addition to higher costs, the extent to which a local labor force
is unionized may also influence plant-level profits and the probability
a plant will close. Two arguments are relevant here.
The first argument is that a highly unionized labor force reduces plant
profit levels by demanding higher wages, receiving more generous fringe
benefits, imposing inflexible work rules on the production site, demand
ing minimum shop-safety standards, and instituting work stoppages
and strikes. Holding all other conditions constant, indirect costs may
therefore be higher and profits lower in plants with a unionized labor
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force. Thus, we conjecture that, faced with increased competition and
downward pressure on prices, U.S. producers in the unionized regions
are more likely to close and to relocate to nonunion labor markets.
Bluestone and Harrison (1982, pp. 147-148) also argue this hypothesis:
it now seems to be a fair generalization that, for the most
part, the geographic patterning of deindustrialization has to
do with the proclivity of companies to shift capital out of
older industrial areas to escape having to live with a labor
force that . . . had become costly. . . . [C]ompanies
are . . . shifting operations . . . into the Sun Belt, non-union
peripheries within the North and abroad.
Again, this hypothesis may not apply to firms that face little com
petition or plants producing products in the earliest stage of the pro
duct cycle. Firms in concentrated, less competitive industries are less
driven to seek out cost-minimizing sites, since they can pass some of
their higher costs on to consumers. Plants producing a state-of-the-art
product require a highly skilled labor force, and managers may have
to work with unions to fulfill this requirement.
A second argument is that unions will increase the likelihood of a
closing among firms adopting new technologies. Firms acquiring new
technologies generally undergo changes in skill requirements. Some
workers become redundant, and employers would prefer to lay them
off. Other workers must be retrained for new tasks. Both of these ad
justments are more easily made in a nonunion than in a union plant.
In plants where unions have negotiated rigid job categories and made
layoffs due to technological change costly and difficult, the adjustment
to a new technology can be a slow and contentious process. Employers
may, therefore, find it less expensive to close the plant and start over
in a new location with a new technology and new labor force than to
attempt to increase productivity at an existing plant. We therefore predict
a higher rate of plant closures in locations where a higher percentage
of workers are unionized.

Hypothesis 3: Changes in Factor Prices
There are three reasons to expect that plants located in areas with
greater than the national average increase (or a smaller-than-average
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decrease) in input prices should experience above average rates of plant
closures. First, increases in local production costs should reduce profit
levels in local plants and force many marginal plants facing elastic de
mand curves to close. Referring back to equation (1), TCj will increase,
making the condition for closure more likely. Second, the opportunity
cost of operating in the now higher cost region will increase, making
the now lower cost sites relatively more profitable. This is shown in
equation (2), by an increase in TQ. Managers will respond by
relocating to and reinvesting in the now lower cost regions. Third, when
increases in labor costs are responsible for cost increases, the company
may install labor saving technologies. When these new technologies
cannot be adopted at an existing plant, closure is more likely. Again,
this hypothesis is expected to apply to firms in competitive industries,
since such firms are less able to absorb losses or pass increased costs
on to consumers, and to firms not tied to high-cost regions because of
a specially skilled labor force.
To summarize, holding all other variables constant, we expect the
loss in profits to be greatest and, therefore, plant closures highest in
the locations with the greatest increases in production costs.
Hypothesis 4: Import Penetration
Growing dependence on imports, in particular from Third World coun
tries, is receiving widespread blame for the decline in U.S. manufac
turing employment and the spread of industrial plant closures. Three
examples are cited here:
[W]ith import penetration rates reaching 50 percent or over
for the last three years, hardly a month goes by without the
closing of another shoe plant (Fecteau and Mera 1981, p. 88).
There are things happening as a result of our foreign trade
policies that are undermining U.S. economic strength—and
these things should not go uncorrected. These things include
the loss of jobs to imports (Finley 1981, p. 78).
Too many dollars spent by U.S. consumers are stimulating
jobs in Asia, rather than Alabama. Troubled U.S. manufac-
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turers are shutting U.S. plants or shifting abroad, as cheap
imports clobber U.S. companies (Phillips 1984, p. Fl).
Both price competition from abroad and the loss of markets are reduc
ing revenues and cutting into the profits of U.S. producers, especially
those producers in mature industries utilizing a low-skilled U.S. labor
force. We conjecture, therefore, that plant closures are more likely to
occur in industries and regional economies dependent on a low-skilled
labor force.
The product cycle model, referred to above, predicts changes in an
industry's locational requirements as that industry's product evolves
from an innovative to a mature and highly standardized product (Vernon 1966). In the early stage of innovation, production methods are
fluid and decisions about the manner of production and the configura
tion of the innovation must be made quickly and frequently. This need
for flexibility requires that production take place in proximity to decisionmakers, a skilled labor force that can adjust to changes in the pro
duction process, and agglomeration economies so specialized services
can be called in and the activities of competitors monitored.
As the product becomes standardized and production methods routine,
ties to decisionmakers, a skilled labor force and agglomeration economies
relax, and firms can then begin a nationwide or worldwide scan for
new production sites. At this stage, firms can locate branches to take
advantage of low-skilled and lower cost labor (Vernon 1966).
The low-wage sites in the United States have been mainly in the South
with its unskilled and growing labor force from its own rural popula
tion and Mexico and the Caribbean. The textiles and shoe industries
moved South in the 1920s and 1930s. Electronics moved South in the
1950s and 1960s and semiconductors moved South in the 1970s and
early 1980s. During these periods, plant closures should have been par
ticularly high in these respective industries in the industrialized states
and in the case of semiconductors, in California.
Because of intensifying international competition and improved com
munications and transport, U.S. companies are now shifting the pro
duction of these standardized products even further afield to low-wage
countries. Another increasingly common way of reducing the costs of
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inputs is outsourcing, i.e., purchasing components manufactured abroad
which were previously produced internally by the firm. In either case,
U.S. plants producing with low-skilled labor are expected to be especially
vulnerable to closure as they fail to compete with imports or move
overseas. Whereas the first two hypotheses predict higher plant closure
rates in the northern industrial states, this and the third hypothesis predict
higher closure rates in southern states. In terms of the model, this
hypothesis explains decreases in TC0 because technological change in
production processes and communications have made a new range of
alternative production locations possible.
Aside from passing through the product-cycle model, additional
characteristics of industries likely to be hard hit by imports and to shift
production overseas are those with a high value-to-weight ratio and a
high elasticity of demand. A high value-to-weight ratio implies low
transport costs as a proportion of product value. A high elasticity of
demand implies that small differences in price will make large differences
in the size of the market for the product (Vernon 1966).
Empirical work on industrial location and trade patterns offer some
support to the product cycle model. In the computer industry (SIC 3572),
plants in the vicinity of highly skilled computer workers, such as in
the Northeast and northern California, are more involved in the design
and development of new computer systems. The production of peripheral
computer equipment is dispersing to areas where workers are less skilled
and less expensive, such as Tennessee, Nebraska, South Dakota, Utah,
North and South Carolina, and Florida (Hekman 1980a). In a second
example, new branch plants in the specialized surgical instrument in
dustry were found to be moving into the major centers of current pro
duction rather than into the low-wage regions such as the South (Hekman
1980b). Surgical equipment may be an industry which is still early in
the product life cycle and still requires a highly skilled labor force, or
it may be an industry which never goes through the classic product
cycle phases.
A study of the Committee for Economic Development (1984, pp.
92-93) determined the extent to which developing country exports are
replacing domestic production in the U.S. Import penetration ratios,
measured as the ratio of imports from the developing countries to ap-

Regional Rates of Profit

77

parent domestic consumption (domestic production plus imports minus
exports) were calculated. The numbers demonstrated that developing
country exports constitute only 3 percent of all goods consumed in the
U.S., but market penetration has increased rapidly, rising 11.3 per
cent over the decade of the 1970s. Moreover, this report indicated, as
expected, that U.S. imports from developing countries were heavily
concentrated in low-wage, labor-intensive industries, with over 50 per
cent in textiles, apparel, and electrical machinery.
To summarize, because low-wage, low-skilled manufacturing
establishments are facing intense foreign competition, we expect profit
rates to be relatively low and plant closures likely in import-competing
industries and regions dependent on low-skilled, low-wage labor.

Hypothesis 5: Market Demand
The fifth and final hypothesis is that plants faced with declining de
mand for their product will be most likely to experience falling revenues,
shrinking profits, and closure. Markets can be local or national in scope.
For example, many manufacturers produce intermediate inputs for local
producers, which in turn sell to a national or local market. Other firms
in the same industry produce for a national market, and some, of course,
produce for both local and national markets. Since we cannot identify
the scope of the market for each plant in our study, we hypothesize
that growth in both national and local demand affect each plant. We
expect to find a higher probability of closure for plants manufacturing
products for which there is a shrinking national market and that are
located in a declining regional economy. Closures will be least likely
for plants located in growing regions and producing products for which
there is strong national demand. In terms of the model, plants experien
cing a drop in TRj are more likely to experience negative profits in
equation (1) and consequently to close.

Summary of Hypotheses
To summarize, we hypothesize that plant level profits are influenced
by the level of local production costs, the extent to which the plant's
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labor force is unionized, changes in local production costs relative to
costs in other regions, the extent to which the plant is competing with
foreign imports, and the growth in local and national markets for the
plant's product. The probability a plant will be shut down rises as its
level of profit falls. The model is the following:
(3) PCi)t_t+1 =f [TCf)t , (U/U0)t,A(TC/TC0)t_t+1 , IM_t+1 , Mi>t.t+1)].
Where:
PC;
TC
Ur/U0

=The probability plant i will close.
= Total production costs.
=Rate of local labor force unionization, relative to the
national rate of unionization.
A(TCr/TC0)=Change in local production costs relative to the nation.
I
= Import penetration.
Mj
= Change in demand for plant i's output,
r
= Local economy,
t
= Beginning of period,
t -I-1
= End of period.
i
= Plant.
Empirical Test
The model tests the effects of local production cost levels, unioniza
tion, changes in local production costs relative to costs in other loca
tions, import penetration, and growth in market demand on the prob
ability a plant will close. The model is tested on three industries:
metalworking machinery (SIC 354), electronic components (SIC 367),
and motor vehicles (SIC 371). The selection of these three industries
was discussed in chapter 2. The observations are plants in the Dun and
Bradstreet data set in 1975.
The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable takes on value of 1 if the plant was in ex
istence in 1975 and not in existence in 1982. The dependent variable takes
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on the value of zero if the plant remained open throughout the period.
The 1975 to 1982 period was selected to include one full business cy
cle. The period 1975 to 1979 was an expansionary year for the national
economy, and 1979 to 1982 was a recessionary period. The inclusion
of one full cycle minimizes any biases in the results that occur due to
regional variations in the severity of business cycles (see Howland 1984).
For example, the industrialized mid western states experience more
volatile business cycles than the rest of the country because of their
dependence on capital goods production. The inclusion of only years
that coincided with a recession may make it appear that high wages lead
to plant closures, when the true cause of high closures in the Midwest
was the business cycle rather than the region's high wages.
The test only includes plant closures that occurred in SMSAs. The
reason is as follows. To test the impact of local conditions on plant
closures, we need to approximate local labor and energy markets as
closely as possible. For example, to test the extent to which high wages
increase the probability a plant will close, we need to approximate wages
faced by the plant in question. Wage rates in the SMSA where the plant
is located are a reasonable measure of wages paid by the plant. Statewide
wages are not a satisfactory measure, since wages vary substantially
within states, especially within larger states such as California.

Independent Variables
The five hypotheses are tested with the following independent
variables.

Production Costs Levels
In order to test hypothesis 1, that plant closures are more probable
in high production cost areas, we need to identify production costs that
vary across the regions of the United States. Production costs that vary
spatially are wages, energy, and taxes. While taxes are not a major ex
pense for the average manufacturer, they are included here because of
their role in the debate over the causes of plant closures.
Next to materials, labor costs are the largest expense for the average
manufacturing establishment. For example, payroll and supplemental
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labor costs, including such employee benefits as pension programs,
unemployment insurance, health benefits, etc., consume 44 percent of
revenue in the metalworking machinery industry, 36 percent of revenue
in the electronic components industry, and 18 percent of revenue in
the motor vehicle industry (U.S. Department of Commerce 1977b, tables
3a and 3b). No other production expense aside from raw materials is
as large.
To demonstrate the spatial variation in wages, table 4.1 reports wages
for production workers in 1977 in selected states, by region. While the
statistical test of the model uses data on SMSAs, state data are used
here to condense information. In 1980, there were 318 SMSAs in the
United States, and even though not all have employment in these three
industries, wage data presented by SMSA would be unmanageable. Table
4.1 shows that in 1977 the Mid-Atlantic and East North Central states
had wages above the national average. The New England, South Atlantic,
and East South Central states had wages below the national average.
The SMSA-level wage data used in this study are taken from the Cen
sus of Manufactures and are average hourly wages at the 3-digit SIC
level for production workers. The range of wage values for the industries
and SMSAs used in this study are reported in appendix 4.2.
Energy is another input to the production process whose costs vary
across the country. Compared to labor, however, energy costs are a
small proportion of the average establishment's revenues in the three
industries studied here. For example, purchased fuels and purchased
electric energy are approximately 1 percent of revenues in the metalwork
ing machinery, electronic components, and motor vehicle industries
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1977b, tables 3a and 3b).
Energy costs are highest in the New England and Mid-Atlantic states
and lowest in the South and West (see table 4.1). Electricity costs are
low in the Pacific region due to this region's abundance of hydroelec
tric power. The Tennessee Valley Authority is responsible for keeping
electricity costs relatively low in the East South Central region. For
the range of values for SMSAs used in this study, see appendix 4.2.
Energy costs are measured as the "typical" monthly electricity bills
for industrial users in the 300 kilowatt hour (KWH), 120,000 megawatt
hour (MWH) category. The 300 KWH refers to the amount of electricity
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Table 4.1
Indices of Wages, Electric and Other Fuel Costs,
Taxes, and Union Membership for 26 Selected States by Region

State
New England
CT
MA
RI
Mid-Atlantic
NJ
NY
PA
East North Central
IL
IN
MI
OH
WI
West North Central
IA
MN
MO
South Atlantic
FL
GA
MD
NC

sc

1977 wages8
production workers
SIC
SIC
SIC
371
367
354

Other
Electric fuels
costb
cost"
(1975)
(1975)

Taxesc
(1977)

% Union
labord
(1978)

.97
.94
.92

.91
.93
.83

.68
NA
NA

164.6
175.4
177.7

128.0
125.7
118.5

2.42
1.76
1.76

106.9
119.1
132.3

.97
1.00
1.02

.93
1.10
1.17

NA
1.04
NA

157.1
124.7
125.0

127.4
119.6
101.1

1.82
1.39
1.05

112.3
191.3
166.9

1.00
.97
1.13
1.04
1.04

.91
.92
.84
1.06
.88

.80
.97
1.12
1.08
1.03

100.7
88.6
122.5
87.8
103.6

98.9
97.8
110.6
95.5
103.9

1.12
.66
2.45
.73
.92

153.8
143.9
168.0
144.0
135.7

1.00
.99
.94

.86
1.00
1.37

.54
.92
NA

98.8
105.3
101.1

97.8
102.3
93.9

.49
1.23
.64

93.7
119.1
146.4

.81
.83
NA
.75
.67
.99

.85
.80
.79
.89
.80
.78

NA
NA
NA
.58
.42
.75

118.5
114.7
129.3
99.6
90.8
115.4

103.9
90.0
122.4
105.0
101.1
108.4

.86
.47
.95
.59
.92
.58

57.1
66.4
102.5
31.8
32.7
62.0

VA
East South Central
.81
93.7
.60
87.2
84.6
.64
NA
AL
71.4
.97
NA
NA
KY
109.3
.39
93.3
.82
TN
86.4
76.3
.62
.87
.53
86.6
West South Central
73.2
.47
.50
1.01
.90
AR
83.8
81.1
.81
TX
77.1
.76
1.13
53.7
.51
73.5
Pacific
.95
.85
1.03
CA
115.7
1.80
98.9
104.9
SOURCES: 7977 Census of Manufactures, table 5, volume HI, part 1 and 2; U.S. Department
of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Energy Price and Expenditure Report, 1970-1981,
DOE/EIA-0376 (81), June 1984; U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administra
tion, State Energy Data Report Consumption Estimates 1960-83, DOE/EIA-0214 (83) section
4, May 1985; William Wheaton (1983) "Interstate Differences in the Level of Business Taxa
tion," National Tax Journal, 36, 1, pp. 83-94; and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2070, December 1980, table 166.
a. Average Production Wage in state divided by National Average Wage,
b. Index for "other fuels" calculated using data for the states on the price of petroleum, coal,
and natural gas in dollars per million BTUs and weighted by the consumption of each fuel by state,
c. Index of business taxes paid by the manufacturing sector as a percent of all manufacturing income,
d. Union membership as a percent of nonagricultural employment by state, 1978.
NA=not available.
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used and the 120,000 MWH category refers to the intensity of the power.
The important factor here is that energy costs are measured as the bill
the same manufacturer would pay in different cities across the coun
try, if its use of energy was exactly the same in each city .We use only
electricity costs because of the relative ease of collecting these data for
SMSAs and because the major share of energy in our three industries
comes from this source. Sixty-eight percent of energy expenditures in
metal working machinery was for electricity. The comparable figures
for electronic components and motor vehicles are 78 percent and 57
percent. The remaining shares of energy expenditures are spread among
fuel oils, coals, coke and breeze, and natural gas (U.S. Department
of Commerce 1977a).
Business taxes are an additional production cost that varies by area
of the country. The business tax burden includes property, corporate
income, unemployment, payroll, insurance, and stock transfer taxes and
general license or business fees. Wheaton (1983) estimates business taxes
to be an average of 8 percent of net business income. Taxes as a share
of business revenues, the estimate comparable to the wage and energy
figures presented above, is not available. In the same paper, Wheaton
estimated state tax burdens for 1977 by summing up all business tax
payments by each state's manufacturing sector and dividing this value
by the state's business income in manufacturing. An index of his
estimates is found in table 4.1. In general, the index shows tax burdens
to be relatively high in New England and the Mid-Atlantic, and in
Michigan, Illinois, and California. The tax burdens in the West North
Central, South Atlantic, and East South Central regions are relatively
low. The state ratios calculated by Wheaton are used in this study. State
tax rates rather than SMSA rates are used because these business taxes
are levied at the state level and therefore do not vary within the state.
Because wages are the most important input, we should expect closures
to be more sensitive to variations in wages than either energy costs or
taxes.
Unionization
Rates of union membership also vary spatially, with workers in the
industrialized North and West most likely to be represented by unions.
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Approximately one-third of nonagricultural employees are represented
by unions in these two regions. The lowest rates of union representa
tion are in the West South Central and South Atlantic regions (see table
4.1).
If the level of unionization influences disinvestment in any industry,
the three industries studied here would be among them. National data
on the proportion of workers covered by unions are not available at
the 3-digit level of industrial detail. However, the data at the 2-digit
level indicate all three industries may have above-average rates of union
participation. Twenty-nine percent of machinery production workers
(SIC 35) are unionized. Thirty-six percent of electronics and electrical
production machinery workers (SIC 36) are represented by unions and
57 percent of transportation production workers (SIC 37) are union
members.
For purposes of this study, unionization is measured as the percent
of the nonagricultural labor force belonging to unions. These data are
not available at the metropolitan level of disaggregation, and, therefore,
the state level data, reported in table 4.1, are used.
Production Cost Changes
Hypothesis 3 predicts greater declines in profit levels, and therefore
a greater probability of plant closures, in areas with above-average in
creases in production costs. Inputs whose costs changed relative to the
U.S. average over the period of study include wages and energy costs.
For the three industries studied here, as well as all manufacturing,
cross-regional differences in wages have narrowed. The largest relative
wage increases have been in the rapidly growing regions of the U.S.
Wages in the stagnating or slow-growth regions have dropped relative
to the national average wage (see table 4.2). A positive value in table
4.2 signifies an increase in the state's position relative to the U.S.
average, while a negative value means a decrease in the state relative
to the U.S. average.
Energy price increases over the 1975-81 period have also favored
producers in the Mid-Atlantic and some of the East North Central, as
well as South Atlantic states. Price increases were greatest in Califor
nia, Texas, and New Hampshire (table 4.2). The above-average price
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Table 4.2
Changes in the Indices for Production Wages 1977-82 and for Electric
and Other Fuels Cost 1975-81 for 26 Selected States by Region
State

Change in wages (1977-82)8
SIC
SIC
SIC
354
367
371

New England
CT
-.01
MA
-.04
RI
-.04
Mid-Atlantic
NJ
-.04
NY
-.02
PA
-.02
East North Central
IL
.05
IN
-.02
MI
.03
OH
.01
WI
-.02
West North Central
IA
-.05
MN
-.03
MO
-.02
South Atlantic
FL
-.08
GA
.01
MD
NA
NC
.09
SC
.02
VA
-.08
East South Central
AL
NA
KY
NA
TN
0
West South Central
AR
.16
TX
.06
Pacific
CA
.01

Electric
cost change"
(1975-1981)

Other fuels
cost change0
(1975-1981)

-.06
.01
-.07

.08
NA
NA

-3.8
-4.2
1.4

5.2
6.0
3.1

-.01
-.09
.06

NA
-.30
NA

-2.8
-5.9
-13.1

4.2
8.2
-9.9

-.03
-.04
-.04
-.01
NA

-.02
-.04
-.03
.01
.06

2.8
4.7
-7.8
-4.2
-15.6

-7.8
-17.5
-13.9
-14.5
-3.2

.04
-.11
-.03

.07
.04
NA

-8.8
-10.8
-10.2

-2.8
-4.4
-5.5

0
.06
.09
.07
.05
.27

NA
NA
NA
.05
.13
NA

12.0
-27.7
-29.4
-15.9
-14.2
-20.8

-1.0
2.9
-13.8
-15.1
-3.7
-0.2

NA
NA
.03

.12
.05
.03

8.5
13.7
15.4

-7.5
-15.1
-2.8

.04
-.11

.03
.04

-1.3
22.3

16.5
7.2

.06

-.03

32.3

12.9

SOURCES: Census of Manufactures, 1977 and 1982, table 5, vol. ffl; U.S. Department of Energy,
Energy Information Administration, State Energy Price and Expenditure Report, 1970-1981,
DOE/EIA-0376 (81), June 1984, and U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administra
tion, State Energy Data Report Consumption Estimates, 1960-1983, DOE/EIA-0214 (83), sec
tion 4, May 1985.
a. These numbers are calculated by subtracting the 1977 Wage Index Value, shown in table 1,
from the 1982 index value (not shown).
b. These numbers are calculated by subtracting the 1975 values, shown in table 1, from the 1981
index value (not shown).
c. Index for "other fuels" calculated using data for the states on the price of petroleum, coal,
and natural gas in dollars per million BTUs and weighted by the consumption of each fuel by state.
NA=not available.
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increase in Texas is explained by this state's dependence on natural gas
and the decontrol of natural gas prices during this period. While
petroleum prices increased at an annual average rate of 18 percent per
year, between 1975 and 1981, natural gas increases averaged 22 per
cent per year. Sixty percent of the West South Central's energy for in
dustrial uses comes from natural gas.
The variables used in this study are the change in the average hourly
industry wage between 1977 and 1982. The change in energy costs are
the change in a typical electricity bill for an industrial user using 300
KWH in the 120,000 MWH category from 1978 to 1982. Because of
the difficulty of locating an index for all business taxes for two periods,
and the relatively small proportion of total costs attributable to taxes,
the change in tax burden is not included in the model. Again, the range
of values for the included SMSAs, is reported in appendix 4.2.
Import Penetration
To measure the extent to which a plant is adversely affected by im
ports, we selected two proxies. One is the plant's 4-digit line of business.
We expect that the greater the import penetration in the plant's 4-digit
industry, the greater the loss in revenues and profits, and the greater
the probability a plant in that industry will close. Table 4.3 reports the
4-digit industries within metalworking machinery, electronic com
ponents, and motor vehicles, and ranks them by the extent to which
imports in each industry are replacing domestic production.
Two measures of import competition are reported in table 4.3. The
first column, the annual growth rate in imports, measures the rate at
which imports are growing. Because this measure does not take into
account the growth in domestic demand, it may not accurately repre
sent import penetration. Therefore, table 4.3 also includes a second in
dicator of import penetration. The second column of table 4.3 measures
the growth rate in the ratio of imports to domestic production (value
of shipments), weighted by imports' share of value of shipments. This
value measures the rate at which imports are replacing domestic pro
duction, accounting for the proportion of imports in the industry at the
beginning of the period.
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Table 4.3
Import Growth Rates by 4-Digit SIC Codes,
Metalworking Machinery, Electronic Components, and Motor Vehicles

SIC code

Annual growth
rate in imports
(1975-1980)

Growth rate in the ratio of
imports to value of
shipments, weighted by
imports share of value of
shipments in 1975
(1975-1980)

Metalworking machinery (SIC 354)
3541-Metal cutting
3542-Metal forming
3546-Power hand tools
3547-Rolling mill machines
3544-Special dies
3549-Metalworking N.E.C.
3545-Accessories

12.94
8.71
11.72
3.64
2.10
-3.92
7.05

.10
.07
.06
.04
.01
.00
-.72

9.35
15.82
13.70
8.87
17.69
.00
2.00

.07
.06
.03
.02
.02
.00
.00

8.07
3.43
.00

.12
.03
.00

Electronic components (SIC 367)
3675-Electronic capacitors
3674-Semiconductors
3676-Resistors
3671-Electronic tubes
3679-Components N.E.C.
3677-Coils & transformers
3678-Connectors
Motor vehicles (SIC 371)
3711-Bodies
3714-Parts & accessories
3713a-Truck bodies

SOURCES: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, U.S. Imports, Consumption and General
SIC-Based Products by World Areas, 1982, table 1, May 1983; and U.S. Imports for Consump
tion and General Imports, 1975, table 1, May 1976.
a. Includes motor homes (SIC 3716) along with truck and bus bodies.

Table 4.3 indicates variation in import penetration across 4-digit SIC
industries within SICs 354, 367, and 371. For example, in the
metal working machinery industry, imports are cutting into domestic
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production in all industries except SIC 3549 N.E.C. (not elsewhere
classified) and SIC 3545 Accessories. The annual growth rate in im
ports is greatest in SIC 3541 metal cutting machinery. SICs 3675 and
3711 are experiencing the greatest competition from imports in the re
maining two 3-digit industries.
The 4-digit industries enter the model as dummy variables, with SICs
3541, 3671, and 3711 as the reference industries. If import competi
tion is one cause of plant closures, we would expect to see statistically
significant and negative values for the coefficients on the dummy
variables on industries experiencing less import competition (smaller
numbers in column 2 of table 4.3) than that of the reference industries.
A second measure of import competition is the percent of the local
labor force with more than a high school education. Even within 4-digit
industrial categories, there is still a wide variety of manufacturing ac
tivities, some requiring specialized, highly skilled labor and others re
quiring low-skilled assembly. The low-skilled assembly operations are
hypothesized to be most affected by foreign competition and plant
closures.
As a proxy for skill level in manufacturing, we use the percent of
the SMSA labor force having 12 years of schooling or more. The
hypothesis is that plants producing a standardized product with a lowskilled labor force, and consequently vulnerable to imports and closure,
will be concentrated in locations with a large labor force with little educa
tion. The percent of the labor force with a high school education ranges
from 48.2 for New Bedford, Massachusetts to 81.7 percent for Seat
tle, Washington.

Demand for Output
Three variables are used to measure demand for a plant's output. Two
measures of local demand are considered, however this variable is
measured differently for each of the three industries. The market for
metalworking machinery is primarily other manufacturers. Metal working
machines are generally specialized products designed for a specific
manufacturer. Since face-to-face contact is often required, machinery
shops are small scale and serve a local clientele (Trainer 1979). Thus,
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local market growth is expected to play a significant role in the pro
fitability of metal working machinery plants. This variable in the machine
tool equation is measured by the rate of manufacturing employment
growth in the plant's SMSA.
The electronic components industry produces intermediate products
for local and national markets and final goods primarily for national
markets. Although local final demand is not expected to be particular
ly important for the electronics industry, the percentage increase in
population in the plant's SMSA is included here. To capture local in
termediate demand, the percentage increase in manufacturing employ
ment in the plant's SMSA is included.
The motor vehicle industry primarily produces final goods for local
and national markets. While motor vehicle plants most frequently serve
a national market, assembly plants are situated near markets. Therefore,
to capture local demand, we include the population growth rate in a
plant's SMSA.
For the above variables, manufacturing changes cover the years 1975
to 1982. Population changes cover the years 1970 to 1980. For the
SMSAs included in our sample, manufacturing employment growth rang
ed from -4.85 percent per annum in Youngstown, Pennsylvania to 10.21
percent in San Jose, California. Population growth rates varied between
-.9 percent per annum in Jersey City, New Jersey to 5.0 percent per
annum in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
National market demand is captured in the same 4-digit SIC dummy
variables reported above under import penetration. This approach was
taken to attempt to distinguish between the two hypotheses, given the
limited plant specific data. If the dummy variables on industries with
strong import penetration are significantly different from zero and
positive, then there is support for the import penetration hypothesis.
If the dummy variables on industries experiencing the slowest growth
are significantly different from zero and of the correct expected sign,
then there is support for the hypothesis that national market demand
influences closures.
Table 4.4 reports the growth in output (value of shipments) for each
of the 4-digit industries. If greater industry growth in output reduces
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the probability a plant in that industry will close, we would expect
positive values on the dummy coefficients for industries growing slower
than the reference industry and negative values for the industries growing
faster than the reference industry. For example, support for this
hypothesis would be indicated by negative values on the dummy coef
ficients for SICs 3545, 3546, and 3549 and positive values on the dummy
coefficients for SICs 3542, 3547, and 3544 in the metalworking
machinery industry.
Table 4.4
Growth in Value of Shipments for 4-Digit SIC Categories
Ranked by Growth Rate

SIC code
Metalworking machinery
3542 (Metal forming)
3547 (Rolling mill machinery)
3544 (Special dies)
3541 (Metal cutting machinery)
3545 (Accessories)
3546 (Power hand tools)
3549 (N.E.C.)

Growth rate in value shipments,
constant dollars, 1970-80
(annual average percent)

.48
.42b
.90
2.88
4.90
5.50b
7.28b

Electronic components
3671 (Electronic tubes)
3677 (Coils and transformers
3676 (Resistors)
3675 (Electronic capacitors)
3679 (N.E.C.)
3678 (Connectors)
3674 (Semiconductors)

.05
.43b
1.83b
4.47b
5.93b
10.90b
11.47

Motor vehicles
3711 (Motor vehicles bodies)
3714 (Parts and accessories)
3715 (Truck trailers)
3713 (Trucks and bus bodies)3

-1.95b
.28
4.80
5.04

SOURCES: Census of Manufactures, 7977 ami Annual Survey of Manufactures, 1980.
a. Includes motor homes (SIC 3716).
b. 1972 to 1980 annual average growth rates, 1970 data were not available.
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The 4-digit industries exhibiting slow output growth and intense foreign
competition are correlated. Therefore, it may not be possible to
distinguish between the hypotheses on import penetration and market
demand on the basis of this variable. Rather, if import penetration is
an important factor in plant closures, we will expect both the 4-digit
SIC code and the education variables to be significant.
Control Variables—Size, Age, and Status
As discussed in chapter 3, a plant's size, age, and status are expected
to influence the probability of its closure. Larger firms and establishments
are expected to close at lower rates than smaller firms and establishments.
Younger firms are expected to close at higher rates than well-established
firms, and branch plants and subsidiaries are expected to close at higher
rates than independents and headquarters. The rationale for including
each of these control variables is discussed in depth in chapter 3.
The Impact of Industry Characteristics
As argued above, an industry's rate of technological change, rate of
growth in product demand, and market structure should influence its
sensitivity to several of the above variables. First, plants experiencing
technological change and improvements in labor productivity should
be particularly sensitive to unionization in their plant closure patterns.
This should result in larger coefficients on the unionization variable
in the industries experiencing the greatest rate of technological change.
While all three of the industries studied here (machinery manufac
turing (SIC 354), electronic components (SIC 367), and motor vehicles
(SIC 371)) are experiencing some employment growth, only electronic
components can be characterized as experiencing rapid technological
change. Productivity growth in the machine tool industry has been slug
gish, with 1 to 2 percent annual increases in output per employee hour
over the period 1975 to 1982 (Belitsky 1983). The reason for little
technological adoption of new production processes in this industry is
that most firms are small, single-plant operations that cannot afford ex
pensive new capital equipment. For example, in SIC 3544, metal

Regional Rates of Profit

91

cutting machinery, there are 7100 establishments with an average of
15 employees in each. Numerically controlled machine tools, the ma
jor technological advance in machine tool production, would replace
labor, reduce scrap, and increase precision, but they are too costly to
be affordable for most machine tool firms. Consequently, only 3
percent of metal cutting machine tools are numerically controlled
(Belitsky 1983).
While the electronic components (SIC 367) group includes diverse
industries, overall technological change has been rapid, leading to large
increases in worker productivity. Over the period 1967 to 1980, out
put per employee hour increased by 8.8 percent annually in the elec
tronics industry (Critchlow 1983b). Improvements in assembly line pro
cedures and automation of many tasks are changing the skill requirements
and increasing worker productivity. Assembly jobs, the largest occupa
tional category, are being lost to machine monitoring, feeding, loading,
unloading, and maintenance. Demand for solderers, technicians, and
drafters has also declined, while demand for scientists and engineers
has increased.
Technological change in the auto industry has been slow, relative to
that of electronics. From 1975 to 1982, output per employee hour for
production employees increased by 1.8 percent per year (U.S. Depart
ment of Labor 1983, p. 219). While this industry has mechanized much
of its assembly line operations, the most common technological changes
over the period of study here have been in computerized auto styling
and design and computerizing inventory management, such as using
computers to keep track of parts and production materials, and
forecasting parts shortages.
Earlier, we hypothesized that firms adopting new technologies may
find it is easier to close existing plants and adopt new production pro
cesses in a new plant, rather than attempt to accommodate new
technologies in an existing unionized plant. If true, we would expect
closures in electronic components plants to be more sensitive to unioniza
tion than closures in metal working machinery and motor vehicles. Sup
port for this hypothesis would show up in larger coefficients on the
unionization variable in the electronic components equation than the
motor vehicle and machine tool equations.
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Second, industry rates of growth are also expected to influence regional
plant closure patterns. Reductions in capacity are expected to be con
centrated in plants located in high-cost regions. In fast-growth industries,
high-cost plants are also expected to close at higher rates than low-cost
plants, but because the capacity at high-cost plants may be needed to
meet excess demand, the closure rates are not expected to be as high
as for declining industries. These differences should show up as larger
coefficients on the production cost variables in a declining (motor
vehicles) than a growing (electronic components) industry.
Third, cross-industry differences in market structure should also in
fluence the size of the coefficients across the three industries studied
here. All three industries studied here face competition for markets and
therefore are expected to be responsive to the variables outlined above.
However, in the case of motor vehicles, which was an oligopoly until
the late 1970s, plant closures are expected to be particularly sensitive
to high production costs and unionization.
Markusen (1985) argues that when oligopolies emerge early in the
evolution of an industrial sector, pricing practices, restrictions in out
put, and product differentiation result in the spatial concentration of
production. This spatial concentration is not the result of a least cost
calculus, as Markusen demonstrates for the case of steel, and exists
because higher costs are easily passed on to consumers. Once the
oligopolist's market is eroded, either through the development of
substitutes, or, as in the case of autos, through competition from abroad,
"oligopolists have the incentive, resources, and know-how to rationalize
and restructure very rapidly with devastating consequences for tradi
tional centers" (p. 12). If Markusen's argument holds for the auto in
dustry, we would expect to see very high closure rates in the high-cost,
unionized plants, which are located in the traditional centers of
automobile production. This would show up as large, positive, and
statistically significant coefficients on the variables for labor costs, energy
costs, and taxes.
Summary of the Equation to be Estimated
Five hypotheses are to be tested with 16 independent variables. An
establishment is more likely to close (1) the higher the level of labor,
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tax, and utility costs, (2) the more unionized the local labor force, (3) the
greater the increase in local labor and energy costs relative to the na
tional average cost increase, (4) the lower the percent of the labor force
with a high school degree and the greater the competition from imports,
and (5) the greater the decline in product demand in local and national
markets. Several additional variables that influence the probability a
plant will close, including the plant's status as an independent, head
quarters, branch, or subsidiary, the plant's age, and the plant's size,
are included in the model to hold these factors constant. The final equa
tion to be estimated is:
(4) PCj = a0 + a l Wages + a2Energy s + a3Taxs
+ a4Unions + <x5ChWages + a6ChEnergy s
+ ex7HSs + aglj + «9Manus + a 10PopChs
+ a j jHdquarterSj + a12Subsidiaryj
+a13Branchi +a 14Sizei +a 15Agei
where
PC = A binary variable, where PC = 1 if the plant closed between 1975
and 1982 and 0 if the plant remained in business.
Wage = Average hourly wage rate for production workers in the 3-digit
SIC code industry between 1977 and 1982.
Energy =A "typical" monthly utility bill between 1975 and 1981.
Tax = Percent of business income spent on business taxes in 1977.
Union = Percent of the nonagricultural labor force in unions, 1978.
ChWage=Change in wages, 1977 to 1982.
ChEnergy= Change in energy costs, 1975 to 1981.
HS= Percent of the labor force with a high school degree, 1980.
I = Dummy variable representing the industry's 4-digit SIC code.
Manu= Percentage change in manufacturing employment, 1975 to
1982.
PopCh= Percentage change in population, 1970 to 1980.
Hdquarters= Dummy variable with 1 = headquarters and 0 if not.
Subsidiary = Dummy variable with 1= subsidiary and 0 if not.
Branch = Dummy variable with 1= branch and 0 if not.
Size = Size of establishment in number of employees.
Age = Age of establishment (only available for single-plant firms).
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New=Dummy variable if firm was established after 1969 (only
available for single-plant firms).
s=Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
i=Plant.

Results
The results are reported in tables 4.5 through 4.7. The equations for
each industry were estimated for all establishments and for branches
and independents separately. Branches and independents were estimated
separately for several reasons. First, it allows for the possibility that
the slopes of the coefficients vary by type of establishment. For exam
ple, the Rhode Island Strategic Development Commission (1983) survey
found closures of branches to be more sensitive to production costs than
closures of independents. Second, separate equations allow us to check
for biases caused by faulty data. As shown in chapter 2, there is evidence
the data on the dependent variable is more accurate for branches than
for independents. Third, a separate model for independents (single-plant
firms) also permits the effects of a firm's age to be held constant. As
noted above, the D&B data do not include the age of branch plants.
To capture more homogeneous industrial categories, the establishments
used in the following models are only those that identified the given
industry as its first line of business. There were 46 SMSAs with
metalworking machinery establishments for which a complete set of
data could be compiled. There were a total of 6,303 establishments in
these 46 SMSAs in 1975, 1,573 of which closed over the 1975 to 1982
period. The results for the electronic components industry (table 4.6)
are based on 1,083 establishments in 36 SMSAs. Of these 1,083
establishments, 397 closed over the 1975 to 1982 period. There were
23 SMSAs with motor vehicle establishments and a complete set of data.
There were 1,358 establishments in these 23 SMSAs, 457 of which clos
ed over the period under study. See appendix 4.3 for a list of the SMSAs
included in the analysis and the number of plants in each SMSA.
The findings demonstrate little support for the hypotheses that local
economic variables are responsible for plant closures. For example,
in the machine tool industry equation, the only coefficient statistically

Regional Rates of Profit

95

significant at the 5 percent level of confidence is the manufacturing
growth rate (Manu), and the sign is positive rather than the expected
negative. A positive sign indicates that the faster the growth in local
manufacturing employment, the more likely a metalworking establish
ment will close, a result inconsistent with the hypotheses set forth earlier.
In logit analysis, the coefficients cannot be directly interpreted.
Therefore, the elasticities (the increase in the probability of a closure
given a 100 percent increase in the independent variable) are calculated
for the significant variables. These elasticities are relevant only when
all other variables take on their mean value. For example, the value
in the brackets [ ] under the coefficient on the local manufacturing
growth rate (Manu) can be interpreted to mean that a 100 percent in
crease in the manufacturing growth rate leads to a 1 percent increase
in the probability a plant will close, when all other variables are at their
mean value.
The one variable that is significant at the 10 percent level and of the
correct sign is wages (Wage) in the equation for independent electronic
components firms (see table 4.6). Independent electronic component
firms are more likely to close in areas where wage levels are high. The
value in brackets is interpreted to mean that a 100 percent increase in
the wage level results in a 12 percent increase in the probability an in
dependent will close, when all other independent variables are at their
mean value.
In the cases where other variables are statistically significant, the signs
are the opposite of those expected. For example, table 4.7 reports a
positive sign on the coefficient for the percent of the population with
a high school degree, indicating a greater probability of a motor vehi
cle plant closing where the labor force is better educated. In addition,
the same table shows a negative but significant sign on the coefficient
for taxes in the equation for independents. This indicates that the prob
ability of a firm closing is lower in high-tax SMSAs.
Further, there are no statistically significant differences in the prob
ability of a plant's closing across 4-digit industries, even though there
are wide variations in the extent to which imports are cutting into the
domestic production and wide variations in their rates of output growth
(see tables 4.3 and 4.4). For example, if serious import penetration
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Table 4.5
Effects of Economic Variables on Plant Closures
Metalworking Machinery (SIC 354)
Logit Model

Constant
Wage

Energy
Tax
Union
ChWage

ChEnergy
HS
SIC 3542
(Metal forming machine tools)
SIC 3544 (Special dies)
SIC 3545
(Machine tool accessories)
SIC 3546
(Power driven hand tools)
Manu

All

Branches

.88
(1.04)
-.08
(2.56)

-2.99
(.72)
.15
(.50)

.00
(2.46)
.59
(.58)
.01
(.33)
_ 08**
(2.67)
[-.02]
-.00
(.54)
.00
(.11)
.11
(.12)
-.29
(.83)
-.22
(.47)
-.51
(1.69)
.05*
(5.88)
[.01]

.00
(.31)
2.54
(.80)
-.00
(.00)
-.21
(.83)
.00
(.02)
.02
(.32)
.25
(.16)
-.14
(-07)
-.24
(.18)
-.57
(.68)
.03
(.22)

Independents
-.23
(.06)
-.09*
(3.42)
[-.02]
.00
(-43)
.91
(1.16)
.01
(.85)
-.07
(2.27)
-.00
(.03)
-.00
(.13)
.40
(.76)
-.07
(.02)
.02
(.00)
-.14
(.07)
.05*
(5.48)
[-01]
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Table 4.5 (continued)
All
Hdquarters
Subsidiary

Branch

Size

.05
(.14)
.76*
(20.94)
[.17]
1.35*
(141.46)
[.32]
-.002*
(10.29)
[-.003]

Branches
—

.00
(1.09)

Independents
—

-.02*
(75.35)
[-.004]

Age

—

New

-

.27*
(13.32)
[.01]

6303

404

5554

.56

.55

.62

No. of observations
Fraction of pairs where
predicted = actual response

.001**
(3.23)
[.001]

* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence or greater.
** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level of confidence.
( ) Chi-square statistics.
[ ] The increase in the probability of a plant closing occurring given a 100 percent increase in
the corresponding independent variable.
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Table 4.6
Effects of Economic Variables on Plant Closures
Electronic Components (SIC 367)
Logit Model
All

Constant
Wage

Energy
Tax
Union
ChWage
Ch Energy
HS
SIC 3672
(Cathode ray & picuture tubes)
SIC 3673
(Electronic tubes)
SIC 3674
(Semiconductors)
SIC 3675
(Electronic capacitors)
SIC 3676
(Electronic resistors)
SIC 3677
(Electronic coils)

Branches

-2.94**
(2.88)
.35
(2.10)

-5.99
(0.8)
.39
(.52)

.00
(.08)
1.70
(.39)
-.01
(.60)
-.32
(1.84)
.00
(.09)
.00
(.04)
.26
(.18)
.94
(2.62)
.81
(2.45)
.79
(1.66)
.36
(.30)
-.48
(.64)

-.00
(.91)
9.04
(1.58)
-.01
(.03)
-.04
(.01)
.00
(1.34)
-.05
(1.46)
7.20
(.12)
7.41
(.12)
7.26
(.12)
9.42
(.20)
7.42
(.12)
6.86
(.10)

Independent
-3.99**
(3.58)
.51**
(3.08)
[-12]
.00
(.67)
2.91
(.82)
-.03
(1.79)
-.50
(2.68)
-.00
(.00)
.01
(.63)
-.06
(.01)
.15
(.05)
.30
(.30)
-.13
(.03)
-.39
(.27)
-1.06
(2.62)
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Table 4.6 (continued)
All

Branches

Independents

Manu

-.01
(.05)

-.01
(.03)

-.02
(.15)

PopCh

.08
(.70)

.09
(.21)
—

.10
(.77)
—

-.00
(1.93)
—

-.00
(.19)
—

-.002
(2.19)

1083

186

778

.63

.63

.63

Hdquarters
Subsidiary

Branch

Size
Age

-.23
(.84)
.59*
(5.64)
[.11]
.79*
(20.01)
[.15]

New

No. of observations
Fraction of pairs where
predicted = actual response

.01
(1.06)
.42*
(5.81)
[.11]

* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence or greater.
** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level of confidence.
( ) Chi-square statistics.
[ ] The increase in the probability of a plant closing occurring given a 100 percent increase in
the corresponding independent variable.
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Table 4.7
Effects of Economic Variables on Plant Closures
Motor Vehicles (SIC 371)
Logit Model

Constant
Wage
Energy
Tax
Union
ChWage
ChEnergy
HS
SIC 3713
(Truck and bus bodies)
SIC 3714
(Motor vehicle parts
and accessories)
PopCh
Hdquarters
Subsidiary

All

Branches

-3.82*
(7.53)
.03
(.33)
.000
(.47)
-2.75
(1.66)

-6.94*
(4.47)
-.15
(1.58)
.001
(1.28)
-4.56
(1.28)

.004
(.08)
-.004
(.00)
.000
(.00)
.03*
(4.53)
[.01]
-.09
(.11)
.17
(.52)

-.01
(.06)
.47
(2.56)
-.000
(.02)
.06
(2.47)

-.06
(.43)
-.27
(1.75)
.40**
(3.07)
[-08]

-.29
(1.56)
—

.78
(1.75)
.09
(.04)

Independents
-4.37*
(6.09)
.03
(.25)
.000
(1.06)
-5.91*
(4.16)
[.20]
.007
(.15)
.08
(.23)
-.000
(1.85)
.03**
(2.74)
[-01]
-.33
(.83)
.08
(.07)
-.08
(.44)
—
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Table 4.7 (continued)
All
Branch

Size

1.09*
(48.80)
[.25]
-.0003*
(5.04)
[-.0001]

Branches
—

-.000
(2.60)

—

-.001
(.32)
.001
(.77)

Age
New

No. of observations
Fraction of pairs where
predicted = actual responses

Independents

-

.73*
(20.97)
[.14]

1358

264

900

.60

.60

.60

* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence or greater.
** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level of confidence.
( ) Chi-square statistics.
[ ] The increase in the probability of a plant closing occurring given a 100 percent increase in
the corresponding independent variable.
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resulted in high industry closing rates we would expect industry 3711
(motor vehicles and car bodies) to experience high rates of closure. This
would show up in table 4.7 as negative and significant coefficients for
SIC 3713 (truck and bus bodies and motor homes) and SIC 3714 (motor
vehicle parts), since these latter two industries are less affected by im
port competition than SIC 3711.
The absence of evidence of an association between industry closure
rates and industry growth rates is similar to findings from plant closing
studies in Great Britain. Healey (1982), in a study of the textile and
clothing industries, found no relationship between closure rates and in
dustry growth rates, and in studies of Ireland (O'Farrell 1976), the East
Midlands (Gudgin 1978), and Scotland (Henderson 1979), researchers
found no significant correlation between the same variables.
There are at least three possible explanations for this result. One,
low rates of start-ups and expansions may pick up the adjustments when
an industry declines, much the same pattern as that shown for regional
growth in chapter 3. A second, though not mutually exclusive, explana
tion is that there are differences across industries in the adjustment to
decline and no relationship between the variables the rate of plant closures
and industry growth exists. For example, healthy firms in growing in
dustries may exhibit high rates of closure because they have sufficient
profits to invest in research and development and to adopt new
technologies. The ability to adopt new technologies may lead to plant
closures as older, redundant plants are closed. These high closure rates
in fast-growth industries may offset a high rate in declining industries.
In all three industries, a plant's status has the greatest impact on the
probability a plant will close. Headquarters close at about the same rate
as independents. In the metal working machinery industry, the probability
a branch will close is 32 percent greater than the probability a singleplant firm will close. The probability of a subsidiary closing (including
headquarters and branches) is 17 percent higher than for an indepen
dent. Both of these variables are significant at high levels of confidence
in all three equations. As chapter 2 pointed out, the data overestimate
closures in independents and give a more accurate reading of branch
plant than independent closures. Even given the overestimate of indepen
dent closures, the coefficient on branch plants is positive, highly signifi
cant, and large.
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Size also has an impact on the probability a plant will close, with
larger establishments in both the metalworking machinery and motor
vehicle industries less likely to close. Interpreting the result from the
metalworking machinery industry, every 100 percent increase in size
reduces the probability a plant will close by 0.3 percent. The findings
on size for this industry can be explained by the tendency for large in
dependents to be less likely to close. This variable is insignificant for
branches (table 4.5).
Tables 4.5 through 4.7 also indicate new firms are more likely to
close than older firms. New firms are defined as those started after 1969.
Only in the metalworking machinery industry is there evidence older
firms are more likely to close than younger firms, where every 100
percent increase in age increases the probability a machine tool firm
will close by 0.1 percent. The significance and positive values for both
(Age) and (New) in the metalworking machinery equation for in
dependents indicates the impact of age on the probability a firm will
close is a "U"-shaped function with high probabilities of closure for
very young and very old metalworking manufacturing firms, and lower
probabilities for middle-aged metalworking machinery firms.
In both the electronic components and motor vehicle equations, very
young plants are most likely to close. However, there is no evidence
that age influences the likelihood of closure for firms older than five
years. These results can be explained by the tendency for metalwork
ing machinery firms to be small single-plant operations that close when
the owner retires. The other two industries are comprised primarily of
firms with a corporate form of management.
The dependent variable in the previous models included both clos
ings and out-of-state relocations. We estimate a similar model, including
only relocations. The number of relocations was too small in both the
electronic components and motor vehicle industries to yield meaningful
results. However, the model could be estimated for the metalworking
machinery industry. These results are reported in table 4.8, and indicate
headquarters and subsidiaries and plants located where labor unions are
well organized are the most likely to relocate to another state. This find
ing supports the hypothesis that plants leave regions to avoid dealing
with a unionized labor force.
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Table 4.8
Effects of Economic Variables on Relocations
Metalworking Machinery (SIC 354), Logit Model

Constant

.47
(.01)

Wage

-.19
(.36)

Energy

-.00
(.73)

SIC 3545
(Machine tool accessories)
SIC 3546
(Power driven hand tools)
Manu

-1.26
(1.28)
-.61
(.18)
.10
(.57)

Tax

-3.38
(.40)

Union

.10*
(3.72)
[-03]

Hdquarters

ChWage

-.03
(-01)

Branch

-.55
(.28)

ChEnergy

-.00
(-00)

Subsidiary

1.30*
(4.22)
[-31]

HS

-.11
(2.41)

SIC 3542
Metal forming machine tools) -.80
(-47)
SIC 3544
(Special dies)

-1.35
(1.58)

1.60*
(12.20)
'

Size

-.00
(.00)

No. of observations

6303

Fraction of pairs where
predicted = actual response

.55

* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence or greater.
( ) Chi-square statistics.
[ ] The increase in the probability of an out of state relocation given a 100 percent increase in
the corresponding independent variables.
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The finding that headquarters are more likely to relocate than
branches (table 4.8) should be interpreted judiciously, since D&B is
much more likely to record a relocating headquarters correctly than a
relocating branch. As discussed in chapter 2, many relocating
branches are probably recorded as a closing and a subsequent start-up
in a new location. Table 4.8 offers no support, however, for the fre
quently argued position that high wages, taxes, and energy bills are driv
ing plants out of the northern states.

Conclusions
The evidence from the metal working machinery, electronic com
ponents, and motor vehicles industries does not support the hypotheses
that regional differences in production cost levels, level of unioniza
tion, production cost changes, import penetration, and local market
growth lead to regional differences in rates of plant closures. This result
helps explain the absence of regional variations in plant closure rates
and rates of job loss reported in chapter 3. There are several possible
explanations.
One explanation is that the independent variables affect a plant's pro
fitability with a lag. We measured the level and change in variables
over the period 1975 to 1982, the same years as covered by the plant
closing data. The plant closing decision may reflect economic condi
tions from an earlier time period.
A second explanation is that plant closing decisions are not affected
by the characteristics of the regions where the plants are located and
that the decision to close a plant, once the plant's status, age, and size
are held constant is an idiosyncratic event or affected by factors that
occur randomly across regions. These latter two conclusions are con
sistent with the case studies conducted by Massey and Meegan (1982)
in Great Britain.
A third explanation for the finding that the characteristics of a plant's
location do not have an impact on the plant closing decision is that,
unlike the decision to open a plant, the decision to close a plant may
be influenced by political and longer run economic variables. For ex-
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ample, when there are other options for cutting back on capacity, a
manager may decide against closing a heavily unionized plant or a plant
in a depressed community because of fear of adverse attention from
the media or consumers, or because the owner feels a responsibility
to the community. Schmenner found occasions where closing decisions
were made on grounds other than short-run profitability:
With both costs and with social responsibility in mind, some
companies have modified their decisions regarding plant clos
ings from what might be termed a rigid financial accounting
approach. The most common modification—one that is seen
as the most equitable one amid a distasteful situation—is to
close the least senior plant (1982, p. 236).
This strategy guided Texas Instrument's only plant closing during the
1973-75 recession in Ft. Walton Beach, Florida.
A fourth possibility is that the model misses an important interven
ing variable, i.e., competition from other producers. Evidence from
chapter 3 demonstrates that plants located in regions with shrinking
markets and high production costs are competing in a less intense en
vironment, reducing the likelihood a plant will close. As profit rates
in a region (and/or industry) fall, new investment is deflected to lower
cost regions or to higher profit industries (Engle 1974; Carlton 1979).
Entrepreneurs shift their attention away from the less profitable market,
leaving a less competitive environment to existing producers.
In their case studies of job loss, Massey and Meegan (1982) found
two instances where competition was an important consideration in the
plant closing decision. Iron casting foundries located in regions with
little competition operated relatively inefficient plants. Plants located
in regions with more intense competition were more efficient, but also
more likely to close. They report a similar finding for the newsprint
industry. Newsprint companies, faced with excess capacity, chose to
adjust by closing plants located in competitive markets and to continue
operating plants where the company held a monopoly position. Market
competition was not included in the model presented in this chapter.
The characteristics of regional economies have been a good predic
tor of where new firms locate. Plants locate where wages and energy
costs are relatively low, an appropriately skilled labor force is available,
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and agglomeration economies exist. Regional characteristics do not,
however, appear to influence the geography of plant closures. The on
ly factors that appear to influence the closure decision are attributes
of a plant, such as its status, age, and size. The findings of chapter 4
reinforce the conclusion of chapter 3, that plant closing rates are uncorrelated with economic growth. Spatial variations in economic growth
appear to be explained by high plant start-up and expansion rates in
the fast-growth regions, rather than low rates of plant closures.
Because plant closures occur at roughly even rates in all regions of
the country, worker displacement may be a serious issue in the fastgrowth as well as the slow-growth economies. In chapter 5, we explore
the extent to which regions with strong employment growth absorb the
workers permanently laid off. Do displaced workers face difficult labor
market adjustment in all regions of the country, or is displacement
primarily a problem concentrated in labor markets where there is in
sufficient job creation?
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Appendix 4.1
Sources of Data
Average Hourly Wages by Industry, 1977 and 1982: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, 1977, table 6 and Census of Manufac
tures, 1982, table 6.
Union Membership, 1976: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract, 1979, table no. 705, p. 427.
Electricity Rates, 1978 and 1982: United States Department of Energy, Energy Infor
mation Administration, Typical Electric Bills, January 1,1978, table 11, August 1978,
pp. 166-185; and Typical Electric Bills, January 1,1982, table 19, October 1982, pp.
284-309.
Years of High School and College Completed, 1980: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, Population Census, 1980, table 119, Educational Characteristics
for Areas and Places.
Business Taxes on Manufacturing, 1977: Wheaton, William (1983) "Interstate Dif
ferences in the Level of Business Taxation," National Tax Journal, 36,1, March, p. 89.
Population Changes, 1970-80: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1982, table A.
Change in Manufacturing Employment, 1975 to 1982: U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, 22,11, May 1976, table 1, pp.
126-134 and Employment and Earnings, 31,5, May 1984, table 1, pp. 125-140.

Appendix 4.2
Range of Values of Independent Variables
for Equations Reported in Tables 4.5 through 4.7
Variable
Wage SIC 354
Wage SIC 367
Wage SIC 371
Energy
ChWage SIC 354
ChWage SIC 367
ChWage SIC 371
ChEnergy

Maximum

Minimum
5.74 (Fort Lauderdale)
4.54 (New Haven)
5.63 (Memphis)
1218.00
-1.04
.42
.95

(Seattle)
(Buffalo)
(West Palm Beach)
(Boston)

-4548.00 (Fresno)

11.62 (Buffalo)
8.12 (St. Louis)
12.14 (San FranciscoOakland)
7519.00 (Boston)
5.50 (Denver)
4.25 (St. Louis)
7.06 (San FranciscoOakland)
4266.00 (Hartford)
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Appendix 4.3
Number of Establishments Included in Logit Model
and Their Regional Distribution
Number of establishments
Metalworking Electronic
machinery components
SIC 367
SIC 354
New England
Boston
Bridgeport
Brockton
Hartford
Lawrence-Haverhill, MA-NH
Lowell, MA-NH
New Britain
New Haven-West Haven, CT
Providence-Warwick-Pawtucket
Middle Atlantic
Allentown
Buffalo
Erie
Harrisburg
New York, NY-NJ
Newark
Paterson—Clifton-Passaic, NJ
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Syracuse
York, PA
East North Central
Akron
Canton
Chicago
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN
Cleveland
Columbus
Detroit
Evansville
Indianapolis
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI
Lima, OH
Milwaukee
Muncie

96
113
61
53
12
53
35
22
407
243
116
241
94
18
26
106
28
947
101
373
21
1270
33
144
21
183
35

95
7
4

Motor
vehicles
SIC 371
29

9
6
8
9
5
89
37
25
45
7

88
22
69

83

16

81
17
243

4
12

10
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Appendix 4.3 (continued)
Number of establishments
Metalworking Electronic
machinery components
SIC 367
SIC 354

East North Central (cont.)
43
Racine
41
South Bend
112
Toledo
48
Youngstown-Warren
West North Central
113
Minneapolis-St.Paul
122
St. Louis
South Atlantic
Baltimore
Charlotte-Gastonia, NC
42
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood
Greensboro—Winston-Salem—
13
High Point
36
Miami
Raleigh-Durham, NC
32
Tampa-St. Petersburg
Washington, DC
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton
East South Central
Louisville, KY-IN
Memphis
35
Nashville
West South Central
57
Dallas-Fort Worth
41
Houston
Oklahoma City
San Antonio
Mountain
40
Denver
Phoenix
Pacific
Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove
505
Los Angeles-Long Beach
39
Portland, OR
25
San Diego
78
San Francisco-Oakland
29
San Jose
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc
__
Seattle-Everett
6303
SUM

Motor
vehicles
SIC 371

19
16
9
9
9

35
41
9

6
1
7
22
6
9
20
16
37

55
27
28
15

19
17
70
177
39
27
135
10
10
1087

82
341
40
62
___
1358
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Local Employment Growth
and the
Reemployment Success
of Displaced Workers
Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate that the numbers of displaced workers
are larger in the slow-growth industrialized states of the North, but the
rate of labor displacement for two of the three industries and the rate
of plant closures for all three industries are even across the regions.
Workers in the metalworking machinery and electronic components in
dustries located in the healthy economies of the Sun Belt are as likely
to be displaced by a plant closing as workers in the slow-growth
economies of the Rust Belt. These findings suggest that labor displace
ment may be a nationwide problem.
If manufacturing workers displaced in strong labor markets are readily
reabsorbed into the workforce, then assistance for dislocated workers
should target depressed communities. If, however, displaced workers
in strong, as well as weak, local economies face difficult adjustments
and large financial losses after displacement, a nationwide strategy is
appropriate. This issue is the focus of chapter 5.
Three questions are addressed. (1) What impact does local labor
market growth have on the readjustment of displaced manufacturing
workers? (2) Are there specific demographic groups who experience
large financial losses after displacement, even when laid off in grow
ing labor markets? (3) What impact does worker prenotification have
on the reemployment success of displaced manufacturing workers?
As part of their Current Population Survey in January 1984, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics identified displaced workers for the first time. We
used this data base to explore the above issues. There are five findings.
(1) The reemployment success of displaced manufacturing workers is
115
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more sensitive to local conditions in the workers' industry than to con
ditions in the total local economy. (2) Workers displaced from locally
declining industries experience the longest stretches of unemployment
and the greatest declines in living standards. (3) All middle-age, bluecollar workers with a stable work history, even those displaced in strong
local labor markets, experience large financial losses after displacement.
(4) Displaced workers' reemployment success is influenced not only
by local labor market conditions, but by the number of years worked
prior to layoff, the state of the national economy in the year of the layoff,
and the workers' sex, race, and occupation. (5) Workers who are
prenotified of a closing are not, as a group, more successfully reemployed
than those who are not prenotified.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into six sections. The first
describes the Current Population Survey—Supplement on Displaced
Workers. The second section reviews prior literature on the effect of
labor market growth and worker demographics on reemployment. The
third section defines a measure of the financial costs of displacement
and the study methodology. The fourth section presents regression
results. The fifth section discusses the role of prenotification on workers'
reemployment success, and the final section summarizes findings.
Current Population Survey—Supplement
on Displaced Workers

In January 1984, as a part of the Current Population Survey (CPS),
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) identified workers who lost their
jobs after January 1, 1979 as a result of a plant closing, the phase-out
of a shift, the closure of a self-operated business, the completion of
seasonal work, or slack work. While there is no widely accepted defini
tion of displacement, for purposes of this study we define displaced
workers as those who lost their jobs for the first three reasons given
above. This definition was chosen because it is unlikely that a worker
laid off because of a plant closing, the phase-out of a shift, or the failure
of a self-operated business will be rehired at his or her old job, whereas
workers displaced for the last two reasons may be reemployed by the
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same firm. Among those surveyed, 82 percent lost their job as the result
of a plant closing or relocation, 15 percent as the result of the phaseout of a shift, and 3 percent as the result of a failure of a self-operated
business. We also define a displaced worker as one who completed at
least one full year on the job prior to layoff, since much of the current
proposed plant closing legislation would require that workers be
employed at least one year. Based on this definition, the BLS-CPS data
indicate that slightly more than 3 million workers were displaced be
tween January 1979 and December of 1982.
The January 1984 CPS provides information on the length of the
displaced worker's unemployment spell, and his or her previous and
current wage, old and new industry affiliation, age, years at the firm
prior to layoff, education level, sex, race, and whether he or she was
prenotified or expected the closing, along with other information. We
supplemented these data with figures on employment gains and losses
from 1979 to 1983 in the worker's labor market and on average week
ly unemployment insurance payments in 1980 by state.

Shortcomings in the Data
There are a number of shortcomings in the data for the purposes of
this study, One is that many workers, especially those displaced close
to the 1984 survey date, did not complete their unemployment spell
prior to the survey, making it impossible to determine the length of
their unemployment period and their subsequent wage. A failure to cor
rect for this truncated sample is likely to result in (1) underestimating
the duration of the average unemployment spell, (2) overestimating the
average postdisplacement wages, and (3) making faulty comparisons
across workers. For example, a worker displaced in December of 1983
and still unemployed in January of 1984 would register four weeks of
unemployment. A worker displaced earlier in the year, who was
unemployed for four weeks and then reemployed would register the
same unemployment spell. The two unemployment spells should not
be treated as equivalent. In addition, the reemployment wage among
those displaced close to the survey date will be biased upwards. The
most successful workers are most likely to be reemployed quickly, prior
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to the survey date, and these workers probably earn higher-than-average
postlayoff wages.
In order to insure that most workers in our sample had a chance to
complete their unemployment spell prior to the January 1984 survey
date, our analysis excludes all workers laid off in 1983 and 1984. The
years to be excluded were determined by examining the distribution
of unemployment spells for each year of layoff. These distributions were
done separately for each year because the length of the spells could vary
by year, with longer spells more likely in years of a weak national
economy. Unfortunately, the data do not include information on the
month a worker was laid off. To be conservative, we assumed all workers
were laid off in December of the layoff year. If all workers laid off
in 1982 were laid off in December of 1982,75 percent would have com
pleted their unemployment spell by the January 1984 survey date. Thus,
these observations are included in the study. If workers displaced in
1983 lost their jobs in December of that year, only 40 percent would
have completed their unemployment spell as of the survey date; thus,
these observations are excluded.
A second shortcoming of the data set is the exclusion of
nonmetropolitan observations. The only information contained in the
CPS on a worker's geographical location is SMSA and state of residence.
States are too large to be used as a proxy for a labor market, thus the
analysis is limited to SMSA residents.
Another possible shortcoming is that the CPS does not report the loca
tion of layoff, although there is a record as to whether the worker moved.
All movers are assigned to the city of residence at the time of the survey.
Approximately 19 percent of displaced manufacturing workers in SMSAs
relocated from another county or city, so the potential for bias is substan
tial. Presumably, most migrants moved from declining areas to grow
ing SMSAs, most likely after a prolonged and discouraging job search
in the declining area. The resulting bias would make conditions look
more favorable in declining areas and less favorable in growing SMSAs
than is actually the case. To test for this possibility, the results were
estimated with and without movers. The direction of the bias is as ex
pected, but, as explained below, not large.
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A fourth problem is recall bias. Horvath (1982) found that when in
dividuals are asked to recall the length of unemployment spells that oc
curred 6 to 12 months in the past, they tend to underestimate the length
of the spell. This suggests there is an even greater potential bias here,
where workers are asked to recall the amount of time they were
unemployed up to four years earlier.

Previous Literature
Effects of Labor Market Conditions on Reemployment
Prior to the release of the January 1984 CPS, most empirical work
on the experience of displaced workers was based on case studies (see
Gordus, Jarley, and Ferman 1981). While pre- and postclosing surveys
from a particular plant can illuminate many of the consequences of a
shutdown, it is unclear to what extent the results can be generalized
to all displaced workers. This is particularly true in the plant closing
literature, where most cases have focused on closings in declining and
manufacturing-dependent communities. These studies have shed a great
deal of light on the impact of workers' age, education, race and sex
on their reemployment success, but can tell us very little about the ad
justments for these demographic groups in expanding local economies.
Case studies that do address the impact of labor market conditions
on reemployment are those of the Armour and Company plant clos
ings. The results from studies of five Armour and Company meat packing
plant closures show the condition of the labor market in which the clos
ings occurred had a crucial effect on the success of training and transfer
programs (Ullman 1969). In the 1960s, Armour and Company, the
United Packing Workers Union, and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters
and Workman's Union agreed to assist workers who were displaced
as a consequence of Armour closings. Offices were set up in Forth Worth
in 1962, Sioux City in 1963, Kansas City in 1964, Peoria in 1967, and
Omaha in 1968 to coordinate and establish counseling services, offer
retraining and placement programs, and provide job search support
groups. Qualitative evaluations conducted after the five experiences
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indicated that the strength of the local labor market had a crucial effect
on the placement records for each city (see also Shultz 1964; Conant
1965; and Stern 1969).
In a study of displaced steel workers, Jacobson (1977), found that
if the worker was displaced into a local labor market where the
unemployment rate was 1.4 percentage points above the city's average
rate, financial losses over the first six years after displacement were
about 8 percentage points higher than average. He also found that
younger workers' losses were particularly sensitive to the unemploy
ment rate. Younger workers experienced negligible losses in strong labor
markets and substantial losses in weak local markets.
A third study, by Bendick and Devine (1981), found 14.8 percent
of workers displaced in declining SMSAs were unemployed for more
than 26 weeks, while only 7.6 percent of workers displaced in growing
SMSAs were unemployed for more than 26 weeks. The authors defin
ed displaced workers as those who were unemployed for longer than
eight weeks, actively seeking employment, and between the ages of 22
and 54.
Podgursky and Swaim (1987), using the same CPS data used here,
found high area unemployment levels, measured as SMSA rates for
workers located in the largest SMSAs and state rates for all other
workers, reduced the reemployment earnings of displaced workers.
Unemployment was measured as the average rate between the year of
displacement and 1984. For every 1 percent increase in the unemploy
ment rate, postdisplacement earnings fell by between 1 and 2 percent.

Effects of Worker Characteristics on Reemployment
A large number of case studies have focused on the effects of a
worker's age, education level, race, and sex on the postdisplacement
adjustment.

Age
Mature workers are expected to encounter larger wage losses than
younger workers because they have invested in job-specific human capital
that was rewarded prior to layoff but may not be transferable to a new
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job. Age discrimination, employers' reluctance to spend resources on
retraining and pension plans for someone with a relatively short worklife,
and the actual or perceived inflexibility of older workers are additional
reentry barriers for older workers. This hypothesis is supported by a
number of studies.
Hammerman (1964) conducted case studies of five plant closings and
reported that in four of the five cases, workers over 45 years of age
had significantly higher unemployment rates than those below that age.
When older workers did obtain jobs, they experienced greater losses
in hourly earnings than did younger workers. Foltman (1968), in a study
of the Wickwire plant closing near Buffalo, New York, found older
workers had greater difficulty in obtaining jobs. Nine months after the
shutdown, 83 percent of the 20-29 age bracket, 92 percent of the 30-39
age bracket, 73 percent of the 40-49 age bracket, and only 44 percent
of the over 50 age bracket had found new jobs. After controlling for
education and family status, Dorsey (1967) found that age was an im
portant variable in explaining the unemployment spell of workers laid
off from a Mack Truck plant in Plainfield, New Jersey. Every year
of age resulted in an average of .2 additional weeks of unemployment.
Jacobson and Thomason (1979), Holen, Jehn, and Trost (1981) and
Podgursky and Swaim (1987) conducted cross-industry and cross-region
studies of worker displacement and also found older workers experience
larger postdisplacement losses than younger workers.
Education
Levels of formal education are also expected to affect a worker's
postlayoff experience. More highly educated workers should achieve
higher wages at their postdisplacement job and shorter unemployment
spells than their less-educated counterparts. Workers with more education
should conduct more effective job searches, make better presentations
at an interview, be more ambitious or assertive, and be perceived by
potential employers to be more flexible and trainable.
The evidence of a relationship between length of unemployment and
education is mixed, but generally shows duration decreases as educa
tion increases. In his case studies of five plant closings, Hammerman
(1964) found that 6-21 months after shutdown, high school graduates
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experienced lower unemployment rates than those who had not com
pleted high school. The least educated workers also took the sharpest
cuts in wages. In the study of the Wickwire plant closing in Buffalo,
Foltman (1968) found that nine months after the closing only 49 per
cent of those who had not completed high school had found jobs. Of
those who had completed high school, 79 percent had obtained jobs;
of those who had some college education, 82 percent had found jobs.
Foltman also reports that workers who were more educated were less
likely to accept lower incomes when reemployed. Dorsey (1967), in
the Mack Truck study mentioned above, found that better-educated
workers experienced shorter unemployment spells after layoff, and a
survey of the reemployment of workers from the Playskool plant in
Chicago found higher placement rates for workers with high school
diplomas (O'Connell 1985).
Race
A number of plant closing case studies report that minorities do
relatively poorly in terms of reemployment after a permanent layoff.
Stern (1971), in a study of displaced meat packers in Kansas City, found
blacks made $204 less per year than whites when reemployed. Palen
and Fancy (1968), in a study of the Studebaker plant closing in South
Bend, Indiana, found 39.9 percent of whites and 60 percent of nonwhites were unemployed four months after the shutdown. Aiken, Ferman, and Sheppard (1968) found a similar result in their study of the
Packard plant closing.
Sex
Similar findings are reported for women. Hammerman (1964), in his
study mentioned above, noted female unemployment rates three times
the rate of males; Stern (1971) reports in his study of displaced meatpackers that females made $2,123 less per year than males when
reemployed; and Lipsky (1970) found that women displaced during a
General Mills shutdown were unemployed an average 24.8 weeks, com
pared to only 16.5 weeks for the males. Only Lipsky's study controls
for workers' age, race, education and previous income. A similar result
for women is reported by Jacobson and Thomason (1979), Holen, Jehn,
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and Trost (1981), and Podgursky and Swaim (1987) in their studies
of the impact of displacement on earnings losses.
Level of Unemployment Insurance Benefits
Numerous empirical studies outside the plant closing literature have
found evidence that individuals who receive higher unemployment in
surance (UI) benefits prolong the job search (Classen 1977; Feldstein
1974; and Welch 1977). Consequently, in addition to labor market con
ditions, and workers' age, education level, race and sex, we expect the
size of a state's unemployment insurance payments to influence the length
of the unemployment spell and the reemployment wage of displaced
workers.

Methodology
Estimating Financial Losses From Displacement
A displaced manufacturing worker experiences financial losses as a
result of the unemployment spell and any wage cuts upon reemploy
ment. We measured these financial losses as the present value of the
predisplacement wage five years into the future subtracted from the pres
ent value of zero wages during the unemployment spell plus the
postdisplacement wage thereafter, continuing five years into the future.
260
260
(1) CD = E
cw
- E
ow
i=s + l (1+r)1
i = l (1+r)1
where s=Weeks unemployed.
r=Annual discount rate of 10 percent.
ow = Previous weekly wage.
cw= Current weekly wage.
CD=Cost of displacement.
i=Weeks (i=0 in week of job loss).
A 10 percent discount rate was chosen to reflect an average annual rate
of inflation of 6.5 percent over the period 1979-1987, and a marginal
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rate of substitution between present and future consumption of 3.5 per
cent (see Tresch 1981, p. 489). Hereafter, this variable is referred to
as the cost of displacement (CD). A negative value signifies financial
losses. A positive value indicates a financial gain.
The advantage of this measure of the financial costs of displacement
is that it summarizes, in one indicator, the payoff to a worker who trades
a longer unemployment spell for a higher-paying job. Its disadvantage
is that its accuracy depends on the assumption a worker's prelayoff wage
would have continued five years into the future, and the reemployment
wage continues unchanged for up to five years (after the unemploy
ment spell). These measurement errors probably result in an underestima
tion of both the present value of the reemployment wage and prelay off
wage, with the largest underestimates for younger, well-educated
workers displaced in growing regions. This is the group most likely
to receive wage increases with time. Figure 5.1 compares actual losses
with those measured in this study. The gap between actual losses and
measured losses depends upon the slopes of the earning profile, which
are, unfortunately, unknown. 1
We also assume the 17 percent of the sample unemployed on the survey
date will be unemployed for the whole period. For both unemployed
and part-time workers, we assume that the value of their leisure is zero,
which may bias financial losses upwards. An additional shortcoming
is that the measured financial losses ignore the value of fringe benefits.
However, this may be more than balanced by the fact that we do not
include the value of transfers to unemployed workers. 2
The effect of local labor market conditions and worker demographics
on the financial costs of displacement are tested with the following model.
The variables are defined in table 5.1.
(2) CD=X0 +X1AEs +X2IEs +X3YRLOi +X4YRWKDi
+X5AgCj+X6EDj+X7Racej -hXgSeXj -I-X^EN,,+X10OCCj.

Similar models are also tested, replacing CD with the change in nominal
weekly wages (CWW) and the number of weeks unemployed (WKS).
The latter two models offer insight into the reasons for financial losses.
Are losses, for example, due to long unemployment spells or large losses
in nominal weekly wages?

Displaced Workers

Figure 5.1
Comparison of Measured Financial Losses with Actual Losses
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Table 5.1
Variables Included in the Model
(Equation 2)

Conditions in the Local Labor Market
AE
= Annual average net employment change for all industries
January 1979 to December 1982 in thousands of jobs.
IE
= Annual average net employment change, in 2-digit SIC level
industry of displacement, 1980 to 1983 in thousands of jobs.
YRLO = Dummy variable representing the state of the national
economy in the year laid off. Value = 1 if recession year 1980
or 1982 and 0 if an expansionary year 1979 or 1981.
Characteristics of the Worker
YRWKD = Years worked at that job prior to layoff.
Age
=Worker's age in January 1984.
ED
=Worker's years of formal education in January 1984.
Race
= Dummy variable with 1= white and 0=nonwhite.
Sex
= Dummy variable with 1= female and 0=male.
BEN
= Average weekly unemployment insurance payment in a
worker's state.
OCC
= Dummy variable representing the worker's prelayoff occupa
tion. Value =1 if a blue-collar worker and =0 if a whitecollar worker.
Dependent Variables
CD
= Total cost of displacement (equation 1).
CWW = Change in nominal weekly wages.
WKS
= Weeks unemployed.
Subscripts
i
= Individual.
s
= Local labor market.

The coefficients on YRLO, YRWKD, Age, Sex and OCC are ex
pected to be negative, and the coefficients on AE, IE, ED, and Race
are expected to be positive. A priori, the sign on the coefficient for BEN
is ambiguous. Strong empirical evidence exists to show that individuals
who receive UI compensation extend their job search, reducing the pre
sent value of the unemployment experience. However, the expectation
is that this extended job search will allow individuals to find employ
ment more suited to their skills and thus to increase their reemployment
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wage beyond what it would have been if the worker had been forced
by economic necessity to take the first job that came along. UI benefits
should therefore extend the weeks unemployed and increase the new
wage. But it is unclear whether the reemployment wage, extended five
years into the future, will be large enough to offset the losses from a
prolonged spell of unemployment.
Findings

The mean costs of displacement, the change in nominal weekly wages,
and weeks unemployed are shown in table 5.2 for all displaced manufac
turing workers, and for comparison purposes, all displaced workers.

Table 5.2
Unemployment and Reemployment Statistics in January 1984
for Workers Displaced Between January 1979 and December 1982
All Industries and All Manufacturing
Mean change
Weeks
Out of
in nominal
Cost of
displacement8 weekly wages" Employed0 Unemployed0 labor force0 unemployed"
%
%
%
%
(% gain or loss)
$
All workers
-16,543.

4.03
(1.0%)

All manufacturing workers
-12.01
-21,531.
(-4.1%)

68

15

17

32

67

16

17

37

a. Universe includes all workers in labor force at time of survey, except self employed.
b. Universe includes only wage and salaried workers. Excludes self employed. Equal to current
nominal weekly wage minus previous nominal weekly wage.
c. Universe includes all workers.
d. Universe includes all workers in labor force at time of survey, except self employed.
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Displaced workers who found new jobs did so at an average increase
of $4 per week in wages. During the same period, the average weekly
wage for all workers in the U.S. increased by an average of $17.50
per year, or $11.00 over a 7.5-month period, the average unemploy
ment spell for displaced workers. Therefore, displaced workers sus
tained a net loss of $7 per week when compared to earnings for all
workers over a comparable time period.
Displaced manufacturing workers suffered larger financial losses and
longer unemployment spells than the average displaced worker. The
average displaced manufacturing worker lost $12 per week in wages
when reemployed. This drop occurred during the same period in which
the average nominal weekly manufacturing wage increased by approx
imately $24.00 per annum (U.S. Department of Commerce 1985, p.
417).
We now turn to the question of how displaced workers fare in grow
ing versus declining labor markets. Table 5.3 compares the costs of
displacement in declining and growing labor markets for two industries,
machinery and transportation manufacturing, and for all manufactur
ing. Machinery and transportation manufacturing were selected for disaggregation because they are the only 2-digit SIC code industries in the
survey with sufficient numbers of observations to yield meaningful
results. The table shows that the costs of displacement are sensitive to
local industry employment growth. For machinery manufacturing,
workers displaced in growing areas experienced, on the average, a net
loss of $1,173 in the five years following displacement, compared to
a net loss of approximately $17,182 for workers displaced in declining
labor markets. Displaced transportation workers and all manufactur
ing workers also experienced greater financial losses in declining than
in growing labor markets.
Table 5.3 also compares the average change in nominal wages, the
current employment status, and the average length of the unemploy
ment spell in growing and declining local labor markets. All indicators
are sensitive to local labor market conditions. However, for all manufac
turing, the drop in wages for reemployed displaced workers is nearly
equivalent in both growing and declining SMSAs.
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Table 5.3
Comparison of the Unemployment and Reemployment Experience
of Displaced Manufacturing Workers in Growing and Declining
Labor Markets, for Selected Industries and All Manufacturing

Mean cost
of displacement8
$

Mean change _
in nominal
weekly wage
Percent
$
(% change)
working

Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 35)
Growing labor markets
-1,173
45.44
(+12.7)
Declining labor markets
-17,182
-49.96
(-12.7)
Transportation Manufacturing (SIC 37)
Growing labor markets
-6,130
-9.49
(-2.5)
Declining labor markets
-45,942
-115.27
(-29.9)
All Manufacturing
Growing labor markets
-19,758
-10.97
(-3.2)
Declining labor markets
-31,298
-12.13
(-3.4)

Current Status0

Percent
unemployed

Percent out
of labor
force

Mean weeks
unemployed

82

12

21

68

20

31

10

94
65

23

12

67

68

16

16

31

58

23

19

43

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, Supplement on Displaced Workers,
January 1984.
NOTE: For 2-digit SIC industries, growing labor markets defined as SMSAs with net job gain of 1450 jobs
or more in that industry; declining labor markets as SMSAs with net job loss greater than 49 jobs. For all
manufacturing, growing labor markets defined as net manufacturing employment growth equal to or greater
than 9,500 employees and declining labor markets as SMSAs with net job loss greater than 49 manufacturing
jobs. Selected industries with weighted totals of 10,000 population in both growing and declining SMSAs.
a. Includes all displaced workers currently in the labor force. Excludes self-employed. Value as calculated
in equation (1).
b. Includes only currently working wage and salaried workers. Excludes self-employed. Equal to current weekly
wage minus previous weekly wage. A positive value indicates a gain in nominal wages.
c. Includes all displaced workers, as defined in text. Definitions for each category are as defined by the U.S.
Bureau of the Census in its Current Population Survey.
d. Includes all displaced workers currently in the labor force. Excludes self-employed.
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Impact of Local Labor Market Conditions
and Worker Characteristics
The results of equation (2) are shown in table 5.4. The dependent
variable in column I is the cost of displacement. (Again, a negative value
indicates a loss.) The dependent variables in columns II and in are the
change in nominal weekly wages and number of weeks unemployed,
respectively.
Several findings are of interest. First, the reemployment success of
displaced manufacturing workers is more sensitive to local growth in
their industry of displacement (IE) than in total local employment (AE).
One interpretation is that manufacturing workers do not move easily
into new industries, and when they do so it is at a substantial loss in
income. The results on the local industry growth coefficient can be in
terpreted as, for every 1,000 industry jobs added to the local labor market
in a year, the losses experienced by a displaced worker are reduced
by $4209. The coefficient on total employment growth (AE) is both
relatively small and statistically insignificant.
We expected that the inclusion of movers in their SMSA of current
residence rather than area of displacement would bias the coefficients
on local economic growth downwards because some of the most hard
hit and discouraged workers displaced in declining areas moved to
growth economies. Reestimating equation (2) without movers, we found
that the direction of the bias was as expected, but not large. Without
movers in the equation, the coefficient on total employment (AE) is
$19 and on local industry growth (IE) is equal to $4226.
While there is no evidence that growth in total local employment
reduces the loss in weekly wages, there is evidence that workers displac
ed in expanding local economies are unemployed for shorter periods
of tune than workers in weak economies (see column HI). However,
the impact is small. The coefficient on AE in column in can be inter
preted to mean that a net increase of 1000 local jobs in all sectors reduces
the unemployment spell by 2 percent of a week (or less than one hour).
In contrast, an additional 1000 jobs in the workers' industry of displace
ment reduces the unemployment spell by 2-1/2 weeks. The large financial
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losses of workers displaced where their industry is declining is due to
both declines in weekly wages and lengthier periods of unemployment
(columns n and HI).
Table 5.4
The Impact of Labor Market Conditions and Worker Demographics
on the Cost of Displacement, Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent
variable
Constant
AE
IE
YRLO
YRWKD
Age
ED
SEX
Race
BEN
OCC
F
R2
No. of observations

I
Cost of
displacement
-28033.08
(-.88)
12.82
(1.11)
4208.56*
(2.17)
-12555.63*
(-2.11)
-1285.01*
(-2.48)
-292.79
(-.94)
1455.61
(1.18)
17893.91*
(2.75)
14134.98*
(1.96)
39.83
(.16)
-10251.15
(-1.48)
5.10*

n

Change in nominal
weekly wage
-111.83
(-.71)
.04
(.69)
20.08*
(2.04)
-70.34*
(-2.34)
-6.47*
(-2.47)
-1.46
(-.92)
8.81
(1.43)
78.45*
(2.38)
58.63
(1.61)
.17
(.13)
-44.01
(-1.27)
4.56*

.22
186

* Statistically significant at 5 percent level of confidence.
** Statistically significant at 10 percent level of confidence.
( ) t-statistics.

.20
188

m

Weeks
unemployed
59.15*
(2.57)
-.02*
(-2.25)
-2.57**
(-1.88)
-9.84*
(-2.31)
.64**
(1.77)
.08
(.36)
-.73
(-.88)
.51
(.11)
-17.71*
(-3.35)
-.09
(-.48)
15.83*
(3.16)
6.22*
.23
213
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As expected, workers laid off when the national economy was in
decline experienced larger financial losses, due to greater declines in
their reemployment wage. Contrary to expectation, however, workers
displaced during the recessions experienced shorter periods of unemploy
ment by nearly 10 weeks. One explanation is that workers displaced
when the national economy is weak lower their reservation wage sooner
and, therefore, find jobs more quickly than workers displaced in a
stronger national economy.
Workers who had committed more years to their employer prior to
layoff (YRWKD) experienced larger financial losses than recently
employed workers. This finding indicates that earnings of senior workers
reflected union rates or firm-specific skills of less value to new than
prior employers. The results show that for every year of employment
at their prelayoff job, workers lost $1285 in total income and $6.47
in weekly wages once reemployed. When YRWKD is added to the equa
tion, the coefficient on Age becomes insignificant. The two variables
are highly correlated, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of .56 (see
appendix 5.2).
Surprisingly, the coefficient on education is insignificant. Again, this
may be due to multicollinearity among the independent variables. Oc
cupation and education are correlated (the correlation coefficient=.40)
and when occupation is dropped, education is statistically significant.
In contrast to the numerous case study findings, this analysis shows
women do better than men in recouping their prelayoff wage (but do
not experience shorter unemployment spells). There are two possible
explanations. First, women probably earned lower wages in the manufac
turing sector than men, and therefore had less difficulty recovering their
prelayoff wage. Second, women are likely to hold service sector-type
jobs in manufacturing, and thus may be able to put those skills to use
in another industry, including the growing service sector. Men, on the
other hand, may have been trained for jobs specific to their industry
or firm. When a similar job is not available in another firm, they may
have to again start at the bottom of the wage ladder. Our findings on
the reemployment pattern for women may differ from earlier studies
because previous studies explained wage levels rather than wage changes.

Displaced Workers

133

In support of case study and other statistical studies, nonwhites ap
pear to experience larger financial losses than whites, by $14,135. These
losses are due to blacks' longer unemployment spells, by nearly 18
weeks, and not to larger losses in the reemployment wage of blacks.
The generosity of state unemployment insurance (UI) payments has
no impact on the cost of displacement, the reemployment wage, or the
weeks unemployed. One explanation for this finding is that displaced
workers behave differently from all unemployed, and do not prolong
their job search where UI benefits are larger. A second possibility is
that average weekly UI benefits may be a poor measure of a worker's
actual compensation. Displaced workers, in addition to UI benefits, may
receive Trade Adjustment Assistance, extended health care benefits,
severance payments from the company, or compensation from their
union. Unfortunately, the BLS survey did not ask respondents about
supplemental compensation.
Finally, there is evidence that blue-collar workers are unemployed
for an average of 15.8 weeks longer than white-collar workers, but lit
tle support for the hypothesis that blue-collar workers are less likely
than white-collar workers to recoup their prelayoff wage. To summarize,
we find the reemployment success of displaced workers is more sen
sitive to local employment growth in their industry of displacement than
to growth in all industries, and that black, blue-collar workers with long
commitments to their prelayoff employer experience the largest finan
cial losses.

Impact of Prenotification on the Reemployment
Success of Displaced Workers
The CPS data base also provides information on whether displaced
workers were notified by employers their plant would close. Among
the numerous federal proposals to deal with worker displacement,
employee prenotification of an impending closing has the most support
from both labor and Congress. In 1985, proponents of a national plant
closing bill put their strength behind legislation requiring only prenotifica
tion, ignoring a host of other issues such as severance payments, ex
tended health care, mandatory negotiation over whether the closing can
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be averted, and employee retraining. This legislation was narrowly
defeated in a House vote on November 21, 1985,203 to 208. A similar
bill, requiring 60 days notice for firms with 100 employees or more,
was revived in the 100th Congress. The bill was passed by both Houses,
but vetoed by President Reagan in mid-1988. The House of Represen
tatives overrode the presidential veto. A majority in the Senate sup
ported passage, but they could not muster a two-thirds vote. The legisla
tion was a omnibus bill, including a wide range of trade related initiatives.
However, the mandatory prenotification clause attracted the most con
troversy and was responsible for the veto of the total trade package.
Maine and Wisconsin currently require advance notice, although the
legislation is only weakly enforced; and during the period 1975-83, 30
states introduced more than 125 bills relating to plant closings. More
than 90 percent of these bills had provisions requiring advance notice
of shutdowns (Ehrenberg 1985).
The legislative emphasis on prenotification is motivated by the belief
that adjustment problems are particularly acute where workers and com
munities receive little advance notice of a closing, and consequently
cannot plan for an employee buyout, reuse of the physical facility, or
a period of personal or community fiscal stringency. Advance notice
also gives employers, workers and the community a chance to explore
ways to keep the plant operating through, for example, the identifica
tion of a new owner. Finally, prenotification gives local governments
a chance to set up retraining and counseling programs for displaced
workers. It is difficult to reach displaced workers once the plant has
closed and the workers have dispersed.
Opponents of federal- or state-mandated prenotification claim such
legislation would have adverse effects on the firm and the community.
Potential adverse effects on the firm include the departure of the firm's
most productive workers prior to the closing, falling stock prices for
the plant's parent, and precedent for further government involvement
in the affairs of business. Opponents also claim that mandatory
prenotification would inhibit local economic growth by discouraging
firms from locating or expanding in states where an advance notice law
is in effect (McKenzie 1982).
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The evidence on the frequency of employee prenotification indicates
that, in the absence of legislation, little or no prenotification is com
mon. The following story by a displaced worker from a branch of
Dresser Industries is typical of the anecdotal evidence.

When Dresser got us down to about 50 people, they told us
we were in trouble. They said we'd have to give up
something. It wasn't contract time until June of '84 and we
had no reopener clause, so those of us that were left gave
the company a full week without pay.
We were worried and scared, too, I guess.
We asked management if the plant was going to close. At
first, we were told no, and later were told, if the plant was
going to shut down, we would be given plenty of advance
notice.
But that isn't the way it worked. In October we were told
the plant was going to be shut down within three weeks. And
on November 15, 1982 it shut down and closed. 3
In 1980, only about 13 percent of all major collective bargaining con
tracts included prenotification clauses. About one-half of those did not
specify the length of advance notice and only 34 percent agreed to an
advance notice of 31 days or more (Wendling 1984). Although these
figures indicate that a minority of employers are required to give ad
vance warning of a closing, the figures may actually overstate the number
of protected workers. Employees not covered by a collective bargain
ing agreement are even less likely to have a legal right to advance notice.
A second study on the frequency of prenotification indicates higher
rates of prenotification. Gainer (1986) surveyed 355 firms that closed
plants and found that 20 percent of the establishments had provided their
workers with over 90 days of advance notice and 40 percent had pro
vided less than 14 days or no advance notice. The higher prenotification figures in the Gainer study could be because (1) many firms who
are not required to give prenotification do so; (2) the Gainer study is
more recent and, with increased publicity, more firms are giving
prenotification; or (3) Gainer interviewed larger firms (firms with 100
employees or more), which are more likely than the average size firm
to give advance notice.
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One study of the impact of prenotification on reemployment success
is by Folbre, Leighton, and Roderick (1984). They used data from
Maine, prior to the passage of the 1982 mandatory advance notice law,
and found that unemployment rates in local communities where a clos
ing occurred did not rise as high and fell faster where employees had
been given advance notice of the closing. The authors argue that this
evidence "strongly suggests that Maine workers significantly benefitted from advance notification of job loss" (p. 195).
Holen, Jehn, and Trost (1981), using a sample of 9500 workers from
42 plants that closed, found a statistically significant and positive rela
tionship between advance notice and postdisplacement losses. In other
words, workers given advance notice experienced greater postdisplace
ment losses than those who were not given advance warning. The authors
speculated that "advance notice may be given in just those cases where
losses are expected to be high" (p. 27). Although the authors suggest
the variable prenotification may be endogenously determined, they do
not make the appropriate corrections in their empirical work.
The BLS's Survey of Displaced Workers permits the exploration
of several of the issues posed above, including whether a displaced
worker was prenotified, the extent to which prenotification encourages
preclosing departures, and the impact of prenotification on workers'
reemployment success.
The question posed to workers was, "Did you expect a layoff or had
you received advance notice of a layoff or a plant or business closing?"
The survey includes no additional information as to the length of the
advance notice, or whether the worker was informed by management
or expected the plant to close because of such factors as rumors of poor
profit performance. Even given these shortcomings, there are several
interesting findings.
Among all displaced manufacturing workers living in SMSAs at the
time of the survey, 61 percent said they were either given advance notice
or expected their plant to close. Among the 61 percent who expected
a closing, only 9 percent left their jobs before they would have been
laid off. 4
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The impact of prenotification on displacement losses was tested us
ing both the ordinary least squares estimation of equation (3) below and
two-stage least squares (2SLS):
(3) CD=a0 +a 1AEs +a2IEs +a3YRLOi +a4YRWKDi
tj-l-a9BENs
Where the variables are defined in table 5.1, except:
PN=Dummy variable, with 1 =the worker was prenotified or expected
the closing and 0=the worker was caught by surprise.
Column I in table 5.5 reports the results, which indicate larger losses
for prenotified than non-notified workers. This result is similar to that
of Holen, Jehn, and Trost (1981) who used both a different data set
and different measures of income losses. One explanation for this
counterintuitive result is that, for humanitarian reasons, employers are
more likely to prenotify workers who will experience large losses.
Another reason is that employers may be more likely to prenotify workers
in weak labor markets, where losses will be large, because employees
will have relatively few employment options. Employers may know the
probability is small that these workers will leave prior to the closing.
If any of the above explanations are true, there will be simultaneity
bias in the estimated coefficients. If prenotification is a function of ex
pected financial losses, the assumption of independence between the
independent variables and the error term is violated (see Maddala 1977,
pp. 231-235).
The 2SLS method of estimating simultaneous equations was used to
correct for this problem. The simultaneous equation system includes
equations (3) and (4), where equation (4) explains the probability a
about the closing. A predicted value of
worker was prenotified
XN
using the reduced form of equation
generated
prenotification (PN) was
(4). The variable PN in equation (3) was then replaced with PN .
(4) PN=7o+7iCONj + T2UNj + T3MEs + 74Sj + 75CDi
where
CON=Percent of output produced by the four largest firms in
1980.
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UN=Dummy variable =1 if the SMSA and industry had above
median levels of unionization and 0 if they did not.
ME=Annual average change in manufacturing employment, 1979
to 1982.
S=Average size of plant in 1980.
CD=Costs of displacement.
j= Industry of displacement at the 3-digit Standard Industrial Code
level.
s=Local economy.
i=Individual.
The above independent variables were included because it was ex
pected workers in concentrated industries would be more likely to
negotiate advance warning clauses in labor contracts; unionized workers
would be more likely to be prenotified for the same reason; workers
in growing economies would be less likely to be prenotified because
employers feared they would leave early; and workers in large plants
were more likely to suspect or hear rumors about an impending closure.
The reduced form of equation (4) was estimated with a logit model,
since the dependent variable is dichotomous. PN, the probability a
worker was prenotified is, however, a continuous variable.
The results of the 2SLS estimation are reported in columns II, III,
and IV of table 5.5. While the results show the expected sign on PN,
the coefficient is still not significant. There is no evidence prenotified
workers experience smaller financial losses than non-notified workers.
One hypothesis is that prenotification only reduces financial losses
when workers are located in growing labor markets. This hypothesis
was tested by including interaction terms between prenotification and
local employment growth. Again, neither interaction term is signifi
cant, reinforcing evidence that prenotification does not reduce losses
to displaced workers (see table 5.6).
The only workers who appear to benefit from advance notice are those
who quit prior to layoff (see table 5.7). Table 5.7 reports the results
when only prenotified workers are included in the analysis and the dum
my variable PN is replaced with a dummy on prenotification and early
quit (PN&QT). The variable PN&QT is equal to 1 when a prenotified
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Table 5.5
Impact of Prenotification on the Reemployment Success
of Displaced Manufacturing Workers

Dependent
variable
Constant

II

Costs of
displacement

Costs of
displacement

-25502.95
(-.74)

-57391.72
(-1.28)
68168.21
(1.10)
14.73
(1.22)
5734.21*
(2.49)
-19963.67*
(-2.33)
-1525.10*
(-2.87)
-265.43
(-.82)
1422.35
(1.15)
27578.43*
(2.97)
15674.91*
(2.11)
-32.67
(-.13)
-16189.17*
(-1.96)
5.39
.25
191

PN

-8039.32
(-1.30)

AE

11.61
(1.00)

IE
YRLO
YRWKD
Age

3861.17*
(1.98)
-11512.52**
(-1.92)
-1267.87*
(-2.45)
-276.21
(-.88)

ED

1489.11
(1.21)

Sex

17277.56*
(2.65)
13388.16**
(1.86)

Race
BEN

22.87
(.09)

OCC

-9101.03
(-1.30)

F
R2
No. of observations

ra

I
Ordinary least
squares

4.81*
.22

196

iv

Two stage least squares

* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
( ) t-statistics.

Change in
nominal
weekly wage
-269.31
(-1.20)
360.91
(1.15)
.05
(.83)
28.20*
(2.43)
-109.05*
(-2.52)
-7.77*
(-2.89)
-1.30
(-.80)
8.67
(1.39)
129.34*
(2.75)
66.05**
(1.76)
.20
(-.15)
-75.20**
(-1.82)
4.93
.23
193

Weeks
unemployed
59.64**
(1.80)
-22.89
(-.49)
-.02*
(-2.03)
2.95*
(-1.77)
-6.77
(-1.07)
.65**
(1.75)
.11
(.48)
-.68
(-.80)
-3.77
(-.55)
-16.57*
(-3.02)
-.01
(-.03)
18.96*
(3.14)
5.62
.23
193
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Table 5.6
Impact of Prenotification on the Cost of Displacement,
Interaction between Prenotification
and Local Labor Market Conditions
(Two-Stage Least Squares)
Dependent
variable

Constant
PN*AE
PN*IE
AE
IE
YRLO
YRWKD
Age
Ed
Sex
Race
BEN
OCC
F
R2
No. of observations

I
Cost of
displacement

II
Cost of
displacement

-22997.85
(-.71)
1.66
(.01)
—
—
10.56
(.18)
4356.14*
(2.20)
-13194.87*
(-2.06)
-1426.01*
(-2.71)
-347.29
(-1.10)
1639.34
(1.33)
20362.53*
(2.87)
14238.92**
(1.94)
2.76
(.01)
-11352.34
(-1.59)
5.25
.24
191

-21597.12
(-.67)
—
—
-12881.59
(-.75)
12.21
(1.05)
13048.73
(1.10)
-14141.50*
(-2.31)
-1403.50*
(-2.67)
-334.68
(-1.06)
1503.66
(1.21)
21473.31*
(3.20)
14189.66**
(1.94)
10.95
(.04)
-12955.78**
(-1.77)
5.31
.25
191

* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
( ) t-statistics.
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Table 5.7
Impact of Prenotification and Early Departure
on the Reemployment Success of Displaced Manufacturing Workers
(Two-Stage Least Squares)
Dependent
variable

I
Cost of
displacement

II
Change in nominal
weekly wage

-10960.62
(-.28)
PN&QT
27311.08*
(2.30)
2.70
AE
(.20)
721.53
IE
(.32)
YRLO
-887.35
(-.12)
-1414.90*
YRWKD
(-2.32)
-170.96
Age
(-.45)
1379.52
ED
(.92)
Sex
28856.27*
(3.59)
4075.48
Race
(.49)
BEN
-364.78
(-1.21)
OCC
-3082.68
(-.34)
F
3.58
R2
.27
No. of observations
119
Constant

* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
( ) t-statistics.

-42.00
(-.21)
123.46*
(1.97)
-.01
(-.14)
4.18
(.35)
-15.37
(-.39)
-7.48*
(-2.34)
-.89
(-.44)
10.74
(1.38)
133.54*
(3.16)
2.28
(.05)
-1.92
(-1.22)
2.46
(.05)
3.03
.24
120

m

Weeks
unemployed
52.53**
(1.70)
-.21*
(-2.30)
-.02
(-1.43)
-1.81
(-1.03)
-15.55*
(-2.71)
.49
(1.03)
.18
(.62)
.71
(.67)
-3.63
(-.56)
-16.57*
(-2.44)
-.19
(-.80)
21.06*
(3.01)
4.70
.29
139
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worker left prior to the closing and 0 when a prenotified worker stayed.
As expected, workers who are prenotified and early quitters experience
smaller displacement losses by $27,311, smaller weekly wage losses
by $123, and shorter unemployment periods by .21 weeks (or one day).
These preclosing leavers are probably among the most reemployable
of the prenotified workers, and advance warning of the closing appears
to give many of them an opportunity to leave early. Since 9 percent
of displaced workers quit early after prenotification, compared to a quit
rate of 1.6 percent over the same period for all manufacturing, it ap
pears that many of the early quits are, in fact, a response to advance
notification (U.S. Department of Labor, 1981 and 1982). For workers
displaced in tight labor markets, an early departure from a job may also
decrease the competition for available jobs and improve workers'
reemployment chances.
Summary
We began this chapter by addressing three questions. (1) What im
pact does local labor market growth have on the readjustment of displaced
manufacturing workers? (2) Are there specific demographic groups who
experience large financial losses after displacement even when laid off
in growing labor markets? (3) What impact does worker prenotifica
tion have on the reemployment success of displaced manufacturing
workers?
The first two questions can be addressed using the coefficients reported
in column I, table 5.4 and several profiles of displaced workers. We
select a 50-year-old, white, male, blue-collar worker, displaced in 1979
or 1981, with a 12th grade education, who worked at that firm 25 years
prior to layoff, who is receiving the average UI compensation of $90.55
per week and is located in a labor market that lost an annual average
of 3,000 jobs in all sectors and 500 industry jobs. This worker would
experience an estimated financial loss of $52,000 in the five years im
mediately following layoff. The same individual in a labor market with
an expansion of 3,000 jobs in all sectors and 500 industry jobs would
have been only approximately $4,400 better off.
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Younger, blue-collar workers also experience financial losses in both
growing and declining labor markets. For example, a 25-year-old, male,
blue-collar worker, with three years committed to the firm prior to layoff
but with the same remaining characteristics as the individual in the declin
ing economy described above, would have lost approximately $16,000
as a result of displacement.
The losses for an older, white-collar male worker within the declin
ing economy and with the same characteristics described in case one
above would be approximately $42,000. However, the losses for young,
male, white-collar workers are small and may well be compensated for
by unemployment insurance and other benefits. For example, the losses
for the young, white-collar worker (25 years old, three years commit
ted to the job prior to layoff, with a 12th grade education) in the declining
labor market defined above, would have been an estimated $6,200.
The only women who appear to experience large losses are the older,
blue- and white-collar workers who committed many years to their
employer prior to layoff. These women appear to experience large losses
in both growing and declining labor markets. Young blue- and whitecollar women with at least a high school diploma appear to make the
transition to reemployment with little financial loss.
It should be recognized that the above losses and gains are rough
estimates. First, the estimates of displacement costs do not account for
wage increases once a worker is reemployed, nor do they account for
any wage increases or reductions workers would have experienced had
they remained on their prelayoff job. Second, the losses are
underestimated because they exclude losses in fringe benefits. Third,
the losses may be overestimated because they do not include unemploy
ment benefits or severance payments. The value of UI benefits varies
by state and the calculation of likely payments per worker is beyond
the scope of this study. However, a rough low estimate of the average
benefits paid would range between $2,272 and $3,024. 5 These benefits
would cancel the losses experienced by some, but not all, displaced
workers.
It should be noted that the model predicts only 22 percent of the varia
tion in the dependent variable. This result is, however, similar to the
results from other studies that predict the behavior of individuals. 6 Final-
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ly, it should be remembered that the population studied here is com
prised of workers displaced in large, relatively diversified local
economies. The personal financial losses attributable to displacement
may be much larger in small towns and rural labor markets where there
are fewer employment opportunities.
In summary, our findings indicate that while labor market conditions
influence a displaced worker's reemployment experience, the effects
of local labor market conditions are not sufficiently strong to overshadow
the impact of years worked prior to layoff and age, occupation, race
and sex. As a consequence, most blue-collar workers and mature whitecollar workers experience substantial financial losses after displacement,
even when displaced in an expanding local economy.
Finally, we did not find evidence that prenotification of layoff reduces
financial losses. This result may be due, in part, to the fact that only
about 9 percent of the workers in our sample who were prenotified left
their jobs prior to the plant's closure. While there is no evidence that
prenotification alone improves the displaced workers' income stream,
this should not be interpeted as an argument against advance notice
legislation. Prenotifiation gives workers a chance to adjust expenditures
in the face of upcoming losses in income, communities a chance to
establish job training and counseling programs to assist displaced
workers, and communities and workers a chance to seek alternatives
to the plant closing.
NOTES
1. Jacobson and Thomason (1979) and Holen, Jehn, and Trost (1981) tracked the difference be
tween the trajectory of prelayoff wages and reemployment wages and found that the gap did in
fact narrow over time. In contrast, Ruhm (1987) examined the persistence of wage losses for
involuntarily laid-off workers and found 42 percent did not experience any narrowing of the loss
after five years.
2. In all calculations where the present value of the unemployment experience is used, the sample
universe excludes the self-employed and workers who have dropped out of the labor force. The
self-employed are excluded because wages are not collected for this group. Workers who have
dropped out of the labor force are excluded because we cannot value their current wage at zero,
as we do with the involuntarily unemployed. These are individuals who may put a value on leisure
or other nonpaid productive work that exceeds the value of paid work in the labor force. This
group is most likely to include workers near retirement age; women, especially those with young
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children; and young workers who are returning to school. This group also includes discouraged
workers, who probably experience the largest financial losses from displacement. The costs of
displacement for those on the work-no work margin are probably low, whereas the costs of displace
ment for the discouraged worker are high. To the extent these two groups offset each other, there
should be no bias in CD as a result of the exclusion of workers who have dropped out of the
labor force.
3. Testimony by James Savoy, President Local Lodge 2689 International Association of Machinists,
before the U.S. Congress (1983).
4. The BLS does not report a quit rate for non-notified workers.
5. The average manufacturing worker was unemployed longer than 26 weeks, the maximum period
for receiving UI benefits under the state UI system. The average weekly benefits paid in all in
dustries was $89.68 in 1979 and $119.34 in 1982 (U.S. Department of Labor 1983, p. 208).
The above value is equal to the present value of 26 weeks of benefits at these levels. This is estimated
to be a lower bound on UI benefits because many displaced manufacturing workers are eligible
for extended benefits and because manufacturing wages are higher than the all-industry average.
Consequently, the average weekly benefits paid to manufacturing workers is probably higher than
the above estimate.
6. For example, in a regression equation with similar independent variables plus home owner
ship, Bendick and Devine (1981) reported an R2 of .02. Holen, Jehn, and Trost (1981) found
demographic characteristics of displaced workers explained only 20 percent of the variation in
wage losses one year after displacement. Clearly, variables other than the ones included here
influence the personal financial costs associated with displacement. Possible missing variables
are personal attributes of the workers.
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Appendix 5.1
Data Sources for the Labor Market Variables
Total Employment Growth, March 1979 to March 1982 data: U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, June 1980 and May 1983.
Industry Employment at 2-Digit SIC Code Level, 1977 to 1981 data: U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Supplement to Employment and Earnings, States
and Areas, Data for 1977-81, Bulletin 1370-16, September 1982. 1980-1983 data: U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Supplement to Employment, Hours
and Earnings, States and Areas, Data for 1980-84, Bulletin 1370-19, September 1985.
Manufacturing Employment, 1979 to 1982 data: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, table B-8, March 1980 and table B-8,
February 1984.
Mean Unemployment Rate, 1979 to 1982: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Employment and Earnings, June 1980 and May 1983.

Appendix 5.2
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Among Selected Variables
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Summary, Policy Implications
and Directions
for Further Research
This study of regional plant closure patterns in three manufacturing
industries and of the costs of displacement in all manufacturing was
designed to identify (1) where plant closures are most likely to occur,
(2) the causes of plant closures, and (3) the conditions under which plant
closure and worker displacement lead to large financial losses for the
displaced worker. Chapter 6 summarizes the major findings and their
immediate policy implications and reviews several directions for fur
ther research.
Data on the three manufacturing industries were extracted from the
Dun and Bradstreet Dun's Market Identifiers file for the years 1973,
1975, 1979, and 1982. The three industries include metal working
machinery (SIC 354), electronic components (SIC 367), and motor
vehicles (SIC 371). In total, there were approximately 54,000
establishments in the data set, representing a 100 percent sample of total
employment in the three industries as measured by the Census of
Manufactures. One strength of these data is that employment growth
can be disaggregated into components of employment change, including
employment growth due to plant start-ups, closings, net expansions or
contractions, and plant migrations.

Plant Closures and Regional Economic Growth
Three sets of findings are drawn from the analysis of the D&B data.
First, there is little regional variation in rates of plant closure. The range
(difference between the highest and lowest rate) is 2.3 percentage points
in metal working machinery, 2.9 percentage points in electronic com151
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ponents, and 2.8 percentage points in motor vehicles. Moreover, there
is no correlation between cross-regional rates of industry growth and
regional rates of plant closures.
In contrast, the regional variation in rates of employment gains due
to start-ups can be large and is highly correlated with cross-regional
differences in industry growth rates. In metal working machinery, growth
rates vary from -1.9 percent in the Mid-Atlantic to 9.5 percent in the
Mountain states, while start-ups range between 1.6 percent to 10.3 per
cent. In electronic components, growth rates vary from -2.6 percent
in the Mid-Atlantic region to 17.7 percent in the East South Central,
and start-ups in these same regions vary from 2.4 percent to 17.5 per
cent. Only in motor vehicles is the correlation between employment
change and start-ups weak, but this is primarily because there is very
little cross-regional variation in either of these statistics. Growth varies
from -2.9 percent in the Pacific to 1.3 percent in the East South Cen
tral, while start-ups vary from .5 to .3 percent in these regions.
It is clear that regions with slow growth have low start-up rates and
limited expansions. They do not have particularly high rates of plant
closures. Conversely, fast growth is due primarily to high start-up rates,
rather than to low rates of job loss due to closures.
These results are consistent with the findings of Birch (1979) of MIT
and Armington and Odle (1982) of Brookings, who reported similar
findings for manufacturing as a whole and other major economic sectors.
Second, we further tested the relationship between regional economic
growth and rates of plant closures in a model estimating the probability
of a closure during the period 1975 to 1982. The independent variables
included establishment size, age, status as a branch, subsidiary, head
quarters, or independent operation, and regional and interregional loca
tion. Few of the locational dummies were statistically significant, and
when they were significant they indicated the probability of closure was
higher for establishments located in fast-growing southern regions than
for those in the slow-growing or declining northern regions.
Third, we tested the view that relatively high production costs are
responsible for many plant closings by examining the effect on plant
closings of several local economic factors—the level and rate of change
of wages and utility rates, the level of taxes, the extent of unionization,
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the degree of import competition, and changes in product demand. We
also examined the effect of plant size and status as a branch, subsidiary,
headquarters, or independent. Because the data on local economic con
ditions are only available by Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(SMSAs), our sample was limited to plants in SMSAs.
We found status as a branch plant or subsidiary influences closures
in all three industries. A branch plant is 32 percent, 25 percent, and
16 percent more likely to close than is an independent in the metal work
ing, electronic components, and motor vehicle industries, respective
ly. Comparable statistics for subsidiaries versus independents in the same
three industries are 17 percent, 8 percent, and 11 percent. On the other
hand, independents and headquarters are equally likely to close.
When the economic variables are included in the equation, establish
ment size has a significant effect on closures in metalworking machinery
and motor vehicles, with larger plants closing at lower rates. But in
19 of the 21 tests, economic variables were shown to have no signifi
cant effect on plant closures. In two cases, there was a significant ef
fect but in the "wrong" direction. In the metalworking industry, low
wages and increases in local product demand were associated with an
increased probability of closure.
These conclusions contradict the results of some survey-based studies
that interviewed managers responsible for plant closures. For exam
ple, in Gainer's (1986) survey of 355 firms that closed a plant, 57 per
cent cited the high cost of labor as a major factor in their decision.
Schmenner (1982) discovered that 21 percent of managers attributed
their plant shutdowns to high labor costs and 10 percent cited labor
unions.
Two explanations for the inconsistency between our statistical results
and the findings of surveys are possible. One is that managers attempt
to exert downward pressure on wages in general, and in their other con
tinuing plants, by overstating the role that wage rates played in a closure.
The closure of a plant may be used as an opportunity to intimidate labor
and encourage workers to rein in their future wage demands. Another
possible explanation is that wages are a large portion of a firm's costs
and are especially noticeable when the plant falls on hard economic times.
High labor costs, rather than more subtle reasons for closure, such as
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the company's failure or inability to adopt labor-saving technologies,
find new markets, improve worker productivity, improve the quality
of the product in the face of competition, etc., may be blamed for the
closure.
The impact of unionization as a cause of plant closures also appears
to be exaggerated. Scholars from all political perspectives, as well as
business spokespersons, frequently attribute plant closures to justified
or unjustified demands by unions (see, for example, Bluestone and Harrison 1982). High wages, relatively generous fringe benefits, costly
strikes, and health and safety restrictions can all accompany a unioniz
ed labor force and supposedly reduce a plant's competitiveness. While
there is evidence that the small number of metalworking machinery plants
which do relocate tend to move out of unionized regions, there is no
indication that plants situated in a unionized labor market are more likely
to close than plants located in a nonunion area.
There are two theories for the relatively high closure rates of branch
es and subsidiaries. One theory argues that managers of multidivisional
firms and subsidiaries expect branches to yield higher rates of return
than is the case for single-plant entrepreneurs. This hypothesis is plausible
because multiplant firms have good information about which branches
and divisions are most profitable. Consequently, they can and do allocate
cash flow to the highest yield activities and phase out, divest themselves
of, and close the least profitable operations. In addition, multiplant firms
also have the expertise and staff to search outside the current product
line and locations for more profitable sites and ventures, again phasing
out less profitable activities.
In contrast, entrepreneurs operating single-plant firms have fewer in
vestment alternatives. They will be more likely, therefore, to keep a
plant operating when its profits fall below the rate at which a multiplant
firm would close down the operation. Nonpecuniary factors may also
play an important role. The small scale entrepreneur may enjoy runn
ing the company and is likely to live in, derive status from, and have
a commitment to the community where the business is located.
The second view also argues that plants are closed when profits are
inadequate, but in this model multiplant firms are responsible for the
low profitability of their branches and subsidiaries. One explanation
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of why profits are low in the long run is that corporations expend
resources on short-run paper profits, rather than on making the in
vestments needed to develop new products, find new markets, and im
prove production technologies. A second is that corporations frequent
ly acquire activities in which they have little operating experience. As
a result, a once profitable acquisition may be poorly managed, become
unprofitable, and ultimately be closed.

Policy Implications for Local Economic Development
Regardless of which explanation best fits a particular branch or sub
sidiary closing, the above results suggest that local takeovers of "un
profitable" branches and subsidiaries can be an option for keeping plants
operating and jobs in the community. This is a viable strategy because
(1) closures do not appear to be the inevitable consequence of local
economic conditions, and (2) local new owners may either be willing
to accept lower rates of return in exchange for community and job stabili
ty or be able to improve upon the previous management to establish
a satisfactory rate of return.
While there is little literature on local private takeovers of closing
plants, there is a burgeoning interest in employee takeovers. Evidence
on the profitability of existing employee-owned firms is encouraging.
A number of studies have compared profitability in employee-owned
firms and producer cooperatives with profits in privately-owned firms
in the same industry. Conte (1982) surveyed a number of these studies,
identifying their shortcomings. A number of difficulties in comparing
profitability in privately- and employee-owned firms arise. For exam
ple, profits in an employee-owned firm may be paid in wages and thus
not show up on the balance sheet as profits. Another difficulty with
such comparisons is that many successful employee-owned firms are
eventually taken over by private companies. As an employee-owned
firm's profits and stock values increase, currently employed workers
often cannot afford to purchase the stock of retiring employees. Rather
than sell stock at below-market prices, employees sell to private interests.
In other cases, successful employee-owned firms have gone public to
acquire expansion capital.
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Taking these difficulties into account, Conte concludes that the average
employee-owned firm is as profitable, if not more so, than the average
privately-owned firm in the same industry. Although experience with
employee-owned firms is still limited, several case studies indicate that
both improved efficiency and wage concessions, combined with new
management, are responsible for the successes (Bradley and Gelb 1985;
Whyte 1986; Washington Post 1985).
Rosen, Klein, and Young (1986, p. 27) of the National Center for
Employee Ownership estimate there have been 65 buyouts since 1971.
About 90 percent are still in business. Out of the 65 buyouts, 2 are com
ing out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, 4 have been profitably
sold to conventional businesses, and 5 have closed.
There are a number of policies the federal government can adopt to
facilitate local takeovers of closing establishments. One barrier to local
ownership is a lack of capital. Local banks are the major source of capital
for small business, and they are often reluctant to risk financing a
business that has a poor track record and a reputation for failure. In
the case of employee takeovers, many banks have also been reluctant
to make loans to an ownership form with which they are unfamiliar.
Moreover, if the closing operation is large, a local bank may not have
the resources to make the loan and still keep a diversified portfolio.
Federal loan guarantees of up to 80 percent of the value of a loan would
reduce the risk to banks and encourage banks to make the loans, leav
ing the banks with enough at stake to carefully evaluate the business'
viability. In a number of instances, federal loan guarantees have already
been critical factors in employee buyouts.
A second federal initiative that would facilitate local takeovers is man
datory prenotification of a closing. In order for workers and communities
to plan a buyout, they must have advance warning that the business
is closing. The chances for a successful takeover are much greater when
new owners can purchase an operating business. Once managers have
departed and ties with suppliers and markets have been severed, return
ing a company to profitability is difficult. In order to purchase opera
tions with markets and employees intact, local buyers must have time
to conduct feasibility studies and negotiate financing. While the length
of time necessary for planning a local takeover varies by the size of
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plant, case studies of worker buyouts of larger plants suggest that at
least 180 days are needed to negotiate and assemble financing (Stern,
Wood, and Hammer 1979; Whyte 1986; Logue, Quilligan, and
Weissmann 1986).
Federal initiative in this area is critical. States are reluctant to take
the lead in requiring prenotiflcation for fear of discouraging new in
vestment. With federal prenotification legislation as an umbrella, ex
isting state programs could improve their success rates.
The above findings also suggest state and local governments should
look critically at claims by the private sector that high taxes are driving
plants out of business or that tax concessions will put a plant operating
in the red into the black. We found no evidence that plant closures were
more frequent events in high-tax than low-tax areas. In fact, tax cuts
may adversely affect local development if the quality of the local in
frastructure and schools is diminished as a consequence. Similarly, utility
companies should avoid pricing policies that shift costs from manufac
turers to consumers as a job retention strategy, and employees should
be skeptical of wage concessions as a means of saving jobs. Where firms
demand such concessions, it is likely that companies are taking advan
tage of a strong bargaining position due to the need for local jobs to
wrest tax, utility rate and wage concessions from government, utility
companies and employees. While surely wage, utility rate, and tax reduc
tions will improve the profit performance of a particular plant, there
is no evidence that such policies alone will reduce local rates of plant
closures.
This conclusion on wage concessions is supported by other empirical
evidence. In a study of the tire industry, Cappelli (1985) found that
"virtually every one of the plants in which concessions were negotiated
in recent years eventually closed." The same author also argues that
firms are threatening shutdowns and engaging in concession bargain
ing when there is no danger of closing. For example, a poll of 619 large,
unionized employers found that 11 percent of the firms surveyed were
taking advantage of the fear of plant closures to demand employee con
cessions, even though the company did not need them to survive. In
1984, the Wall Street Journal also reported that a number of pro-
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fitable firms have used the threat of outsourcing and shutdowns to force
concessions from unions (Cappelli 1985, p. 101).
Two caveats should be added to these conclusions. First, our results
and policy conclusions only hold for the range of wages, taxes, utility
costs, etc., currently found across SMSAs. If a locality, for example,
were to raise tax rates substantially above the range of values tested
in this study, closure rates could rise. Second, although we found no
evidence that high wages, utility costs, and rates of unionization en
couraged plant closures, these conditions have been found to discourage
new investments in the form of plant start-ups and expansion. Conse
quently, the above policy conclusions should not be interpreted as a
suggestion that wages and other costs can be raised without adverse
impact on local economic growth.
Cross-Industry Variations in Plant Closures
Whereas plant closure rates do not vary much across the regions,
neither do they appear to vary substantially across industries. To the
extent they do vary at all, they are positively associated with industry
employment growth. The 1973-79 rate of job loss due to closures was
-3.0 in metalworking machinery, while the overall rate of national
growth was .2, according to the D&B data. In electronic components,
which grew at an annual average rate of 1.7 percent, the rates of job
loss due to plant closures was -3.9 percent. The comparable figures
for motor vehicles were -2.3 for closure and -2.4 for growth.
The result is similar for the 4-digit industries within these three 3-digit
industries. There was little variation in plant closure rates across in
dustries, after plant size and status are held constant.
We also explored the impact of imports on job loss due to plant closures
and found no evidence that plant closure rates are higher in industries
facing strong import competition. While clearly these conclusions are
limited to metalworking machinery, electronic components, and motor
vehicles, these industries vary widely in their rates of growth and
vulnerability to imports. For example, within motor vehicles (SIC 371),
imports in motor vehicle bodies (SIC 3711) grew by 8 percent per year,
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while truck body imports (SIC 3713) did not grow at all. Yet plants
in both industries were equally likely to close, after plant status and
location were held constant. Similar statistics characterize metalworking machinery and electronic components. Our findings are consistent
with unpublished data from the Brookings Institution's Small Business
Microdata Project. Brookings used the total D&B file and found that
cross-industry variations in manufacturing start-ups and expansions,
rather than cross-industry variations in closures, were responsible for
variations in industry rates of growth at the 2-digit level of industrial
detail.
Industrial Policy as a Strategy
to Assist Displaced Workers
The findings raise several questions about proposals to assist displaced
workers in declining industries. Import restrictions and government sub
sidies to declining industries are two proposed strategies in the ongo
ing debate on industrial policy and plant closing legislation. l The in
tention of industrial protection is to slow exits from the industry and
give firms time to diversify product lines or update their capital stock.
The responsiveness of start-ups to market growth suggests that govern
ment policies to protect an industry and increase market demand may
encourage new plant openings in the industry rather than reduce the
rate at which existing establishments are phased out. This will not aid
displaced workers unless the new jobs are created in the same labor
market where the plant closings occur. Given the current shift of new
investment to the Sun Belt, this outcome is unlikely. The textile industry
is an example where years of import protection helped textile companies,
but did not preserve jobs for New England's textile workers.
It should be noted, however, that these conclusions and policy im
plications are limited to workers displaced by plant closures and do not
extend to permanent layoffs in continuing plants. Permanent layoffs in
on-going establishments may be greater in import-affected and declin
ing industries, a question not explored in this study.
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Financial Costs of Worker Displacement
As stated above, plant closures occur at almost even rates across the
nation's regions. The issue of whether worker displacement is or is not
a national issue depends on (1) whether all displaced workers, even those
laid off in growing markets, experience large financial losses, or
(2) whether the losses in wages and long unemployment spells are prob
lems specific to dislocated workers in declining labor markets.
We used the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Current Population Survey—
Supplement on Displaced Workers to examine financial costs of worker
displacement. The survey identified workers who had been involun
tarily displaced from their jobs between January 1979 and January 1984.
Analysis of these data shows that workers displaced in local markets
with a growing demand for labor experience shorter unemployment spells
and smaller wage losses than workers laid off in weak labor markets.
However, most displaced workers, even those displaced in strong labor
markets, experience some financial loss in the five years after layoff.
For example, we found the average metalworking machinery worker
in a declining labor market experienced $17,182 in financial losses in
the five years after displacement. The average metalworking machinery
worker displaced in a growing labor market experienced an average
of $1,173 in financial losses. The equivalent figures for workers displac
ed from transportation manufacturing are $45,942 in declining and
$6,130 in growing labor markets, and for all manufacturing workers
the estimted losses are $31,298 for workers displaced in declining labor
markets and $19,759 for workers displaced in growing areas.
As anticipated, older and less-educated workers are hardest hit by
the permanent loss of their jobs, a finding consistent with numerous
other studies. Contrary to others, however, we found that women ex
perience smaller financial losses after dislocation than men. The losses
to a displaced woman, in the five years after layoff, were an estimated
$19,000 lower than losses experienced by a man of the same age, educa
tional attainment, race, and labor market. The difference in the male
and female postlayoff experience is explained by the tendency for women
to come closer to recouping their prelayoff wage, rather than by shorter
periods of unemployment for women than men. The smaller losses for
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women may be explained either by women's lower prelayoff wage,
which is easier than men's to duplicate, or the fact that women are more
likely than men to hold clerical jobs in the manufacturing sector, and
consequently to have skills valued in the growing service sector.

Policies to Assist Displaced Workers
Even with adequate legal provisions for employee prenotification and
assistance for employee ownership, many establishments cannot be made
profitable and jobs cannot be saved. The results presented above fur
ther emphasize the findings of many other researchers, which argue
for additional adjustment assistance to older workers, and for increas
ed investment in education to ease labor adjustments to economic change.
Assistance for older displaced workers may include phased-in early
social security payments, legislated early retirement benefits for older
workers, or extended unemployment insurance benefits. Because job
search skills for this group of workers are rusty at best, resume writing
and job search workshops have been proposed, along with support groups
or "job clubs" which offer displaced workers emotional support and
companionship during the adjustment to a new job or early retirement.
Efforts to promote formal education should also reduce the costs of
displacement. Programs to encourage young people to remain in school
before entering the workforce, to attend continuing education programs,
or to return to school after displacement, should also reduce the per
sonal and societal costs of displacement. The effort here should be on
reading, writing and analytical skills to complement the $30 to $50
million annual expenditures made by private industries for education
(Bendick 1983). Data from the displaced workers survey show that 10
percent of displaced workers have attended elementary school only.
Another 15 percent have attended high school but have not graduated.
Efforts should be made to facilitate additional education for these
workers, by paying unemployment insurance benefits to them while in
school, for example, and permitting tuition tax credits for those train
ing for jobs outside their current profession.
A final finding from these data is that workers who have advance
notice of a closure do not appear to experience smaller financial losses
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than workers who are caught by surprise. One explanation is that even
with advance notice, few workers leave prior to the plant closure. On
ly 9 percent of prenotified workers left before their layoff. As expected,
however, the prenotified early leavers experience the smallest finan
cial losses. While prenotification may not improve incomes, it does give
workers a chance to adjust expenditures in anticipation of a period of
reduced income, and, as argued above, gives workers and communities
an opportunity to explore the feasibility of a local plant buyout.
Directions for Further Research
The study of plant closure rates across regions and SMSAs has cast
doubt on a number of assumptions about the causes of closures, but
has provided little explanation of why plants close. Our ability to predict
where and why a plant will close is still limited. Future research might
focus on in-depth case studies of continuing and closing plants and
develop alternate and testable hypotheses.
A second area for further study is to look at plant closure patterns,
rates of job displacement, and the costs of layoff across industries rather
than regions. Contrary to accepted wisdom, we found that plant closure
rates in 4-digit industries were unaffected by the degree of import com
petition and industry growth. This finding is limited, however, by the
inclusion of only three 3-digit SIC code industries. Research which in
cludes data on all industries and tests the hypotheses with other data
sets can help establish the validity and generalizability of this result.
Analyses using all industries would also test our speculation that it
isn't until an industry's start-ups and expansions are very low, that losses
due to plant closures begin to increase and lead to further industrial
decline. Moreover, we did not consider the probability of layoff by in
dustry. While this study, combined with the results of the Brookings'
studies, suggests that layoffs are as likely in declining as growing in
dustries, this question cannot be carefully tested with the D&B data.
The D&B data only allow us to determine whether there was a job loss
and not whether that job loss is temporary or permanent.
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An across-industry study of the costs of displacement to workers is
a third area for study with potential policy implications. For example,
the results of such a study would be valuable in evaluating the Trade
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. TAA is designed to aid workers
displaced by increased foreign competition; the benefits are cash
payments made available after unemployment insurance expires. The
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, later modified in 1974 and 1981, deter
mined that workers were eligible for benefits where imports made an
important contribution to their separation from their jobs. The purpose
of TAA is not only to buy political support for trade liberalization, but
to assist workers believed to encounter the greatest reemployment bar
riers. An explicit assumption in the TAA program is that workers in
declining industries experience the largest losses from layoff, presumably
because they are the most likely to be laid off or, if laid off, the least
likely to find a comparable job.
Preliminary findings from this study indicate there is no simple rela
tionship between industrial decline and layoffs. The question remains
as to whether workers from declining industries experience larger finan
cial losses because of limited reemployment opportunities. One
hypothesis is that TAA is inequitable. Under TAA, a worker displaced
from an industry exhibiting national growth but local decline is not eligi
ble for assistance while a worker displaced from an industry exhibiting
national decline but local growth is eligible. The former may face greater
displacement losses and reemployment barriers than the latter, and yet
is not eligible for TAA.
Evidence arguing against industry-specific programs is provided by
Bendick and Devine (1981), who compared the length of the unemploy
ment spell of workers displaced from declining industries with that of
workers displaced from growing industries. They found that 12.1 per
cent of workers who had previously worked in growing industries were
still unemployed after 26 weeks, while only 10.7 percent of workers
displaced from declining industries were still unemployed after 26 weeks.
This pattern was reinforced with regression analysis, with the
characteristics of workers held constant. Working in a declining industry
had no statistically significant effect on the expected duration of
unemployment. One explanation for this result may be that the length
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of the unemployment spell is more sensitive to local industry growth
than national industry growth. This is an area for further work.
A fourth area for future research is in the study of dislocated workers
who migrate. One shortcoming of the data analyzed in chapter 5 is that
we could not determine where a dislocated worker who had moved liv
ed prior to the relocation. Consequently, it was impossible to deter
mine whether movers experienced smaller financial losses than stayers.
Another related task is to identify the demographic and social
characteristics of nonmovers in depressed labor markets. An answer
to these questions will be helpful in determining whether financial con
straints are a barrier to the migration of displaced workers and whether
relocation assistance is likely to ease the adjustment for displaced
workers.
A fifth and final direction for future research is to study the reemployment experience of workers in nonmetropolitan labor markets. Because
of the lack of information on the location of dislocated workers outside
of SMSAs, these nonmetropolitan displaced workers had to be eliminated
from this study. Data on the reemployment experience of workers
displaced in what are probably less diversified economies will broaden
our understanding of worker adjustments to job loss.
NOTE

1. See, for example, U.S. Congress (1983) the testimony by P.M. Lunni, Jr., Assistant VicePresident, Industrial Relations, National Association of Manufacturers, pp. 275-278.
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